Saving Soviet Democracy: A Russian Revolution Timeline

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Hello, some of you might recognise this timeline, for some of you this might be entirely new but the work has been on hiatus for an extended period of time. I got into a bit of writer's block and couldn't continue but I recently started up writing again and will soon be updating once more. I thought I would post on this forum as well so that folks can hopefully enjoy, maybe learn, and sometimes ask questions or offer critiques. For now, I'll be posting a few chapters a day until I reach the end of what I had initially posted. Without further ado, I'll begin with the original introduction to the work:


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Saving Soviet Democracy: A Russian Revolution Timeline

by GiantMonkeyMan

"Under the pitiless pelting of facts I have been driven to the conclusion that if Lenin and 18 other Bolshevik leaders had perished, events in Russia would have taken much the same course. The robbed and oppressed masses - a hundred millions of men and women - moved toward the goal of their long unfulfilled desires like a flow of molten lava that no human force can dam or turn aside." - E. A. Ross

"I have reached the end of the road and so, I'm afraid, has my sort of liberalism." - Prince Lvov

"I told them that it would be better to die with honour than to obey any further orders to shoot the crowds: 'Our fathers, mothers, sisters, brothers, and brides are begging for bread,' I said. 'Are we going to kill them? Did you see the blood on the streets today? I say we shouldn't take up positions tomorrow. I myself refuse to go.' And, as one, the soldiers cried out: 'We shall stay with you!'" - Sergei Kirpichnov

"Up to now, the entire great historical epic of the Russian social revolution has mistakenly been identified only with Bolshevism." - Isaak Shteinburg

"Now things will change. Now we are all: dictatorship of the proletariat. Dictatorship of those who were nothing the day before." - Victor Serge

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The events of the Russian Revolution and the Civil War that followed shook the world. A dynasty hundreds of years old was toppled in the midst of the most devastating war the world had ever known and hundreds of millions of people all across the former Russian Empire cried out for dignity, fairness, and a chance to control their own lives. I've been fascinated by these events for most of my adult life and more than that I've wanted to explore the events and the myriad of possibilities that could have occurred. For a brief moment, a barest shadow of time, the downtrodden and the wretched ruled a segment of the globe.

But it was only a glimpse of socialist democracy for a variety of reasons. Some perspectives proclaim the Bolsheviks entirely at fault, that they hungered for dictatorship from the start, and cared little for the whims of the masses. Some perspectives suggest that the Bolsheviks represented a revolutionary push towards socialism, that they channelled the frustrations of the working class into a concrete political programme, and that the forces of reaction and imperialism did everything in their power to strangle the revolution in its bloody birthing bed.

I won't pretend to have all the answers, although I obviously agree with the point that the poor masses were more autonomous and aware than many give them credit, they were not simply duped by Bolshevik machinations. I also agree that the Bolsheviks are, at the very least, partially responsible for the turn towards single-party dictatorship even if they were central to giving the masses a voice in the first place.

This timeline is an attempt to explore some of the possibilities of the Russian experience. There were more than just Bolsheviks involved at the most radical peaks of the revolution and at times the Bolsheviks held the masses back for fear of total collapse. This timeline aims at offering a plausible pathway towards the idea of a multi-party soviet democracy. I know that many will contest this as a possibility and so I aim to include quotations from things I have researched to better support the alternate historical ideas that I am positing.

I hope you all enjoy and comment. Also, thanks Cregan on ah.com for listening as I threw a load of ideas at you.
 
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Saving Soviet Democracy: A Russian Revolution Timeline
by GiantMonkeyMan
Chapter 1:

It is with a sense of slight irony that both Tsar Nicolas II and the central figure of the revolutionary Bolsheviks, Vladimir Lenin, reacted somewhat similarly to the events of the February Revolution. Nicholas had taken it upon himself to command the war effort from the headquarters in Mogilev but he was as distant and blind to the front as he was to the deteriorating conditions amongst the Russian populace and, upon receiving news of chaos in the capital from his Chamberlain on the eve of the February uprising, simply said, "That fat fellow Rodzianko has again written to me with all kinds of nonsense, which I shan't even bother to answer". Lenin, upon hearing the news of the February uprising proclaimed to his wife Nadezhda Krupskaya in their exile in Switzerland, "It's staggering! It's so incredibly unexpected!". The events, which seem so obvious in hindsight, took nearly everyone by surprise.

Both individuals tried to return to the capital as soon as they understood the news but only Lenin would be successful. The Tsar would find his decorated, gold-leafed, train diverted away from St Petersburg first for his own safety and then out of political convenience. He would spend the time after his abdication a living metaphor of his failed governance, unable to even return to his palaces for fear of what his presence might inspire in the populace. In bursts of revolutionary fervour, the workers and peasants across the Russian Empire would tear down the symbols of Tsarism, burn his portraits and topple his statues but he remained in a comfortable existence, still waited upon by loyal servants and attended by various sycophants.

The path back to Russia for exiled revolutionaries was less glamorous. Leon Trotsky, in exile in New York, attempted to get passage back on a ship via Canada. The British Government, keen to keep Russia in the war and thus occupy Germany on multiple fronts, arrested Trotsky as a 'pro-German' and absconded with him to a prisoner of war camp at Amherst where, according to his wife Natalia Sedova, he "kept speaking to the interned workers and sailors about the significance of the Russian Revolution. The prisoners took to him at once, which led to continuous conflict with the British officers". Miliukov and the other ministers of the self-appointed Provisional Government tried their best to keep the internationalist socialists from ever returning and upsetting the balance of power. Only continued pressure allowed the former Chairman of the 1905 Soviet to return - already the Provisional Government was powerless to the Soviet.

Nikolai Bukharin, who had also been in New York with Trotsky, returned on a more circuitous route, journeying across the United States and then taking passage across the Pacific. He was detained briefly in Japan where the authorities were unsure of what to do with a open revolutionary but eventually he made it to Vladivostock. The authorities of the area, controlled mainly by Mensheviks, arrested him on the grounds of 'internationalist agitation amongst the soldiers' but he would eventually be freed to begin his journey across the breadth of Russia on the Trans-Siberian Railway to the his old arena of struggle in Moscow. Victor Serge spent the opening months following the revolution in the midst of a general strike in Barcelona. Very much inspired by the events of Russia, the trade unions in Catalonia were calmly discussing the deposing of the monarchy where months before they were struggling to increase membership. Rebellion broke out in August of 1917 but was crushed after the massacre of hundreds of workers and Serge, and most of the other Russian exiles in Spain, attempted to return to their homeland through France.

The French Government, mirroring their British allies, did all they could to prevent undesirable Russian revolutionaries from returning. They had had their own sparks of rebellion with mutiny in Champagne and increasingly militant strikes and were doing all they could to prevent the collapse of their military ambitions. Serge even attempted to join the Foreign Legion, who had promised to take a force of Russian exile volunteers back to Russia to fight on the front, but to no avail. Like many, he was known to the French state for his views and all of the Allies were working in concert to prevent any Lenins or Trotskys disrupting the war effort in the East. Soon, Serge and the other Russian revolutionaries were seized from their Paris abodes and taken to a concentration camp in Sarthe. Eventually, after suffering near-starvation in the camps, Serge and his comrades were traded in a negotiated deal for some members of the French military mission in 1919.

Within Russia many anti-Tsarists and revolutionaries found themselves liberated upon the February Revolution. Kamenev, Sverdlov, Stalin and other Bolsheviks who had been forced into internal exile in remote corners of Siberia found themselves part of an intoxicated tide of revolutionaries drifting away from their former prisons back to the West and the centre of politics. Maria Spiridonova, the Social Revolutionary assassin who had been imprisoned in Siberia for a good eleven years, likewise found herself suddenly liberated. Such was the mood all across Russia that the local people of Chita elected her Mayor. Her first act: to blow up the prisons.

The exiles in Zurich were desperate to return, to make their mark on history, even as nearly all safe means were denied of them. The Menshevik Julius Martov attempted to contact the British Government and request to be allowed to return by ship but he was promptly denied. Lenin even fantasised about taking an aeroplane and flying over the front but such thoughts could only be entertained during the sleepless dark of night. Eventually Martov concocted a plan through an intermediary in the former social democrat, Alexander Parvus. A Russian-born German, Parvus had been active in the revolution of 1905 but soon after turned to making money through the sale of arms and only remaining on the periphery of the revolutionary community. A stalwart supporter of German nationalism, he had previously concocted a plan to cause chaos in Russia by funding several strike movements in the industrial heartland but his efforts found little traction. His links, both with the Russian social democratic movement and the German government, meant he was well-placed to help the Swiss socialists negotiate a deal to exchange the Russian exiles for German prisoners.

By all accounts none of the Zimmerwaldists, as they were known for their participation in an international peace conference of socialists in the Swiss municipality, could be certain of the intentions of the German High Command and certainly none trusted the word of Parvus, although Swiss socialist Fritz Platten was confident in the deal. The Russians would travel through Germany in a sealed train where they would then be transported to Sweden where they could cross the border to Finland. The train would not be literally 'sealed' but rather the passengers would be prevented from contacting any German citizen whilst travelling through the country. Lenin leapt at the opportunity but many of the other revolutionaries were more cautious. Eventually the Swiss social democrat Robert Grimm concluded that it was potentially a one time deal, convincing the Menshevik Martov and the Socialist-Revolutionary Mark Natanson to commit to the journey.

Karl Radek had stowed aboard the train in Switzerland with false papers declaring him an Austrian as the Germans refused to allow Polish revolutionaries through due to their occupation of Polish territory and their ambitions in that country and he had to hide amongst the luggage when German social democrats and trade unionists boarded the train in case they recognised him. The train quickly became separated into political sections with the Bolsheviks having occupied the carriages closest to the locomotive, as if it would get them to the revolution faster, and the Internationalist Mensheviks occupying the rear carriages with the Socialist Revolutionaries between them and members of the Jewish Bund and various independent revolutionaries dispersed amongst them all. They were crowded on all sides by German officers. The German military kept a tight perimeter and there were times the Russians feared they were going to be transferred to a prison. Martov and Lenin argued tersely and bitterly, long time rivals they made uneasy neighbours, but Radek describes the moment the tension fell away when in Frankfurt "suddenly the cordon was broken, as German soldiers came rushing up to us. They had heard that Russian revolutionaries, who were in favour of peace, were travelling through. Each of them held a jug of beer in both hands. Excitedly they asked us whether and when peace was coming."

The prospect of international revolution suddenly became more concrete. Lenin, who had told a gathering of Swiss socialist students before they had departed that he doubted he would see socialism in his lifetime, suddenly became even more convinced of the necessity for the working class and the soviets to seize power and immediately end the war and it was hard for Natanson not to be swept up in his fervour. Mark Natanson was an old revolutionary who had been struggling against Tsarism and for the socialist movement all his life. A Lithuanian Jew, he had helped found workers organisations during his time as a student in St Petersburg in the 1870's, before becoming involved in the Narodnik movement and being forced in and out of prison by the Tsarist state for his politics. This was the second time he had returned to Russia from exile following a revolution having been exiled prior to the 1905 revolution where upon returning he had taken up a position on the Socialist-Revolutionary Party's Central Committee.

The revolutionaries were greeted by scores of their allies once they had reached Finland. Lenin was bursting with prodigious energy and his immediate response upon gathering with Kamenev was to lambaste him, "What's this you're writing in Pravda?". Such was the greeting amongst old comrades. He was not alone in starting arguments with his fellow Party members. Martov was met by a delegation of Mensheviks and although their pleasantries were more cordial than Lenin's nonetheless the moment the conversation turned to politics their differences couldn't have been clearer. Martov was committed to establishing peace but many Mensheviks at this stage were dogmatically supporting the Provisional Government as the culmination of the bourgeois revolution, even in their execution of the war.

Nothing could be clearer to emphasise the break between the returning revolutionaries and their comrades at home than the scenes that played out at Finland Station in Petrograd. The Petrograd committee had arranged for the returning revolutionaries to be met by several thousand workers and soldiers and the Armoured Car division even displayed their vehicles in detail. Chkheidze, the Chairman of the Petrograd Soviet who was a Menshevik, came to meet Lenin who had been handed a bouquet of flowers which was cradled awkwardly in his arms. The old Menshevik greeted Lenin formally, if not warmly, and then concluding, "But – we think that the principal task of the revolutionary democracy is now the defence of the revolution from any encroachments either from within or from without. We consider that what this goal requires is not disunity, but the closing of the democratic ranks. We hope you will pursue these goals together with us." Chkheidze abruptly stopped speaking. Many of those gathered were dumbfounded by the conclusion of the speech, a tacit order for the Bolshevik leader to fall in line, but Lenin characteristically ignored him completely, turning away from the Soviet official to address the crowd.

"Dear comrades, soldiers, sailors, and workers! I am happy to greet in your persons the victorious Russian revolution, and greet you as the vanguard of the worldwide proletarian army. The piratical imperialist war is the beginning of civil war throughout Europe. The hour is not far distant when at the call of our comrade, Karl Liebknecht, the peoples will turn their arms against their own capitalist exploiters. The worldwide socialist revolution has already dawned. Germany is seething. Any day now the whole of European capitalism may crash. The Russian revolution accomplished by you has prepared the way and opened a new epoch. Long live the worldwide socialist revolution!"

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Rodzianko telegraphed the tsar.
'The situation is serious.' His warning sped along the wires by the railway lines, across the hard countryside to Mogilev. 'There is anarchy in the capital. The government is paralysed. It is necessary immediately to entrust a person who enjoys the confidence of the country with the formation of a new government. Any delay is equivalent to death. I pray God that in this hour responsibility will not fall upon the sovereign.'
Nicholas did not reply.
The next morning Rodzianko tried again. 'The situation is growing worse. Measures must be adopted immediately, because tomorrow will be too late. The last hour has come when the fate of the fatherland and the dynasty is being decided.'
At the High Command headquarters, Count Vladimir Frederiks, Nicholas' imperial household minister, waited politely whilst his master read the message unspooling from the machine. 'That fat Rodzianko has written me some nonsense,' the tsar said at last, 'to which I will not even reply.'
- October: The Story of the Russian Revolution by China Mieville

The imperial police denounced us to the British, probably as being "pro-German". In Halifax, Nova Scotia, the military authorities, who understood nothing of the events in Russia and who had nothing to say except the inevitable "There's a war on", put us all under arrest, despite our protests, and though our papers were in order
- The Life and Death of Leon Trotsky by Victor Serge and Natalia Sedova Trotsky

A sea passage in wartime was difficult to arrange, and the delay must have been frustrating. Trotsky sailed in March, Bukharin in early April. His emigration ended as it began; he was detained briefly in Japan, and upon entering eastern Russia was arrested ("for internationalist agitation amongs soldiers") by Mensheviks who controlled the area. In early May, he finally arrived in Moscow
- Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Biography, 1888-1939 by Stephen F Cohen

The camp’s regimen was reasonably fair, relatively free. The only trouble was that we were hungry. Spanish influenza was rife and death was our perpetual companion. An infirmary improvised in a ground- floor room held the dying, with those of us who had volunteered as nurses sitting up by them. They were left to wheeze and go blue, or else spotty like a panther’s skin, and then cold.. .What could we do? For my part I spent the night in the open, near the doorway of this stinking mortuary, getting up now and then to give a drink to some dying man. Our group did not have a single death: although we had nearly all been infected; our solidarity meant that we could eat better than the other poor devils. A quarter of the camp’s population was carried off in a few weeks; however, not one rich prisoner died. We looked after each other, refused to allow our sick to be taken to the infirmary- mortuary, and those who appeared to be completely gone—recovered. I learnt a few commonsense things about medicine: the essential treatment for the worst cases—food and comforting. Give them confidence: we won’t let you go, mate, hang on! During the epidemic we continued to assemble and conduct our studies. During one of the meetings, which I was holding purposely on that particular evening to distract the guards’ attention, one of our group tried to escape, under cover of a storm. He fell in the camp’s perimeter, under the livid glare of searchlights: “Twenty years old, and six bullets in his body,” it was remarked. On the following day we summoned the camp to revolt.
- Memoirs of a Revolutionary by Victor Serge

On 17 March he declared that the ‘only hope to get out of here is in an exchange of Swiss émigrés for German internees’. On 18 March he announced his own readiness to act, and invited any of his followers who wished to return, to contact him, declaring: ‘We must go at any cost, even through hell.’

In Russia the Foreign Minister, Miliukov, announced that any Russian citizen travelling through Germany would be subject to legal action. But nothing could deter Lenin from taking the only way open to him to get to revolutionary Russia. On 27 March a group of 32 Bolsheviks risked the route through Germany in a ‘sealed train’.

More than a month later Martov took his courage into his hands and followed suit. On 5 May he and a number of other Mensheviks, together with Natanson, the SR leader, Lunacharsky, Balabanova and Manuilsky, followed in Lenin’s footsteps. Altogether there were 257 passengers on this journey, including 58 Mensheviks, 48 Bundists, 34 Socialist Revolutionaries, 25 Anarcho-Communists, 18 Bolsheviks and 22 without party affiliation. On 7 June a third sealed train left Switzerland for Russia with 206 passengers, including 29 Mensheviks, 25 Bundists, 27 Socialist Revolutionaries, 26 Anarcho-Communists, 22 Bolsheviks, 19 unaffiliated, and 39 non-émigrés.
- Lenin by Tony Cliff

Here we have the POD: in OTL, Lenin goes on the train by himself with a small number of his fellows. In this timeline, the Socialist Robert Grimm, who was negotiating on behalf of the Mensheviks, convinced Martov that it could be their only opportunity. And so the 'sealed train' is a much larger, more packed, affair with more revolutionaries taking the risk including Mark Natanson of the SRs.

I think it was in Karlsruhe that Platten informed us that a member of the German trade-union leadership, Janson, was on the train, and that he brought us greetings from Legien and the German trade-union leaders. Ilyich instructed us to tell him to go to “the devil’s grandmother” and refused to meet him. Since Janson knew me, and since I as an Austrian was travelling as a stowaway, the comrades were afraid that it might become known that I was travelling with them. Clearly it was my fate from the very beginning to cause difficulties for comrade Chicherin in his diplomatic relations with Germany. So I was hidden in the luggage compartment and left with a supply of about fifty newspapers, so that I would keep quiet and not cause a scandal. Poor Janson was sent by Platten into the carriage of the German officers who were accompanying us. Despite this snub he showed great concern for us, bought the German newspapers for us at every station, and was offended when Platten reimbursed him for them.
- Through Germany in the Sealed Coach by Karl Radek

“Lenin walked, or rather ran, into the ’Czar’s Room’ in a round hat, his face chilled, and a luxurious bouquet in his arms. Hurrying to the middle of the room, he stopped still in front of Cheidze as though he had run into a completely, unexpected obstacle. And here Cheidze, not abandoning his previous melancholy look, pronounced the following ‘speech of greeting,’ carefully, preserving not only the spirit and voice of a moral instructor: ‘Comrade Lenin, in the name of the Petrograd Soviet and the whole revolution. We welcome you to Russia ... but we consider the that the chief task of the revolutionary democracy at present is to defend our revolution against every kind of attack both from within and from without ... We hope that you will join us in striving towards this goal.’ Cheidze ceased. I was dismayed with the unexpectedness of it. But Lenin, it seemed, knew well how to deal with all that. He stood there looking as though what was happening did not concern him in the least, glanced from one side to the other, looked over the surrounding public, and even examined the ceiling of the ‘Czar’s Room’ while rearranging his bouquet (which harmonised rather badly with his whole figure), and finally, having turned completely away from the delegates of the Executive Committee, ‘answered’ thus: ‘Dear comrades, soldiers, sailors and workers, I am happy to greet in you the victorious Russian revolution, to greet you as the advance guard of the international proletarian army ... The hour is not far when, at the summons of our comrade Karl Liebknecht, the people will turn their weapons against their capitalist exploiters ... The Russian revolution achieved by you has opened a new epoch. Long live the world wide socialist revolution!’”
- The Russian Revolution of 1917: A Personal Record by Nikolai Sukhanov
 
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Saving Soviet Democracy: A Russian Revolution Timeline
by GiantMonkeyMan
Chapter 2:

When Kamenev, Muranov, and Stalin returned to Petrograd from their Siberian exile, they turned Pravda away from the radicalism that it had been espousing under the tenure of Molotov and towards a far more moderate perspective. The Bolshevik organiser amongst the metal workers Alexander Shliapnikov wrote about the change in direction, "The whole Tauride Palace, from the business men in the committee of the State Duma to the very heart of the revolutionary democracy, the Executive Committee, was brimful of one piece of news: the victory of the moderate and reasonable Bolsheviks over the extremists. In the Executive Committee itself they met us with venomous smiles". Effectively, the leadership of the Bolsheviks before Lenin's return supported the Provisional Government and rejected the slogan of soviet power in favour of the liberal government, a decidedly dogmatic view that asserted, much in a similar manner as the Mensheviks, that the revolution must first complete its 'bourgeois stage'.

The first issues of Pravda under the new editorship that the workers and party activists in the factories were reading was a bewildering turn from the slogans of Lenin from when he was in exile and the radical editors like Molotov. Some Bolsheviks in the radical Vyborg district even called for the three's expulsion from the party. Bolshevik activist Ludmila Stahl claimed the party was "groping in the dark", virtually following behind the positions of the Mensheviks. Regardless, the whole of Russia was not yet at the same level as the Vyborg district or Kronstadt or any of the other centres of revolutionary elan. The provincial party groups followed the new Pravda line. When Alexandra Kollontai published Lenin's 'Letters from Afar', most of the party, particularly the leadership under Kamenev, were aghast but nothing could upset the apple-cart more than the return of the man himself.

Lenin's unabashed revolutionary sloganeering upon his return to Russia isolated himself amongst the political leadership of his own party and he faced ridicule from the key figures of both the liberal political organisations and his socialist peers. At a joint gathering of Mensheviks and Bolsheviks Lenin presented his April thesis to a hostile audience. The Mensheviks booed and the Bolsheviks were largely silent in disbelief. Only Kollontai offered her support, to the jeers of the audience. Lenin's position was one thing, he had always been considered an uncompromising sectarian by many in the Russian social democratic movement, and so his unwavering criticism and attacks on the Provisional Government, and his calls for soviet power, could easily be rejected.

The speech of Martov caused if not greater then an equally large stir. The old revolutionary had long been a rival of Lenin's and most of the Mensheviks expected his support in their attacks against the Bolshevik leader. To be sure, Martov wasn't as inflammatory as Lenin but he nonetheless criticised his fellow Mensheviks for their co-operation with the Provisional Government which was prosecuting what he considered Imperialist war for capitalist goals. Bogdanov cried out that Martov had been infected by Lenin's madness. The Socialist Revolutionary Zenzinov claimed, "Even their party comrades at that time turned away in embarrassment from them both". A layer of right-wing Bolsheviks left their party to join with the Mensheviks or the centre ground of the tiny group that surrounded Maxim Gorky and the newspaper he would form called Novaya Zhizn, and Martov and the left-wing Internationalist Mensheviks were increasingly isolated within their own party.

The various sections and factions of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party had always been fluid, particularly amongst the levels of the intelligentsia and the various exiled revolutionaries. Various groupings existed outside the two main parties such as the organisation surrounding Trotsky, the Mezhraiontsy, and the group around Gorky and members shifted depending on where the wind was blowing. Before Lenin's return, Kamenev and Stalin had even been entertaining reuniting with their old Menshevik rivals. All the same elements of division were found amongst the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. Even before the war the party had a myriad of factions but they solidified in the 'defencists', the right who thought Russia should be defended from German militarism with leaders such as Nikolai Avksentiev and Avram Gots and peripherally the transient Kerensky, and the 'defeatists' who advocated an immediate end to the war at all costs, the left who found its voice in Mark Natanson, Maria Spiridonova and Boris Kamkov.

The workers, soldiers, and peasants rarely understood the different factions clearly although it cannot be said that the middle classes or the intelligentsia had a much clearer understanding either. It was a tumultuous time and all of Russian society was divided. Early in 1917, the Left SRs distanced themselves from their central committee by openly working with the Bolsheviks. Ultimately, the divisions and ruptures amongst the various party organisations in the nation was echoed by the increased tempo and radicalism of the marches and strikes during April. Early in April there was a demonstration of soldiers' wives in Petrograd. They broke into homes to confiscate any luxury they felt was not deserved and the authorities were paralysed to stop them. On April 18th by the old calender, or May 1st by the new calender, all the cities and provinces throughout Russia came to a standstill as the masses marched for the International Workers Day under a strange mix of banners, some professing proletarian internationalism whilst others a revolutionary patriotism and support for the Provisional Government.

In the provinces, peasants were beginning to ignore the estate boundaries to fell trees for firewood or timber, argue with their landlords over rent and harvest, and the sparks of peasant organising were becoming more radical. Throughout it all there was a growing sense amongst the poorer classes that they demanded 'fairness'. Peasants refused to pay extortionate prices for seed, taking what they needed and leaving only the money they felt the merchants deserved, workers struck for higher wages, better conditions and respect from the management, and soldiers demanded that their officers no longer call them by familiar terms and refused any order that their committees voted against. Over a hundred illiterate peasants from the Rakalovsk Volost had a scribe write their demands to the Petrograd Soviet, "cabinet, appanage, monastery, church, and major estate owners' lands must be surrendered to the people without compensation, for they were earned not by labour but by various amorous escapades". Soldiers of the 2nd Battery Assembly wrote to Chkheidze decrying their own lack of education and asking if he could send them books with which to learn.

On the day of America's entry into the war, Pavel Miliukov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Provional Government and the leader of the liberal Kadet Party, explained the aims of his administration to an assembly of journalists. One the one hand he professed the rights of nations to self determination but on the other he advocated the seizure of Armenia, the seizure of Constantinople, the division of Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire. Chekheidze called Miliukov the "evil genius of the revolution" and the Menshevik press called on the Provisional Government to conduct only a defensive war. Various demonstrations were had in response to the news. The Kadets arranged a march with banners proclaiming "Long Live Miliukov!" and "Full Confidence in the Provisional Government!" but regiments of soldiers, led by the politically unaligned Fedor Linde, marched on Mariinsky Palace, where the Provisional government met, demanding peace.

The soldiers were condemned by the Soviet Executive, much to the dismay of Linde, but the mood had been struck and thousands of workers and soldiers pooled out onto the streets with placards tellingly proclaiming "Down with the Provisional Government!". Although the Menshevik press and their Central Committee deferred to the Soviet Executive and cautioned patience, Martov's vague statement of condemnation for Miliukov's suggestion of annexations and an offensive war reached many sympathetic ears. Cautious due to his political isolation immediately following his return, Lenin and the Bolsheviks had a similarly vague motion and although the radical Bolshevik membership in Vyborg and elsewhere were emboldened by the demonstrations, they nonetheless deferred to Lenin. Regardless, soldiers marched against the war and against the Provisional Government in the tens of thousands in Petrograd and Moscow.

The Executive of the Soviet issued a directive against any unauthorised soldiers in the streets and General Lavr Kornilov attempted to assemble his own troops to quell any rebellion. The soldiers ignored Kornilov's orders and instead deferred to the Soviet. The demonstrations wound down but it had little to do with the authority of the Provisional Government and their Generals. Lenin proclaimed the slogan "Down with the Provisional Government" an empty phrase unless they had the Soviet with them in agreement of their policies. Absent the backing of the Soviet, and therefore the working masses, such slogans amounted to an attempt of "an adventurist character". The Lenin of immediate revolution to bring power to the Soviets, who had been called the second coming of the anarchist Bakunin by Goldenburg, a Menshevik who had only recently crossed the divide from the Bolsheviks, had been tempered upon his return to a Russia divided but the prospect of soviet power became a more serious question and the Bolshevik leadership was dragged leftwards by the events.

The vivid 'April Days' might have been over in the major cities but across Russia the masses were stirring. The Buddhist Buryats of Siberia, granted political freedoms by the February Revolution, convened in a Congress in Irkutsk and proclaimed their independence. In Ossetia, the locals in that mountain region established their own organs of self-rule. Workers and peasants soviets and Islamic Councils following the socially liberal Jadidist traditions competed across the Muslim Central Asian states, virtually dismantling the old government structures. Delegates gathered in Kazan for an All-Russian Muslim Women's Congress where 59 delegates met before hundreds of a primarily female audience to debate Sharia Law, polygany, and women's rights, voting to approve women's right to vote, the equality of sexes, and the non-compulsory nature of the hijab.

The hated Guchkov, the Minister of War, and Miluikov resigned on April 29th with one of Miluikov's last acts to be pressured into intervening to see the release of Trotsky from British imprisonment. The Provisional Government, recognising its own weaknesses and lack of authority, called, in not so many words, for open collaboration with the Soviet. To many of the workers and soldiers who were not hostile or suspicious to the Provisional Government, like the Bolsheviks or the Anarchists, a coalition government of socialists and capitalists was seen as a step forward but on the same day as the Ministers' resignations the Executive Soviet voted narrowly against coalition. Nevertheless, the right SRs, and even those who had traditionally been considered on the left such as Victor Chernov the champion of the peasantry, began drifting towards the idea of a coalition government.

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The situation in Petrograd became far more difficult for Molotov after 12 March, with the return from exile of Lev Kamenev, Stalin and Matvei Muranov, all Bolsheviks senior to him and Shlyapnikov. The latter alleged that the new arrivals introduced disagreement and ‘deep organisational frictions’ into the leading party bodies, and in particular that they launched an attack on Pravda and its editors. Molotov, who believed that Stalin and the other senior Bolsheviks were mistaken in their policy, was temporarily replaced on the Executive Committee of the St. Petersburg Soviet, but attempts to adopt a more moderate line towards the Provisional Government were resisted by the Russian Bureau. On 12 March, when Molotov led the opposition to Stalin’s candidacy, the Bureau imposed strict conditions on Kamenev, and granted Stalin only non-voting membership, because of ‘certain personal characteristics’. At the same meeting, G. I. Bokii, Molotov’s nominee, was accepted (five votes for, one against, with two abstentions), and Molotov was in the van of those who resisted pressure from the moderates to co-operate with the Provisional Government. At the next meeting, the membership of Stalin and Zalutskii was accepted, but only because Molotov and Shlyapnikov had been promoted to a newly created Presidium. These manoeuvres can have done nothing to improve relations between Stalin and Molotov.
- Molotov: A Biography by Derek Watson

On the following day Lenin came with his own armed escort to the Tauride Palace and presented his Thesis to a stunned assemble of the Social Democrats. He had turned the Party Programme on its head. Instead of accepting the need for a 'bourgeois stage' of the revolution, as all of the Mensheviks and most of the Bolsheviks did, Lenin was calling for a new revolution to transfer power to 'the proletariat and the poorest peasants'. [...] But the sheer audacity of his speech, coming as it did at a joint SD assembly for the party's reunification, ensured a furious uproar in the hall. The Mensheviks booed and whistled.
- A People's Tragedy by Orlando Figes

"From the 7th to the 12th [of May], the Mensheviks held their first All-Russian Conference in Petrograd - midway through which, their left leaders Martov, Axelrod and Martynov arrived to join them. Martov was appalled by what he described to a friend as his party's 'ultimate stupidity' of joining the government, without even extracting a commitment to end the war.
- October: The Story of the Russian Revolution by China Mieville

We can discern from Martov's OTL later return to Russia, in addition to his telegrams and letters to his comrades from abroad, that he would have been a controversial figure amongst the Mensheviks, particularly if he arrived in the midst of Lenin's radical April Thesis. The response to his Thesis caused Lenin to mitigate some of his policies and make concessions to the 'Kamenevists', Martov, in this timeline, is similarly confronted with attacks.

Before 1914, the neo-populist Socialist Revolutionary party was already divided into rightist and leftist factions, but the First World War sparked a widening schism between defencists and defeatists. In early 1917 Left S.R.s distanced themselves from their own central committee by openly allying with other leftists, in particular the Bolsheviks. During the revolutionary year Left S.R. and Bolshevik programmes shared much in common.
- The Council of People’s Commissars as Bolshevik-Left Socialist Revolutionary coalition government, December 1917–March 1918 by Lara Douds

On April 17 there took place in Petrograd the patriotic nightmare demonstration of the war invalids. An enormous number of wounded from the hospitals of the capital, legless, armless, bandaged, advanced upon the Tauride Palace. Those who could not walk were carried in automobile trucks. The banners read: “War to the end.” That was a demonstration of despair from the human stumps of the imperialist war, wishing that the revolution should not acknowledge that their sacrifice had been in vain. But the Kadet Party stood behind the demonstration, or rather Miliukov stood behind it, getting ready his great blow for the following day.

At a special night session of the 19th, the Executive Committee discussed the note sent the day before to the Allied governments. “After the first reading.” relates Stankevich, “it was unanimously and without debate acknowledged by all that this was not at all what the Committee had expected.” But responsibility for the note had been assumed by the government as a whole, including Kerensky. Consequently, it was necessary first of all to save the government. Tseretelli began to “decode” the note, which had never been coded, and to discover in it more and more merits. Skobelev profoundly reasoned that in general it is impossible to demand “a complete coincidence of the aims of the democracy with that of the government.” The wise men harried themselves until dawn, but found no solution. They dispersed in the morning only to meet again after a few hours. Apparently they were counting upon time to heal all wounds.

In the morning the note appeared in all the papers. Rech commented upon it in a spirit of carefully prepared provocation. The Socialist Press expressed itself with great excitement. The Menshevik Rabochaia Gazeta, not yet having succeeded like Tseretelli and Skobelev in freeing itself from the vapours of the night’s indignation, wrote that the Provisional Government had published “a document which is a mockery of the democracy,” and demanded from the Soviet decisive measures “to prevent its disastrous consequences.” The growing pressure of the Bolsheviks was very clearly felt in those phrases.
-The History of the Russian Revoltion by Leon Trotsky

In 1917, a years of revolutionary change in the Russian Empire, Muslim women organised a congress in order to propose and debate resolutions that they hoped would be in encorporated into Russia's new constitution. Transcripts from the April Congress in Kazan provide evidence that participants sharply disagreed over whether polygyny should be permitted, limited, or abrogated, and the used these debates to articulate their own understanding of rights. While women religious scholars pursued efforts to reread the Qur'an in order to emphasize justice, other educated Muslim women favoured historicizing the Qur'an to argue that equality and justice for women in the twentieth century would differ from justice in the time of the Prophet.
-Debating Sharia: The 1917 Muslim Women’s Congress in Russia by Marianne Kamp

The conduct of the Bolshevik Party during the April days was not uniform. Events had caught the party unprepared. The internal crisis was just being wound up, and busy preparations were going on for the party conference. Impressed by the keen excitement in the workers’ districts some Bolsheviks expressed themselves in favour of overthrowing the Provisional Government. The Petrograd Committee, which on March 5 had been still passing resolutions of qualified confidence in the Provisional Government, wavered. It was decided to hold a demonstration on the 21st, though its purpose was still insufficiently defined. A part of the Petrograd Committee were bringing the workers and soldiers into the streets with the intention not very clear, to be sure – of attempting, so to speak incidentally, to overthrow the Provisional Government. Individual left elements standing outside the party acted in the same direction. There was apparently also an anarchist element – not numerous but bustling. The military quarters were approached by individual persons demanding armoured cars or general reinforcements, now for the arrest of the Provisional Government, now for street fighting with the enemy. An armoured car division close to the Bolsheviks declared, however, that they would give no machines to anyone except by order of the Executive Committee.

The Kadets did their best to place the blame for the bloody encounters on the Bolsheviks. But a special committee of the Soviet established beyond a doubt that the shooting had started, not in the streets, but from doorways and windows. The newspapers published an announcement from the Public Prosecutor: “The shooting was done by the scum of the population for the purpose of arousing disorders and disturbances – always useful to the criminal elements.”
- The History of the Russian Revolution by Leon Trotsky
 
I know its just reposting the old chapters, but I'm glad to see this nonetheless. Not sure what to say or ask that I haven't already done back in the SV thread, so I'll just repeat that it's nice to see a relatively more positive (at least I think that's the direction things are ultimately headed?) future for leftist causes...that doesn't amount to a US-wank.
 
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he/him
I know its just reposting the old chapters, but I'm glad to see this nonetheless. Not sure what to say or ask that I haven't already done back in the SV thread, so I'll just repeat that it's nice to see a relatively more positive (at least I think that's the direction things are ultimately headed?) future for leftist causes...that doesn't amount to a US-wank.
Unfortunately, the plan is to end it with the Whites winning the civil war. It's a complete fake-out! Honest.

Once I get through the old chapters, I'll have a new one as well - I know you've been a long time reader and thanks for your continued support.
Yeah I'm glad to see that here too! Your work is amazing!
Thanks Nyvis, you've been a great help going over some of my stuff and letting me articulate how I want to convey certain things. At least some of my confidence to post this has been down to yourself!
 
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Saving Soviet Democracy: A Russian Revolution Timeline
by GiantMonkeyMan
Chapter 3:

On the 16th of May, the Kronstadt Soviet declared that it would no longer be accepting the authority of the Provisional Government, in effect it declared 'All Power to the Soviets'. After the tumultuous events of April, the numbers of sailors at the naval base who were Bolsheviks surged with the party recruiting nearly 3,000 at the start of May. The sailors rejected the Provisional Government appointed Commissar, debated upon new laws, and completely snubbed their officers' and the central government's authority. Two days before, Leon Trotsky had given a speech to the Kronstadt sailors declaring that "You are ahead and the rest have fallen behind". Unlike the Bolsheviks of Petrograd, who cautioned their new comrades against premature action and criticised them for lacking party discipline, Trotsky and his Mezhraiontsy welcomed every blow to the Provisional Government and worked to sever the collaboration of the Soviet with Prince Lvov's new cabinet of ministers.

The Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary leaders of the Soviet, in the midst of the chaos of the April Days, still deferred to the Provisional Government and the Soviet Executive Committee, at the beginning of May, voted in support of the principle of coalition. Martov was furious and criticised the move as "impermissible" but found himself alone with the small left-wing of the Mensheviks that he had gathered about himself. Similar protest was made by the left-wing of the SRs, active in the most tumultuous and radical regions of Russia, but they too were isolated within their party. The SR newspaper, controlled by the right, declared that rejecting support for the Provisional Government was "rendering indirect support to Leninism". For the leftist critics, the choices borne out of the April Days was one of either soviet democracy, spearheaded by the socialist parties, or liberal dictatorship, under the purview of the Kadets and the Generals. This middle path of conciliation with the capitalist parties satisfied no-one, particularly given the Coalition's acceptance of the necessity of the war, its failure to set a date for the Constituent Assembly elections, and its lukewarm commitments to land reform and workers control.

Miliukov, the leader of the Kadets, became the scapegoat of the naked ambitions of the liberal bourgeoisie and the Coalition ejected him quickly from the talks to better distance themselves from the unpopularity of the war. Nonetheless, whilst there would no longer be talk of annexations, the Provisional Government was set on the continuation of their commitments to France and Britain. Prince Lvov was to remain Prime Minister of the Coalition and a majority of the fifteen cabinet positions were taken in the hands of Kadets or the conservative Octobrists with six positions being appropriated by the 'Socialist Ministers', Kerensky, Chernov, Tsereteli, Peshekhonov, Skobelev and Pereverzev. Although they perhaps had the power to demand more, the socialists wanted to remain in the minority, only backing the liberal government instead of controlling it entirely. Gots, the leader of the right wing of the SRs, claimed "there need be no apprehension in connection with the socialists joining the coalition Government" and that Victor Chernov's role as Minister of Agriculture would bring about the slogan 'land and freedom'. Considering the larger controlling parties of the Kadets and Octobrists were completely against land reform whilst the war was still on, it was a bold statement. Kerensky was the new Minister of War and set about his business, colluding with General Brusilov on the prospects on the front.

On the last day of the coalition negotiations Leon Trotsky finally returned to Petrograd, long delayed due to his incarceration by the British. At Tornio, at the border between Sweden and Finland, all of Trotsky's writings and papers were seized for 'examination' by the over-zealous border officers with the promise that they would be returned to him. Almost prescient, the only address Trotsky could give the officers to send the papers to was to send them to the Presidium of the Petrograd Soviet. They were met by a crowd of comrades under red banners but his family was penniless and they had to stay with an old friend, an engineer named Serebrovsky who had once taken part in the street battles of the 1905 revolution but had since turned to the right of the socialist movement.

In Tauride Palace, the Soviet gathered in a plenary session where the six Ministers (three Socialist-Revolutionaries, two Mensheviks, and Peshekhonov of the Populist Socialist Party now in charge of food distribution) asked for support for their new roles. The faction of the Mensheviks around Martov voted against the measure, as did the left wing of the SRs, small in number though they both were, but only the Bolsheviks were united in condemnation. Despite this, it was clear the measure would pass and Coalition was the word of the day. It was to this crowd, vibrating with a restless energy and severed down the middle by the vote, that Trotsky stepped up to give a speech. "I cannot conceal that I disagree with much that is going on here". An agitator through and through, he cut to the core of the issues and the Soviet Executive found themselves with another vibrant critic.

It was between the 7th and the 12th that the Mensheviks held their first All-Russian Conference in Petrograd. It quickly became a battleground between the Mensheviks declaring for the Provisional Government and their party's involvement in the cabinet and the left wing faction around Martov. Irakli Tseretelli, the Minister of Post and Telegraph, a ministry newly formed out of the ashes of April entirely to allow Tseretelli to join the government, led the offensive against the left. Martov could hardly open his mouth to begin a speech before the crowd heckled and booed. Yuri Larin, a Menshevik with links to Trotsky's Mezhraiontsy, put forward to Martov the idea of a split and, in the atmosphere and politics of his party, Martov felt compelled to agree.

Martov met with Trotsky, two titans of the Social Democratic movement in Russia. They had been allies and rivals throughout their time as revolutionaries, they had both edited the Russian exile newspaper Iskra with Lenin and Plekhanov. Now they found themselves aligned, both vehemently against the war and the participation of socialists in the coalition government and both unwilling to submit to the locomotive that was Lenin in the Bolshevik Party. Gorky dismissed them both as "scoundrels" but they were scoundrels united in their cause and soon Trotsky's tiny Mezhraiontsy were merged with Martov's faction to form the Socialist-Internationalist Party (Sotsialistichesko-Internatsialisticheskaya Partiya). It remained small but its members were well recognised, the great orator Trotsky, the diligent Martov, the clever Lunacharsky, Uritsky, Larin, Riazanov, Joffe. Where they lacked the depth and spread of the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, they made up for it with their powerful profile and plethora of well-known revolutionaries.

Kerensky, in his role as Minister of War, published the document 'On the Rights of Soldiers' on the 11th which retained much of the content of Order Number 1 of the Soviet but crucially reinstated the authority of the officers. He was setting out to rally the army for an offensive, in line with the aims of the Provisional Government's foreign allies. “The Coalition Government in Russia is for us the last, and almost the only, hope for salvation of the military situation on that front” proclaimed the British Ambassador George Buchanan. According to General Brusilov, around three quarters of the officers couldn't adapt to the new situation, they were offended by the soldiers committees and continued using the hated familial forms of address when talking to the soldiers. General Gurko, an advocate of the Black Hundreds, said to Kerensky at a meeting, "You say the revolution is continuing. Listen to us. Stop the revolution, and let us, the military, do our duty to the end".

On May 16th, the same day that the sailors of Kronstadt were declaring their rejection of the Provisional Government, the Bolsheviks moved a resolution at a joint meeting of the Moscow Soviet of Workers’ Deputies and the Soviet of Soldiers’ Deputies declaring that by joining with the Coalition the socialist Ministers "had placed themselves outside the ranks of the fighting world proletariat". Again the left wing of the SRs voted with the Bolsheviks and this time the Socialist-Internationalist Party also stretched their influence. By a hair's breadth, the supporters of the Provisional Government held on. Radical sentiment was gripping many sections of the working class and the soldiers. In the Vyborg district of Petrograd where the radical Bolshevik workers hosted the ten thousand men of the First Machine Gun Regiment, a highly trained and literate regiment that had been swept up by Bolshevik sentiment, talk began of arranging an armed demonstration of soldiers and workers in June.

Multiple Soviets proclaimed their disagreement with the Coalition. The Yekaterinburg Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers Deputies called on those they represented "to make ready for the transition of power to the labouring people”. In Helsinki, in Riga, and in many other Soviets in which the Bolsheviks, the Left SRs, or the SIP held influence similar resolutions were passed. Overall, the majority of Soviets supported the Coalition and the right wing socialists held supremacy. Revolutionary defencism, the policy of patriotic defence of the revolution from German militarism, still held sway over large swathes of the workers and peasants. In contrast, the soldiers were quickly moving away from the moderate socialists and the prospect of a continuation of the war.

The Provisional Government and the officers were desperate to scrounge up support for the offensive. A number of patriots, primarily of the propertied middle class, were convinced to contribute to Liberty Loans to fund the prospective advance and the President of the Free Economic Society declared it "the duty of everyone to the Motherland, to his fellow citizens and the future of Russia, to give his savings for the great cause of freedom". Middle class civilians volunteered for shock battalions, formed to raise morale but more regularly composed of former officers ejected from their regiments by the soldiers committees. The Women's Battalion of Death was organised by Maria Bochkavera. The idea had been to inspire the male soldiers through shame but instead it was taken as proof of the Provisional Government's desperation.

Kerensky toured the front in an attempt to whip up the morale of the troops assembled. His speeches hypnotised the soldiers that he met, they carried him on their shoulders, kissed his uniform and the car he had arrived in, and prayed for his good health. He became convinced of the eagerness of the army to advance and his own charismatic ability. Wherever he went it appeared as if the soldiers were fully behind him but outside of these meetings, which were mainly composed of officers and well-off patriots, the poor soldiers were less eager. Brusilov, who had been key to convincing the Provisional Government, and Kerensky, of the possibility of the offensive, soon began to have doubts. He snubbed his officers and attempted to present himself to the soldiers as 'one of them' but he was a poor orator and failed to be convincing, only ending up frustrating the officers and alienating the soldiers. On one occasion, he talked about the German advance into France causing great destruction to vineyards that produced champagne to which one particularly frustrated soldier cried out, "Shame on you! You want to spill our blood so you can drink champagne!"

All throughout the end of May the Bolsheviks and the Socialist-Internationalists were fighting their own battles on a different front. On the 30th of May, the First Conference of the Petrograd Factory Committees opened. Initially, the factory committees were relatively moderate and the Mensheviks held great authority in the trade union leadership, but swiftly, as social tensions increased, the committees themselves swung left. Representing 367 committees and 337,464 workers, nearly 80% of the workers in Petrograd. The debate was around the issue of state control by the Provisional Government, supported by the Mensheviks, or workers control, supported by the Bolsheviks, the SIP and the anarcho-syndicalists. The resolutions called on "complete regulation of production and distribution of goods by the workers". The factory committees in Kharkov were even more radical than in the revolutionary capital, proposing that the committees should seize the factories outright immediately.

Everywhere there was a major concentration of workers, the best orators gave speeches to packed crowds. Sverdlov, Volodarsky, Trotsky, Shliapnikov, and countless others put forward their position: no to the offensive, no to collaboration with the capitalist government, an end to the war, and workers control of the factories. The message resonated. Workers unhappy with their delegates at the Soviet recalled them on over two hundred occasions. The Military Organisation of the Bolsheviks was to the left of the main party structures and began discussing the prospect of an armed demonstration against Kerensky's offensive during the beginning of June when the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets and Soldiers Deputies was scheduled. Chernov proclaimed “The offensive does not concern me, a man of politics; that is a question for the strategists at the front" but the Socialist-Revolutionary had forgotten the old maxim that war is just politics by other means.

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The Kronstadt sailors were young (half of them below the age of twenty-three), almost all of them were literate, and most of them were politicised by the propaganda of the far-left parties. By the start of May the Bolsheviks had recruited over 3,000 members at the naval base. Together with the Anarchists and the SRs they controlled the Kronstadt Soviet. On 16 May the Soviet declared itself a sovereign power and rejected the authority of the Provisional Government and its appointed Commissar at the naval base. It was, in effect, the unilateral declaration of a 'Kronstadt Soviet Republic'. The Petrograd Soviet denounced the rebels as 'defectors from the revolutionary democracy'. The bourgeoisie of Petrograd was terrified by the thought that they were now at the mercy of this militant fortress
- A People's Tragedy by Orlando Figes

On the 1st of May the Executive Committee, having passed through all the stages of vacillation known to nature, decided by a majority of 41 votes against 18, with 3 abstaining, to enter into a coalition government. Only the Bolsheviks and a small group of Menshevik-Internationalists voted against it.

It is not without interest that the victim of this closer rapprochement was the recognised leader of the bourgeoisie, Miliukov. “I did not go out, they put me out,” said Miliukov later, Guchkov had withdrawn already on April 30, refusing to sign the Declaration of the Rights of the Soldier. How dark it was in those days in the hearts of the liberals is evident from the fact that the Central Committee of the Kadet Party decided, in order to save the Coalition, not to insist upon Miliukov’s remaining in the government. “The party betrayed its leader,” writes the right Kadet, Isgoyev. The party, however, had no great choice. The same Isgoyev remarks quite correctly, “At the end of April the Kadet Party was smashed to pieces; morally it had received a blow from which it would never recover.”

But on the question of Miliukov the Entente was to have the last word. England was entirely willing that the Dardanelles patriot should be replaced by a more temperate “democrat.” Henderson, who was in Petrograd with authorisation to replace Buchanan as ambassador in case of need, learning of the state of affairs, deemed this change unnecessary. As a fact, Buchanan was exactly in the right place, for he was a resolute opponent of annexations in so far as they did not coincide with the appetites of Great Britain. “If Russia has no need of Constantinople,” he whispered tenderly to Tereshchenko, “the sooner she announces this, the better.” France at first supported Miliukov, but here Thomas played his rôle, coming out after Buchanan and the Soviet leaders against Miliukov. Thus that politician, hated by the masses, was abandoned by the Allies, by the democrats, and lastly by his own party.
- The History of the Russian Revolution by Leon Trotsky

We returned to Russia after ten years of exile, in the midst of a triumphant revolution, but to a country impoverished and bled white by the war. The first contact we had with the Russian authorities, at Tornio one the Finno-Swedish border, was chilly in the extreme - and this had nothing to do with the weather. All Trotsky's papers were retained for examination on the promise that they would be sent on to the Presidium of the Petrograd Soviet, the only address we could give them.
- The Life and Death of Leon Trotsky by Victor Serge and Natalia Sedova Trotsky

Count Lvov remained Prime-Minister of the first coalition Government. The Cadets and the Octobrists occupied the leading posts. The “Socialist Ministers'—Kerensky, Chernov, Tsereteli, Peshekhonov, Skobelev and Pereverzev—claiming to “represent the whole of democracy”, served merely as a screen behind which the bourgeoisie could carry through its policies. This shameful collaboration with the Cadets was presented by the conciliators as “an outstanding victory for democracy’’. The leader of the Right S.R.s, A. R. Gots, assured Petrograd Soviet deputies that “there need be no apprehension in connection with the socialists joining the coalition Government”. He alleged that the Socialist-Revolutionary Chernov was becoming Minister of Agriculture only in order to implement the slogan “Land and Freedom" (!). Tsereteli, Skobelev and Peshekhonov were supposed to be joining the Government for the same purpose. Another leader of the Right S.R.s, N. D. Avksentyev, declared: “The socialists in the Government are those who dictate policy.” All this was of course downright hypocrisy.
- The Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies on the Eve of the October Revolution by A. Andreyev

No surprise that five days after his provocative appearance, Lenin offered Trotsky's Mezhraiontsy a seat on the board of the journal Pravda if they would join the Bolsheviks. He even mooted making the same offer to the left-wing Menshevik-Internationalists. Their leader Martov had, after long delay and without much help from his Petrograd comrades, returned to the city by a similar method to Lenin (in a considerably larger train). For his part, although Trotsky no longer objected to such joining of forces in principle, he could not accept dissolving into the Bolsheviks.

[...]

When Martov attempted to speak from the platform, the audience howled contumely on him. The horrified left understood how marginalised they were. Particularly in Petrograd, some on the Menshevik left, like Larin (also a Mezhraionets), argued for a split. Martov decided instead to remain within the party as an opposition bloc, hoping to win over the majority of the party congress scheduled for July.
- October: The Story of the Russian Revolution by China Mieville

Here is revealed somewhat the direction of the timeline. In Trotsky and Martov joining forces as opposed to Trotsky (eventually) joining the Bolsheviks, we have the formation of a third far left organisation capable of influencing events. The Mezhraiontsy also not joining with the Bolsheviks somewhat reduced the Bolsheviks' power. The aim of the timeline is a multi-party soviet democracy and the new Socialist-Internationalist Party will be an influential, if numerically small, third organisation in the soviets. In this timeline, Martov arriving earlier, being subject to further attacks, he is convinced to split in actuality instead of simply remaining with the Mensheviks but (often, but not always) voting with the Bolsheviks.

The Bolsheviks moved a resolution at the May 16 joint meeting of the Moscow Soviet of Workers’ Deputies and the Soviet of Soldiers’ Deputies which stated that by their joining the Provisional Government the Petrograd Soviet E.C. members "had placed themselves outside the ranks of the fighting world proletariat". This received 160 votes, and it was with great difficulty that the conciliators manaeed to get a vote of confidence for the coalition Government. The Yekaterinburg Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies opposed the idea of socialists joining the Provisional Government and called on workers, soldiers and peasants "to rally around their Soviets and to make ready for the transition of power to the labouring people". Similar resolutions were adopted by the district Soviets of Petrograd and Moscow and by the Soviets of Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Riga. Krasnoyarsk, Tomsk, Kronstadt, Helsingfors and Alexandrov, among others. But the Soviets in Tver, Vyatka, Archangel, Novgorod, Ryazan, Tambov, Orel, Saratov, Kazan, Baku Odessa, Chernigov, and other places, where the Mensheviks and the S.R.s were in the majority came out in support of the coalition Government. Those who protested against the settling of the April political crisis to the disadvantage of the Soviets were for the most part the workers in the big factories of Petrograd, Moscow and other cities. The workers employed at small enterprises and workshops, and the great majority of the soldiers, were infected by the idea of revolutionary "defencism". They supposed that the participation of the socialists in the bourgeois Provisional Government would guarantee the ending of the war and the fulfilment of other demands.
- The Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies on the Eve of the October Revolution by A. Andreyev

The political preparation for the offensive was at first carried on by Kerensky and Tseretelli, in secrecy even from their closest colleagues. In the days when these half-consecrated leaders were still continuing to spout about the defence of the revolution, Tseretelli was more and more firmly insisting on the necessity that the army make ready for active service. The longest to resist – that is, the coyest – was Chernov. At a meeting of the Provisional Government on May 17, the “rural minister,” as he called himself, was asked with heat whether it was true that he had expressed himself at a certain meeting on the subject of the offensive without the necessary sympathy. It transpired that Chernov answered as follows: “The offensive does not concern me, a man of politics; that is a question for the strategists at the front.” Those people were playing hide-and-seek with the war, as with the revolution. But only for the time being.
- The History of the Russian Revolution by Leon Trotsky

The first major steps toward general coordination of the factory committee movement were taken in Petrograd. Rank-and-file committee members from some of the larger metal works - mostly Bolsheviks acting, as far as is known, without directives from higher party organs - began to plan for a city-wide conference in April. The Putilov factory committee send out a general call on 29 April. The organisational bureau that prepared the conference was composed of four Bolsheviks, one Left SR and a Menshevik-Internationalist who kater joined the Bolshevik party. The delegates who assembled for the First Conference of Factory Committees of Petrograd and Its Environs from 30 May to 5 June represented 367 committees and 337,464 workers, some 80 per cent of the 400,000 workers of Petrograd. Most of the delegates were from the larger plants and particularly those concerned with war production, though more than one-fourth were from smaller plants in chemicals, leather, and printing.
- Workers Control and Socialist Democracy: The Soviet Experience by Carmen Sirianni
 
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Saving Soviet Democracy: A Russian Revolution Timeline
by GiantMonkeyMan

Interlude: The Bolsheviks


In March of 1872, a dense tome thudded on the desk of the Tsarist state's censure. In meticulous and laborious detail, it laid out the conditions and mechanisms of a system that was seemingly alien to the peasant nation of the Russian Empire. The Tsarist system of censorship was strict enough to ban a range of political and philosophical literature, from Hobbe's Leviathan to Nachaev's Revolutionary Catechism, but this work stumped and confused the censor. The author attacked with a fastidious specificity the origins and workings of the British factory system. After attempting to delve into the book himself, the censure concluded "that very few people in Russia will read it, and fewer will understand it" and therefore Marx's Capital was published in Russia and its first 3,000 copies sold out faster than the first 1,000 had in Germany.

Marxism swept through the ranks of revolutionaries and radicals in Russia throughout the 1870's and 1880's, in particular amongst students who had once been so enamoured with the populism of the Narodniks. Yet revolutionary organisations do not spring into existence fully formed like Eve from the rib of Adam. Three future leaders of the social democratic movement converted to Marxism in the 1880's and rejected the individual terrorism of the Narodniks and anarchists who were leading a desperate campaign of assassination against Tsarist officials; Plekhanov, Axelrod, and Zasulich. Plekhanov was the guiding light of early Russian Marxism and he formed the 'Emancipation of Labour Group' in 1883 and attended the First Congress of the Second International in 1889 where he proclaimed that "The Russian revolution will either triumph as a revolution of the working class or it will not triumph at all".

In the 1890's, as the growth of industry in Russia saw the condensing of the great-melting pots of the cities, home to the slums of the workers and the palaces of the rich, the workers movement flexed its muscles for the first time a few years after Lenin had arrived in St Petersburg from provincial Simbirsk. In 1895 Lenin helped found the St Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class and the next year in May 30,000 textile workers downed tools for a three-week strike in which Lenin's organisation played a leadership role. The Tsarist state was not idle. The strike was broken and Lenin and his allies were arrested and sent into internal exile in Siberia. Three years later in March of 1898, in Minsk, the so-called 'First Congress' of Russian Social Democracy met. It comprised of just nine members and all but one of those delegates were arrested within days.

How did such a movement, minuscule in number and hounded by one of the most organised and oppressive police systems in the world, come to have such a huge influence only twenty years later? In 1905, prior to the first great revolutionary moment in Russian history, there were less than 9,000 members of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, less than a third of the Jewish Labour Bund's 30,000 and many Jewish Marxists had ties with both groups, but there is no denying that this organisation would have such a huge impact on the shaping of the nation and the development of the system of Soviet Democracy that would evolve following the February Revolution in 1917. The influence of the Russian Marxists is contradictory. They were small in number, at times they were bitterly divided, but every section of the underground revolutionary movement felt compelled to drift in their wake.

A superficial commentary on the developments of the RSDLP during the turn of the century might give one the impression that Lenin, in his forced exile, had developed a conspiratorial understanding of the party, that he had rejected the mass organisations of the democratic West in favour of a small party of highly disciplined intellectuals. Some even compared his writings to that of Eduard Bernstein, as a tacit rejection of the idea that workers could develop the class consciousness needed to overcome their position in capitalism, but where Bernstein rejected revolution for reform Lenin rejected the mass party for the insurrectory sect - or at least this uncharitable analysis claimed. On the contrary, the reality is that Lenin and those that would be drawn into the orbit of the Bolsheviks were all the students of the mass party of the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands. Lenin translated Karl Kautsky's Erfurt Programme in 1894 and continued to refer to it right up until the devastating news of the SPD's support for war credits.

The split itself was not final and the party remained porous with members drifting between the two factions: Lenin's Bolsheviks, which had been the Majority in the 1903 Second Congress, and Martov's Mensheviks, or the Minority, as well as the smaller groups that formed around Trotsky and Plekhanov and others. Lenin proposed that the party statutes should define a party member as someone "who recognises the party's programme and supports it by material means and by personal participation in one of the party organisations". Martov proposed an amendment of the final part of the sentence; "and by regular association under the direction of one of the party organisations". Both Lenin and Martov were disciples of the German mass workers party but how best to operate such a party under the grinding heel of the Russian Tsarist police state? For Lenin, he wanted the Party to remain disciplined, avoid police infiltration and remain united on the central issues, but Martov envisaged a more open organisation.

Some interpreted this unjustly as Lenin wanting to centralise power around himself and conversely that Martov wanted a broad democratic mass party but if the events of 1917 show anything Lenin's Bolsheviks became the mass party that penetrated the ranks of the working class whilst Martov was ousted from the leadership of the Mensheviks to join the small band of writers and intellectuals that punched above their weight; the Socialist-Internationalists. Regardless, many of the membership of the RSDLP found the split to be petty and Lunacharsky would write, "many were embarrassed by the insignificance of the reason that led to the split". Indeed during the revolutionary events of 1905 and the upheaval surrounding the Lena massacre in 1910, the various factions still worked together, with some difficulties, in the Russian underground out of necessity. Even during the revolutionary period following the February Revolution local party groups would work together but in the interim there remained a sort of permeable split until 1912 where the division became more concrete.

It cannot be denied that Lenin was a powerful political force and influence amongst the Bolsheviks but equally the party remained, out of necessity, a vibrant centre of debate and democratic discussion. The various Bolshevik cells were highly autonomous. Piatnitsky would write, "The initiative of the local party organisations, of the cells, was encouraged. Were the Bolsheviks of Odessa, or Moscow, or Baku, or Tiflis, always to have waited for directives from the Central Committee, the provincial committees, etc., which during the years of the reaction and of the war did not exist at all owing to arrests, what would have been the result? The Bolsheviks would not have captured the working masses and exercised any influence over them." Many Bolshevik propagandists would paint a picture of a unified and solid force entirely behind its leadership but the reality was that the party had constant democratic debate and different sections would choose to follow different tactics at various times. What solidified them was their unity around the party newspaper Pravda, the paper that the Bolsheviks had manoeuvred out of Menshevik control to be their mouthpiece in Russia.

In 1912, despite the best efforts of the Tsarist state, the Social Democrats elected representatives to the Duma. Initially the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks would organise in a joint group but the Bolshevik Duma delegates withdrew to form their own distinct group under pressure from the Bolshevik left wing. For Lenin, the real struggle was amongst the workers and he saw the direct struggle of the masses "as the highest form of the movement, and parliamentary activity without the direct action of the masses as the lowest form of the movement". The Bolsheviks never saw their delegates elected to the Duma as the leadership of the party but rather as a section of the broader struggle. The parliamentary delegates were a tiny minority in the Duma and none of the liberal or conservative press heeded them any attention so Pravda was the skeleton around which the Bolshevik body was organised, spreading their message with news of both the struggles of workers and the parliamentary efforts of the delegates.

Pravda, in the first year of the Bolshevik control, would print over 11,000 letters and articles written by workers, approximately 35 per day. It was not a newspaper written by intellectuals to dictate to workers how the struggle should be organised, it was a paper that reflected the very real struggles of the workers in Russia. The paper, for Lenin, was "a workers’ forum. Before the whole of Russia the workers should raise here, one after another, the various questions of workers’ life in general and of working-class democracy in particular". The task of printing the paper, distributing it, smuggling articles from exiled revolutionaries, compiling letters from workers and statistics of strikes, became the scaffolding around which the Bolshevik cells organised and according to Shliapnikov "The demand for illegal socialist literature was so great that the poor illegal technology could not meet it". Pravda existed in semi-legality with 30 of 64 issues being confiscated and a further eight being fined. The Bolsheviks even organised false 'editors', sometimes near-illiterate Bolshevik workers, who would be arrested by the police in order that the real editors could continue their work.

In early 1914, the workers' struggles surged and they were as much political as they were over working conditions and on May Day of 1914, 250,000 workers in Petrograd and 50,000 in Moscow went on strike with multiple other major cities seeing significant strike waves and demonstrations. The Bolsheviks were intrinsically tied into this movement and so they immediately faced repression upon the mobilisation for the war. Pravda was banned and all the work the Bolsheviks had made making inroads in the working class was undone in a combination of sweeping arrests that saw the Duma representatives deported to Siberia for their opposition to the war, members being conscripted for the front, and a wave of patriotic fervour that dulled the class struggle. The party both in Russia and abroad remained against the war and representatives attended multiple international socialist conferences for peace. As the war dragged on, their message resonated deeper with the masses of Russia and the Bolsheviks again made inroads as the strike wave surged until finally the February Revolution saw the collapse of the Tsarist state.

It can be said during this period that there were many conflicting factions within the party. The right wing was centred around the Duma faction and Kamenev and Stalin. They favoured conciliation with the other socialist parties, particularly the Mensheviks, and saw the establishment of a parliamentary system on the lines of western democracies as the next vital step, dogmatically observing the stagist theories of orthodox Marxism. Stalin, unlike Kamenev, had less original ideas himself and often followed along with whatever he felt was the prevailing opinion of the time and soon after the sealed train delivered the exiled revolutionaries from Switzerland he linked himself to Lenin and Zinoviev. Lenin, after his explosive April Thesis, moderated his approach to effectively straddle the left and the right, giving voice to the frustrations and drive of the left whilst recognising the broader picture outside the revolutionary centres.

Due to the decentralised nature of the party emerging from the suppression of the war, in Petrograd there emerged two important factions under the sway of the left; the Vyborg District Committee which covered the radical factories in the capital and the Military Organisation. After February, when all the soldiers were organising their own democratic committees, the Bolsheviks were quick to realise that this massive dissatisfied demographic would be ripe for agitation. They were the first to set up a Military Organisation with party members organising and spreading propaganda to both the Petrograd Garrison and through channels to the front and other garrisons. The total number of troops stationed in Petrograd or the surrounding area numbered between 215,000 and 300,000. Vladimir Nevsky, one of the leaders of the MO, put the Bolshevik position plainly; "to win the Petrograd garrison was to win the revolution".

Lenin wanted to ensure that the Bolsheviks would avoid "the prevailing orgy of revolutionary phrase-mongering" and instead lay out the concrete truths to stimulate the consciousness of the working class. They grew rapidly, penetrating all layers of the working class and the military. New members were often far more radical, less well versed in Marxism and the Western Social Democratic traditions, and less likely to defer to the more cautious elements of the leadership. In Moscow, the Bolsheviks that had controlled the Moscow Committee prior to February were older, more moderate, and upon the return of Bukharin and the 'young' Moscow Bolsheviks there developed a divide almost based on age, with the younger members being far more ambitious. Bukharin was optimistic and his first writings after the fall of Tsarism claimed, "There is no doubt whatsoever that the Russian revolution will spread to the old capitalist countries and that sooner or later it will lead to the victory of the European proletariat".

The party was diverse, it was animated, and it developed a message that resonated with a number of people tired of the war and the dire state of the economy. The American journalist John Reed would write "No matter what one thinks of Bolshevism, it is undeniable that the Russian Revolution is one of the great events of human history, and the rise of the Bolsheviki a phenomenon of world-wide importance. Just as historians search the records for the minutest details of the story of the Paris Commune, so they will want to know what happened in Petrograd and the spirit which animated the people". The Bolshevik Party, emerging from conditions of bitter oppression and in the midst of an imperialist war, would come to give a voice to the teeming mass of the poor and weary. As the Provisional Government geared up for their offensive, a continuation of the bloody struggle, the party would be tested more than ever and they would step up to make their mark on history.

---

The Tsarist censors soon realised their mistake. Ten months later they took their revenge on Nikolai Poliakov, Marx's first publisher, by putting him on trial for 'subversive' publication, a collection of Diderot's stories, which were confiscated and burned by the police, forcing Poliakov out of business. But it was too late. Capital was an instant hit. Its first print run of 3,000 copies was sold out within the year (the first German edition of 1,000 copies, by comparison, took over five years to sell). Marx himself acknowledge that in Russia his masterpiece was 'read and valued more than anywhere'.
- A People's Tragedy by Orlando Figes

In March 1898 a “Congress” of the Social Democrats took place at Minsk. It was a tiny affair, with only nine delegates, from Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev, the journal Rabochaya Gazeta, and the Jewish socialist organisation the Bund. It failed to adopt a program or a paper. Its only achievements were the issue of a manifesto, drafted by Peter Struve (an “economist” who later became a liberal leader and then a monarchist), the promulgation of the idea of a nationwide party, and the election of a central committee of three. Eight of the nine delegates and two of the three central committee members were arrested a few days after the end of the conference.
- Lenin by Tony Cliff

Lenin's WITBD portrait of the Social-Democratic workers is not addressed to the workers themselves; that is, he is not exhorting them to live up to his exalted picture. Rather, it is addressed to the praktiki: look, this is how the workers really are at this point in time, so you had better deal with it in your strategies and goals. If the 'worry about workers' approach were correct, we would expect Lenin to say to his polemical opponents: you are overestimating the workers, you cannot count on them, trim down your plans. But, in actuality, his consistent argument is: you are underestimating the workers, they demand more than you are giving them, you need to learn to think big and be more ambitious. In fact, the workers play many roles in Lenin's drama. They appear as dedicated [/I]fighters[/I], as organisers of their own economic struggle, as an eager and appreciative audience, and as diligent students. They are also expected to actively push forward leaders from their own midst. We shall examine these roles in turn.

The workers are assigned the central role in the coming revolutionary drama because, first of all, they are fighters. Like the proverbial British tar, their fists are ever ready for a knock-down blow. The workers can be counted on to take to the streets and provide the muscle power without which the antiautocratic revolution will dwindle away into mere grumbling. Some writers claim that this is all Lenin expects of the worker majority - all fists and no brains. And it is true that Lenin, like Social Democrats in general, views the workers as the rank and file of the revolutionary army. In May 1901, he proudly announced that the workers were making it evident to everybody that a mass anti-tsarist force was now in existence. 'There is such a force and it is the revolutionary proletariat. It has already proven its readiness not only to hear and support the call to political struggle, but to audaciously throw itself into battle.' But, as a good Erfurtian, he also expects that the proletarian class army will be effective fighters because they understand the reasons for the conflict better than other class armies, because they have greater organisational capacity than other classes, and because they are energetic participants in the ongoing spread of awareness. Their effectiveness as fighters thus depends on their ability to fulfil the other roles assigned to them.
- Lenin Rediscovered: What is to be Done? in Context by Lars T. Lih

The ideal to which Lenin and the Bolsheviks aspired was therefore an open, mass, democratic party capable of giving effective expression to the revolutionary energy of the Russian working class. Their model was the German Social Democratic Party (SPD). The largest working-class organisation in the world, and the dominant force in the Second International (a confederation of European socialist parties), by 1912 the SPD had a million members, was publishing 90 daily papers, and ran a women's section, a youth section, various trade unions and co-ops, and numerous sports clubs and cultural societies.
- A People's History of the Russian Revolution by Neil Faulkner

Nominal editors were appointed who would go to prison while the real editors remained free. There were approximately 40 of these “editors,” who were quite often illiterate. In the first year of Pravda’s existence, they spent some 47½ months in prison. Of the 645 published issues, the police tried unsuccessfully to confiscate 155, and 36 issues incurred fines.

Of each issue, half was sold in the streets by newsboys, and half in the factories. In big factories in St. Petersburg, each department had one person in charge. He distributed the paper, collected funds, and kept in touch with the editors. Distribution outside St. Petersburg was very difficult. It is true that Pravda had 6,000 postal subscriptions, but to distribute these was not as easy as it might appear. Copies had to be packed in calico for protection, and mailed from half a dozen different post offices, which were changed daily to throw the police off the track. In addition, bundles of Pravda were delivered to the provinces by a number of intricate routes. Thus, party members or sympathisers working on the railways would throw out bundles at specially arranged spots along the route, where other comrades would wait for them. In one town, copies were sent directly to the post office, where a comrade among the postmen took charge of them when they arrived.

The circulation of Pravda was quite impressive, especially if one takes into account the illegal status of the party publishing it. It ranged between 40,000 and 60,000 a day, the higher figure achieved on Saturdays. This was a giant step from the original four copies of leaflets that Lenin wrote by hand and then copied carefully in printed letters. It was also a great contrast with the first paper on which Lenin collaborated in 1897, the St. Petersburg Rabochy Listok (St. Petersburg Workers’ Bulletin), organ of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. This early journal had had two editions – one mimeographed in Russia, with 300–400 copies (January 1897), and the second printed in Geneva (September 1897). A circulation of 40,000–60,000 may seem modest by present Western standards, but under the repressive conditions of tsarism, it was a grand achievement, and the paper’s ideas found response among hundreds of thousands of workers.
- Lenin by Tony Cliff

The larger factories in the major cities, where workers' sense of class solidarity was most developed, were the first to go over in large numbers to the Bolsheviks. By the end of May, the party had already gained control of the Central Bureau of the Factory Committees and, although the Menshevik trade unionists remained in ascendency until 1918, it also began to get its resolutions passed at important trade union assemblies. Bolshevik activists in the factories tended to be younger, more working class and much more militant than their Menshevik or SR rivals. This made them much more attractive to those groups of workers - both amongst the skilled and the unskilled - who were becoming increasingly prepared to engage in violent strikes, not just for better pay and working conditions but also for control of the factory environment itself.
- A People's Tragedy by Orlando Figes

All across Europe, Marxist parties in the organisation of socialist and labour groupings known as the Second Socialist International break with the previous pledges and rally to their governments' war efforts. The move shock and devastate the few stalwart internationalists. On hearing of the pro-war vote of the powerful German Social Democratic Party, Lenin clings desperately, for the short while that he can, to the belief that such reports are a forgery. The great Polish-German revolutionary Rosa Luxemburg considers suicide.

Within the Duma, only the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks walk out against the war. For this show of principle, many deputies will find themselves exiled to Siberia. When Plekhanov visits Lausanne to argue for military defence of Russia, a pale, raging, familiar figure comes to confront him. Lenin will not call him comrade, will not shake his hand. Lenin damns his old collaborator with remorseless cold invective.
- October: The Story of the Russian Revolution by China Mieville

Because of its political significance a contest for influence in the garrison among the Provisional Government, the Petrograd Soviet, and the major political parties was inevitable in the period immediately following the February revolution. During the first weeks of March the Provisional Government sought to reestablish the Petrograd Military District's command over the forces of the garrison, but its efforts were quickly overshadowed by those of a more broadly based Soviet. [...] In addition, the Kadets, SR's, Mensheviks, and Bolsheviks competed amongst themselves for influence in the Petrograd garrison during the spring of 1917, each creating a special military organisation for this purpose. But more than any party, the Bolsheviks attention and an enormous expenditure of effort to this cause.
- Prelude to Revolution by Alexander Rabinowitch

This generational sense of identity and self-esteem, rooted in their shared experience and friendships dating back to 1906-10 rendered the young Muscovites a distinct political group in the party in 1917 and after. As before, Bukharin was their ranking figure, with political and personal ties to the others. Osinskii, Smirnov, Lomov, Iakovleva, and her equally well-known brother Nikolai had been friends and associated before he emigrated. Lomov, for example, was an "ardent follower" of the more illustrious Bukharin, of whom he spoke "with love as well as reverence".
- Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Biography, 1888-1939 by Stephen F Cohen

Author's Note: In preparation for an update dealing with the tumultuous June and July Days, I felt it necessary to explore the origins, divisions, and currents within the Bolshevik Party which will remain probably the most significant political organisation of this timeline. There was a lot I could have covered and, as @Cregan will attest, I almost wrote thousands of words on the general history of the RSDLP. I hope this chapter will be used to put into context some of the events that I have already covered and help explore future events with a clearer understanding.
 
Pronouns
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Saving Soviet Democracy: A Russian Revolution Timeline
by GiantMonkeyMan

Chapter 4:

Embodying the thoughts of the multitude of reformist socialists, Maxim Gorky expressed a great deal of pessimism towards the most radical sections of the working classes and their spontaneous acts of vandalism and petty crime. He wrote to his wife Yekaterina Peshkova, "I welcome the coming offensive in the hope that it may at least bring some organisation to the country". He lamented the destruction of artwork and the breakdown of order. Peasants mobs, angry at a lack of movement on the questions of land reform, were burning down manor houses, churches, and government buildings. Workers broke into the houses of the rich to steal what they could with some abandoned houses even being taken completely down to the foundations as the poor pulled them apart for firewood. Statues were torn down and smashed, portraits of great aristocrats were torn to shreds. The whole of Russia was polarised and the violent politics of the fringe were becoming more common, if not entirely accepted. On one part of that fringe, the anarchist-communist Bleikhman proclaimed, "The street will organise us".

The anarchist movement in Russia was small but vibrant, particularly in Petrograd. The most radical sections of the base membership of the Bolsheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries intermingled with the anarchist movement, leading the most violent and radical strikes and spreading the most volatile and daring propaganda. One aspect of the anarchist movement, and the one least impactful on the politics of the era, was a current of opportunism but it nonetheless represented the aspirations and desperations of the poor. People taking up the mantle of anarchist would occupy the homes of the rich to live in ease for the briefest of moments until either the police or some other circumstance would force them to move on. Rich citizens were robbed with impunity, even murdered, as these anarchists, who had been the downtrodden in rags before the revolution, wanted for one moment to feel the touch of silk, to taste fine wine, and sleep in comfort with full stomachs.

The factory movement was also verdant soil for the anarchists to grow. Anarcho-syndicalists had a great impact on the workers in the factories, advocating for workers control of production, being the first to strike and the last to compromise. Although they rarely held total control of any particular industry or factory, the anarcho-syndicalists dragged the debates in the factories to more radical conclusions. The leaders of the trade unions were largely Mensheviks, with some drifting into the camp of Martov and the Socialist-Internationalists, but the factory committees were vibrant arenas of radicalism. The Bolsheviks were more organised and had better links to the broader network of committees and the anarcho-syndicalists usually tacked behind them but the anarchists and the Bolsheviks generally worked together against the more conciliatory socialists and trade unionists.

Outside the villa of the Tsarist official P.P Durnovo hung the banner of the anarchist-communists: 'Death to all capitalists'. The Petrograd Federation of Anarchist-Communists were perhaps the largest anarchist organisation in the capital but it was still relatively small compared to even the Socialist-Internationalists and they lacked the organisation and depth of the Bolshevik Party. Unlike the syndicalists, who restricted themselves to the factory floor, the anarchist-communists engaged in broader propaganda calling for a completely free association of workers and peasants although they were less clear about what that would actually mean and the means to establish such an association. The right-wing and reformist press decried the villa occupied by the anarchists as a den of chaos but the anarchist-communists organised lectures, printed leaflets, and hosted deputies to the Soviet.

Ultimately, the anarchist movement was divided along a multitude of axis and, although they would compete with the left-wing sections of the major party organisations for influence amongst the working class, they were often in turn caught in the wake of the better organised and larger Bolshevik Party or the left-wing of the Socialist-Revolutionary party. One such formation who occupied part of Durnovo villa was the Petrograd People's Militia who called themselves 'anarchist-bolsheviks' after being influenced by the incendiary words of Lenin upon his return in April. Despite their fierce independence and radicalism, these sorts of groups show just how intertwined the anarchists were with the rapidly growing Bolshevik Party.

At the beginning of June the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies met and elected a new executive committee. Proceedings were dominated by the reformist Mensheviks and the right wing of the Socialist Revolutionaries and particularly vicious attacks were levelled against Martov by his former Mensheviks allies. The left wing, the Socialist-Internationalists and the Bolsheviks, were more isolated and on the back foot in these halls of power than they were in the local soviets and the committees of the workers and soldiers themselves where their influence was developing. A demonstration on the 4th, the same day as the opening of the Congress, enjoyed the significant involvement of the Bolshevik Military Organisation and soldiers from multiple divisions and regiments marched under Bolshevik slogans in remembrance of the fallen during the February Revolution.

The Military Organisation were buoyed by events in a way that the parliamentary Bolsheviks, harassed by the SR and Menshevik dominated Congress, could never be. On the 6th, the MO, the Central Committee, and the Petrograd Committee met to discuss an armed demonstration of soldiers and workers. Latsis, the radical member of the MO faced Kamenev, stern, well-regarded, and far more cautious. The Military Organisation put forward that the Bolsheviks had the influence of nearly 60,000 troops of the Petrograd Garrison and that the radical workers of the Vyborg district would join them. Although Lenin was supportive of such a demonstration, Kamenev and others felt that such a demonstration could not remain peaceful and that ultimately the majority of the workers and soldiers still put their support behind the Soviet who, under the control of the SRs and Mensheviks, were calling for co-operation with the Provisional Government.

Events would spiral out of control no matter how cautious the Bolshevik Central Committee would be. The day before, the Petrograd People's Militia, the anarchist-bolshevik formation quartered in the Durnovo villa, boldly threw caution to the wind and organised nearly a hundred soldiers in a bid to seize the printing works of the right-wing newspaper Russkaia volia in order to use it to print their own propaganda. They were led by the larger than life former thief Shlema Asnin who wore a wide-brimmed hat, a long coat and carried revolvers and a bandoleer of bullets like some sort of displaced cowboy of the American wild west. They were forced out by two regiments under the orders of the Provisional Government and on the 7th the Minister of Justice Pereveze ordered the anarchists to vacate the Durnovo villa within a day. The Vyborg workers answered the call of the anarchists for solidarity with twenty-eight factories left idle due to the strike and even some of the Petrograd Garrison marched in support.

The contradictions of the SR and Menshevik Soviet reared its head. At the Congress the vote in support of co-operation with the Provisional Government of Lvov was passed with a majority, with the Bolsheviks and the SIP being the only dissent, but, in the face of the Provisional Government's attempts at suppressing the anarchists and, consequently, the solidarity shown by the workers and soldiers, the Executive Committee of the Soviet lobbied the Minister of Justice to halt his attempts to expel the occupiers of the villa. The Menshevik Tseretelli proclaimed, "At this critical moment, not one social force ought to be thrown out of the scales, so long as it may be useful to the cause of the people". The price of collaboration with the capitalist parties, for the cause of the people, was to tip the scales of justice in favour of the rulings of the Provisional Government and dismiss the concerns of the radical workers.

On the 8th, the Socialist-Internationalist Lunacharsky was key to putting forward and passing a motion calling on the Minister of Justice to postpone all actions against the anarchists until a proper investigation could be conducted but the Mensheviks also passed a resolution calling on the strikers to return to work and for the unacceptability of an armed demonstration without prior Soviet approval. The Menshevik Party had been reeling from Martov's betrayal, many of the working class members had drifted towards either the Bolsheviks or Martov's new party, but thanks to the timing of votes within the soviets the right-wing still dominated proceedings at the congress. Regardless, many of the Socialist-Internationalists were great orators and well-known in the movement and so still managed to convince many individual members of the congress to support their actions.

On the same day, the Bolshevik Central Committee, the Petrograd Committee, the Military Organisation, representatives from the trade unions, the factory councils, and the regiments met to vote in support of organising a demonstration. The meeting had been scheduled for the 9th but the unrest caused the Bolsheviks to bring the meeting forwards to rapidly deal with the issues of the day. The vast majority of these representatives were in favour of the demonstration with 131 votes to 6 voting for the demonstration, with 22 abstentions, but the Bolsheviks were less confident that the workers and soldiers would come out against the orders of the Soviet only 47 votes for and 42 votes against with a huge number of abstentions. The prevailing mood was that the anarchist-inspired unrest was an opportunity that they could ill-afford to miss but Stalin, ever prevaricating, thought that, "the fermentation among the soldiers is a fact; among the workers there is no such definite mood".

For all this period, Lenin had advocated a tactic of patient explanation towards the working class. The Bolsheviks knew the historic tasks placed ahead of them but were not so arrogant as to assume they could act without the broad support of the masses. The day to day actions of the Bolsheviks were to engage with workers and soldiers in their current conditions, explain and develop the Bolshevik programme, and the party rapidly grew but still there remained a general level of trust from the workers towards the reformist collaboration of the Soviet Executive. The debate and discussion of the party representatives concluded that the demonstration would go ahead and the Central Committee formally resolved that the demonstration would take place on the Saturday the 10th at 2:00pm.

The question of whether or not to begin the organisation of the demonstration in secret was considered, better to sweep the rug out from under the reformists in the Soviet, but the Bolsheviks felt they would need the support of the SIP and the anarchists and it was considered unlikely that Martov would refrain from being open. Thus both the Bolshevik parliamentary section and the Socialist-Internationalists were informed of the decision for the upcoming demonstration as Bolshevik cadres pasted posters up in the workers district, directly contravening the commands of the Soviet: "We are free citizens, we have the right to protest, and we ought to use this right before it is too late. The right to a peaceful demonstration is ours."

Trotsky of the SIP was enthusiastic although Martov and Lunacharsky were far more tepid in their support of such a demonstration. The Bolshevik parliamentary section was, by contrast, aghast. Already they were facing the constant pressures of the Menshevik and Socialist Revolutionary Executive Committee of the Soviet, such a direct attack on the Soviet leadership, who had banned protests except under their own purview, could lead to even more set-backs in the Soviet. Similarly, in Moscow, the cautious Victor Nogin clashed with the eager Bukharin as the Bolsheviks worked to create a sister demonstration in the second capital. The young Bolsheviks of Moscow found many sympathetic ears amongst the Moscow garrison and the radical workers but Moscow wasn't quite at Petrograd's level and it looked to be a much smaller showing.

The Soviet Congress was a flurry of activity and despite all the arguments of the Bolsheviks and the SIP a motion was passed to ban all demonstrations for three days. A rumour began circling that Kerensky had preparred his own troops to crush the Bolshevik demonstration. Miluikov met with the Cossacks who were having their own conference in Petrograd in parallel to the Soviet and proclaimed the Bolsheviks "the chief enemies of the Russian revolution". On the 10th, the Menshevik newspaper declared, "It is time to brand the Leninists as traitors and betrayers of the revolution". The representatives of the Congress who agreed with the motion, nearly 500 SRs and Mensheviks, decided to spend the evening of the 9th and the morning of the 10th going to the factories and the regiments to inform the workers and soldiers of the Soviet's new order. Ironically, they found workers and soldiers fully prepared to declare 'all power to the Soviet!' - the core Bolshevik demand for the demonstration.

----

The 'savage instincts' of the Russian peasants, whom Gorky hated with a vengeance, were, in his view, especially to blame for the violence of the revolution. The sole desire of the peasants, Gorky often argued, was to exact a cruel revenge on their former masters, and on all the wealthy and privileged elite, among whom they counted their self-appointed leaders amongst the intelligentsia. Much of the revolutionary violence in the cities - the mob trials, the anarchic looting and the 'carting out' of the facory bosses - he put down, like many of the Mensheviks, to the sudden influx of unskilled peasant workers into cities during the war. It was as if he refused to believe that the working class, which, like all Marxists, he saw as a force of cultural progress, might behave like peasants or hooligans. And yet he expressed his own deep fear that the urban culture of the working class was being 'dissolved in the peasant mass', that the world of school and industry was being lost to the barbaric customs of the village. Gorky blamed the Bolsheviks for much of this.
- A People's Tragedy by Orlando Figes

The Russian revolution bore within it a content that was essentially anarchist in many respects. Had the anarchists been closely organized and had they in their actions abided strictly by a well-defined discipline, they would never have suffered the crushing defeat they did.

But because the anarchists "of all persuasions and tendencies" did not represent (not even in their specific groups) a homogeneous collective with a disciplined line of action, they were unable to withstand the political and strategic scrutiny which revolutionary circumstances imposed upon them.

Their disorganization reduced them to political impotence, giving birth to two categories of anarchist.

One category was made up of those who hurled themselves into the systematic occupation of bourgeois homes, where they set up house and lived in comfort. These are the ones I term the "anarchist tourists," who wandered around from town to town, in hope of stumbling across a place to live for a time along the way, taking their leisure and hanging around as long as possible to live in comfort and ease.

The other category was made up of those who severed all real connections with anarchism (although a few of them inside the USSR are now passing themselves off as the sole representatives of Russian anarchism) and who fairly swooped upon the positions offered them by the bolsheviks
- On Revolutionary Discipline by Nestor Makhno

The Petrograd Federation of Anarchist-Communists was the less refined, tactically more radical, and consequently the more influential of the two major anarchist organisations operating in Petrograd in the summer of 1917. The Anarchist-Syndicalists were the second group. Actually, very little is known about the Anarchist-Communist organisation or its principle leaders. [...] The programme of the Anarchist-Communists was extremely general and unsophisticated. According to a pamphlet distributed in the early summer of 1917, the organisation called for the immediate destruction or elimination of, among other things, all autocratic and parliamentary governments, the capitalist system, the war, the army, the police, and all state boundaries. The same pamphlet advocated the establishment of a new "totally free" communal society, without government or laws, in which individual freedom would be absolute, the peasants would own the land, and the factories would belong to the workers. There were many parallels between the future ideal societies envisioned by the Anarchist-Communists and by the Bolsheviks.
- Prelude to Revolution: The Petrograd Bolsheviks and the July Uprising by Alexander Rabinowich

On the first day of June, the Bolshevik Military Organisation met with representatives of the Kronstadt party and approved plans for a garrison demonstration. To the Central Committee, the MO sent a list of regiments it was confident it could persuade to take part. Together they numbered 60,000 men.

At that moment the CC was focused on affairs of state: from 3 to 24 June, that First All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies – the gathering planned at the All-Russian Conference of Soviets, at the start of April – was meeting in Petrograd. Its 777 delegates comprised 73 unaffiliated socialists, 235 SRs, 248 Mensheviks, 32 Menshevik–Internationalists, and 105 Bolsheviks. The congress quickly elected a new SR- and Menshevik-dominated executive committee.

Almost as soon as proceedings opened, a visibly furious Martov went on the attack – against fellow Mensheviks. He deplored Tsereteli’s collaboration with the Provisional Government, particularly over the recent deportation of his Swiss comrade Robert Grimm. He appealed to the Mensheviks in the hall: ‘You, my past comrades in revolution, are you with those who give carte blanche to their minister to deport any category of citizen?’

From the Mensheviks came an extraordinary response: ‘Tsereteli is not a minister, but the conscience of the revolution!’
- October: The Story of the Russian Revolution by China Mieville

On June 5 eighty Anarchist-Communists (allegedly led by Asnin), armed with rifles, bombs, and a machine gun, seized the printing press of the right-wing newspaper, Russkaia volia. Two military regiments forced the anarchists to surrender their prize the next day, but this did not end the matter. On June 7, P.N. Pereverzev, the Minister of Justice, decided to eliminate once and for all the threat to order posed by the Anarchist nest in Durnovo villa. He issued an order giving the Anarchist-Communists twenty-four hours to vacate their headquarters. The Anarchists refused to comply and appealed to the Vyborg factory workers and soldiers to support them. The next day thousands of workers went out on strike; twenty-eight factories were left idle, and several minor armed demonstrations took place in the factory districts. At the same time the Anarchist-Communists, augmented by the arrival of fifty armed Kronstadt sailors, prepared to defend their headquarters.
- Prelude to Revolution: The Petrograd Bolsheviks and the July Uprising by Alexander Rabinowich

The idea of a showdown between the Petrograd workers and soldiers and the congress was suggested by the whole situation. The masses were urging on the Bolsheviks. The garrison especially was seething – fearing that in connection with the offensive they would be distributed among the regiments and scattered along the front. To this was united a bitter dissatisfaction with the Declaration of the Rights of the Soldier, which had been a big backward step in comparison with Order No.1, and with the régime actually established in the army. The initiative for the demonstration came from the military organisation of the Bolsheviks. Its leaders asserted, and quite rightly as events showed, that if the party did not take the leadership upon itself, the soldiers themselves would go into the streets. That sharp turn in the mood of the masses, however, could not be easily apprehended, and hence there was a certain vacillation in the ranks of the Bolsheviks themselves. Volodarsky was not sure that the workers would come out on the street. There was fear, too, as to the possible character of the demonstration. Representatives of the military organisation declared that the soldiers, fearing attacks and reprisals, would not go out without weapons. “What will come out of the demonstration?” asked the prudent Tomsky, and demanded supplementary deliberations. Stalin thought that “the fermentation among the soldiers is a fact; among the workers there is no such definite mood,” but nevertheless judged it necessary to show resistance to the government. Kalinin, always more inclined to avoid than welcome a battle, spoke emphatically against the demonstration, referring to the absence of any clear motive, especially among the workers: “The demonstration will be purely artificial.” On June 8, at a conference with the representatives of the workers’ sections, after a series of preliminary Votes, 131 hands against 6 were finally raised for the demonstration, with 22 abstaining.

The work of preparation was carried on up to the last moment secretly, in order not to permit the Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks to start a counter-agitation. That legitimate measure of caution was afterwards interpreted as evidence of a military conspiracy. The Central Council of Factory and Shop Committees joined in the decision to organise the demonstration. “Upon the insistence of Trotsky and against the objection of Lunacharsky,” writes Yugov, “the Committee of the Mezhrayontzi decided to join the demonstration.” Preparations were carried on with boiling energy.

The manifestation was to raise the banner of “Power to the Soviets.” The fighting slogan ran: “Down with the Ten Minister-Capitalists” That was the simplest possible expression for a break-up of the coalition with the bourgeoisie. The procession was to march to the Cadet Corps where the congress was sitting. This was to emphasise that the question was not of overthrowing the government, but of bringing pressure on the Soviet leaders.
- The History of the Russian Revolution by Leon Trotsky

Here we have another divergence. The Bolsheviks wanted and needed the other sections of the radical left to side with their demonstration but in this timeline that includes Martov. Would Martov have agreed to a 'secret' preparation of the demonstration? It's unclear. Regardless, the Soviet quickly found out and banned the demonstration and, afterwards, claimed that as proof of a Bolshevik conspiracy to overthrow the Soviet. Here, the Soviet can make no such claim. Also in OTL, the parliamentary faction was never informed of the decision for a demonstration, a massive blunder of the Bolshevik CC, and were consequently very frustrated when the Soviet began its attacks against such a demonstration on the 9th.

The June 10th demonstration was aborted in the last minute in our timeline. The pages of Pravda on the 10th, which had planned to include information about the demonstration, were left blank. Many Bolshevik organisers and the radical sections of the workers and soldiers were confused and frustrated. The Menshevik and SR Soviet went on the attack. In this timeline, the June 10th demonstration goes ahead, to be concluded in the next chapter.
 
Pronouns
he/him
Saving Soviet Democracy: A Russian Revolution Timeline
by GiantMonkeyMan

Chapter 5:


The proclamation of the Soviet Executive Committee banning demonstrations on the weekend of the Bolshevik's planned march threw the Bolshevik leadership into a fit of panic. Six members of the Central Committee met to decide the fate of the march; Lenin, Zinoviev, Sverdlov, Kamanev, Nogin, and Smilga. Should they follow the ruling of their opposition in the Soviet, those who would surrender power to the Provisional Government, or should they seize the opportunity whilst it was there? There was no mass democratic deliberation to make the decision as there had been to decide upon the demonstration in the first place, there was simply no time for such proceedings. Bolshevik worker comrades were out in the factories and at the regiments at that very moment arguing alongside Socialist-Internationalists to persuade the masses to come out and join them whilst facing a barrage of denigration from the collaborationists.

The masses were confused by the events, even more so by the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik members arguing against the march. The average worker or soldier looked to the Soviet for much of their day to day political direction. Soldiers' committees would refuse orders from their officers if it contravened those given by the Soviet and workers looked to the legal mediation of the Soviet when dealing with disputes on the factory floor. How could the Bolsheviks, who argued for a march under the banner of 'All Power to the Soviet!', a Soviet they were a minority in, be considered a sectarian threat? The Bolshevik workers and soldiers were eager for a confrontation, far more eager than the elected Bolshevik leaders within the Soviet who faced the unenviable possibility of being expelled if the demonstration went ahead.

Whilst there were sections of the Petrograd Garrison which were firmly in the Bolshevik camp due to the diligent agitation of the Bolshevik Military Organisation, many of the soldiers' committees were under the control of Socialist Revolutionaries but they were members far to the left of the likes of Gots or Avksentiev on the SR right-wing. The Izmailovsky Regiment, effectively a regiment under the influence of the Bolsheviks but with a significant SR presence, invited the left-wing SR Mark Natanson to their committee meeting in order to explain the events. In complete contradiction to the official Soviet ruling, and his party leadership, Natanson encouraged the regiment to mobilise for the demonstration. The left-wing of the Socialist Revolutionary Party was chomping at the bit, held back by the more cautious right.

All of this was happening in the span of the evening and night of the 9th. The Bolshevik Central Committee eventually voted to ignore the Soviet order and the demonstration was to go ahead. Smilga, on the Central Committee's left, argued that the hard work the Bolshevik cadres had put into forging links within the workers committees would be undone if they caved to pressure from the socialists of collaboration. There was a greater worry that, if the Bolsheviks did end up reversing suddenly, that Trotsky or Martov could still be enough influence to steal the Bolsheviks' thunder and have the march unfold on their own terms. The Socialist-Internationalists had only a fraction of the numbers of the Bolshevik Party but if the Bolsheviks reversed their position suddenly whilst the SIP remained stalwart it could split the workers who were at this moment behind the larger organisation. The small Central Committee (not all the members had time to assemble due to the suddenness of the events) voted four in favour with two abstentions. The Bolsheviks' CC had a tradition of appearing unified by having no contravening votes so despite Kamanev and Nogin arguing against they effectively stepped aside for the sake of democratic centralism.

Like a swarm of beetles the Kronstadt sailors crossed the Gulf of Finland and entered the Neva river to the assembly points of the march, in hundreds of tug boats, sailing cogs, even row boats. There were nearly 15,000 of them, more than the Bolsheviks had hoped given the pressures of the Soviet Executive, and they filtered through the streets of Petrograd towards Mars Field in a mass of grey hunched spikes - their bayonets already attached to their rifles. Everywhere they passed the well-off citizens of Petrograd fled and in the sailors' wake followed clumps of the downtrodden and poor. The soldiers gathered in their regimental committees at their barracks, last minute arguments about the legality of the Bolshevik demonstration erupting. Many regiments chose to heed the order of the Soviet but amongst others the incendiary voices found ample fuel.

Maria Spiridonova, the former assassin and current Socialist-Revolutionary, led a contingent of Vyborg workers and their families with a band that had struck up the Marseillaise and under banners calling for power to the Soviet. The Bolsheviks had organised the march so the civilian contingents would be protected by soldiers and sailor detachments but these workers came armed with rifles and pistols of their own. The front page of the Bolshevik Military Organisation's newspaper, Soldatskaia pravda was emblazoned with the spirit of all who would defy the ban, "Comrades! Those who are for the brotherhood of all peoples, those who favour an open and honest democratic policy for an end to the war, those who oppose the capitalists who organise strikes and who force the people to starve - all who are against the curtailing of soldiers' and sailors' rights and who oppose bourgeois persecution - come out and express your protest."

The anarchists came in a black block of banners, most official demonstration slogans but also their own, "Death to the Capitalists!". They were a tiny section of this great mass that assembled. The Bolsheviks proudly proclaimed near 200,000 soldiers and workers but more conservative estimates point to closer to 150,000. Near 30,000 Bolsheviks and their supporters marched in Moscow in a sister demonstration and other, smaller, demonstrations sprung up in other major cities where the Bolsheviks had influence. The Menshevik Tseretelli had proclaimed that the demonstration would be a 'test' of the influence of the Bolsheviks, one he expected to be a resounding failure. On the contrary, Bolshevism had spread pathologically through the workers and soldiers. The Bolsheviks were the only organisation with answers to the many questions of the day.

Although some on the Bolshevik left had suggested, prior to the demonstration, that there should be plans to turn such a demonstration into a real insurrection, making allusions to seizing the post offices, rail stations, and telegraph offices, the Bolshevik Central Committee demanded full discipline. It was a march bristling with bayonets, led by the Armoured Car division, but it would be peaceful. If there was anything that proved that the Bolsheviks had a greater integration with the workers and soldiers movements it was the level of discipline the marchers held in following the Bolshevik Central Committee's orders to keep the demonstration calm. This undeniable representation of Bolshevik influence prompted Lenin to suggest that, "today the revolution has entered a new phase of its development".

A small anarchist breakaway group, some Kronstadt sailors amongst them, did disobey the Bolshevik control of the demonstration and aim towards the Peter-Paul Fortress with a wild idea of occupying the symbol of Tsarist oppression but the soldiers at the old prison were loyal to the Soviet and refused to budge. Eventually the anarchists, feeling the moment had passed and their momentum lost, rejoined the march at its end near Tauride Palace. Inside the palace, the Soviet met somewhat nervously, all too aware that armed forces were outside calling on them to decisively seize the day. Lenin and Trotsky gave carefully crafted speeches to the crowd and they were joined impromptu by Spiridonova who called on the end of the offensive and the war.

Inside the halls of Soviet democracy, the Bolsheviks fully expected to have the wrath of the Executive Committee forced upon them but they found an unexpected ally in the Socialist Revolutionary Party's political centre. The participation in the demonstration of the left-wing of the SRs had shocked their party to the core but it was a divide that had been pulling at the organisation since February. Spiridonova was a popular figure amongst all the workers, a legend of the anti-Tsarist days, and the SRs hesitated to punish those who broke the Soviet's orders lest they split the party as the Mensheviks had suffered by alienating Martov. The demonstration had also been far larger than expected with the participation of many ostensibly SR workers. The soldiers too, despite claiming to only follow the orders of the Soviet, had ignored those orders in order to march against the offensive and for, ironically, power to the organisation whose orders they ignored.

The mass of armed workers had sent a chill down the spine of the propertied classes. Oddly, the self-professed Marxist Tseretelli gave voice to their fears. The workers should disarm and the Bolsheviks disband. The Kadets and the Octobrists pressured the coalition government to cut out the heart of this dangerous rebellious force but there was no mass movement in Petrograd. The further away from the the major cities, and the further away from the front, the more likely the right-wing parties would find purchase for their ideas but effectively they were losing their influence in the two capital cities. The Provisional Government called on the Bolsheviks to be reprimanded but their statements were tailored to the Soviet, the contradictions of Dual Power protecting the Bolsheviks from vengeance.

Emerging between the vitriol of Tseretelli, who called on the Soviet to order the suppression of the Bolshevik Party completely, and the calm collected Kamenev, who argued that the Bolsheviks, the workers, and the soldiers had a right to protest, came the dithering of Victor Chernov. Chernov was generally considered vaguely on the left of the Socialist Revolutionaries, the noble grandfather of the party, but had also taken a place on the collaborationist Provisional Government's cabinet and so he was effectively the SR's centre. Fyodor Dan of the Mensheviks put forward a counter-proposal to Tseretteli, an effective slap on the wrist and official reprimand to the Bolshevik Party, which Chernov put his considerable weight behind. For some of the SRs, better to lightly punish the Bolsheviks and avoid alienating a growing section of their party than throw that section towards Lenin. The SRs' own lack of decisiveness would prove their undoing.

In the wake of the Bolsheviks' successful march, the reactionary sections of Russian society were frothing at the mouth. The Soviet's weak response to the Bolsheviks was tantamount to betrayal. A counter-demonstration was organised for four days later, much smaller in size with less than 25,000 attending in the capital, composed of officers, the middle classes, and the skeleton of the Black Hundreds. The offensive was their cause célèbre and all that was wrong with Russian society could be solved by patriotic victory on the battlefield. The Bolsheviks were their hated enemies, a party of nothing more than jews and bank robbers. Kerensky, long before having been the hated socialist minister of the government, was suddenly a hero to these marchers who thirsted for blood at the front as well as behind the lines. With every step that Brusilov's forces advanced, these reactionaries grew bolder.

----

Throughout the day of June 9 the Petrograd Bolshevik staged district agitational and administrative meetings. Although some military units and factories rejected the Bolshevik-sponsored demonstration resolutions, it appears generally that the Bolshevik appeal struck a responsive chord, and many thousands of workers and soldiers were ready to participate. Because the core of the demonstration appeal was transfer of power to the SR-Menshevik controlled Soviet, and not to the Bolshevik Party itself, even supporters of the moderate socialist parties were enticed into the movement.

Among important local organisational meetings held on June 9 were a late gathering of the Vyborg District Committee with representatives from twenty-eight Vyborg factories and four Vyborg-based military units and a Military Organisation meeting in the quarters of the Izmailovsky Regiment at about the same time. Both meetings voiced wholehearted support for the demonstration.
Prelude to Revolution: The Petrograd Bolsheviks and the July Uprising by Alexander Rabinowitch

The Petrograd masses at least left no doubt among the delegates as to who was able henceforth to summon a demonstration, or to call it off. The workers of the Putilov factory agreed to paste up the declaration of the congress against the demonstration only after they learned from Pravda that it did not contradict the resolution of the Bolsheviks. The first machine gun regiment – which played the leading rôle in the garrison, as did the Putilov factory among the workers – after hearing the speeches of Cheidze and Avksentiev representing the two executive committees, adopted the following resolution: “In agreement with the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks and their military organisation, the regiment postpones its action.”

This brigade of pacifiers arrived at the Tauride Palace after their sleepless night in a condition of complete demoralisation. They had assumed that the authority of the congress was inviolable, but had run into a stone wall of distrust and hostility. “The masses are thick with Bolsheviks.” “The attitude to the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries is hostile.” “They trust only Pravda.” “In some places they shouted: ’We are not your comrades.’” One after another the delegates reported how, although they had called off the battle, they were defeated.
- The History of the Russian Revolution by Leon Trotsky

The fall of the monarchy transformed the PSR overnight into the largest political party in Russia. On the eve of the revolution, the party had been little more than a congeries of small, atomised groups. These groups were poorly connected to each other and to the party leadership in emigration. The party's reputation for radicalism and its association with socialisation of land, however, drove a heady growth in the several months after the revolution. By the summer of 1917, the influx of new recruits, the so-called "March SRs", swelled the party membership to approximately seven hundred thousand. Little is known about the social background and political outlook of the new party members, but it seems safe to say that the PSR had the widest appeal across class and estate boundaries of any political party in Russia. SRs dominated the nascent network of peasant soviets and had an enormous presence in the army, where soldiers composed almost half of the PSR's 1917 membership
- Captives of Revolution: The Socialist Revolutionaries and the Bolshevik Dictatorship by Scott B. Smith

How best to plausibly represent a demonstration that never took place in our history? It's clear that there were many people supportive of the demonstration and many who were frustrated with the Bolsheviks who caved to the pressure of the Soviet Executive. In our timeline, the Soviet banned the Bolshevik demonstration and then organised their own for June 18th. The results are discussed by Trotsky here:

The Soviet delegates, having a second time made the rounds of the workers’ districts and the barracks, gave wholly encouraging reports on the eve of the demonstration to the Executive Committee. Tseretelli, to whom these communications restored his equilibrium and inclination towards complacent sermonising, addressed some remarks to the Bolsheviks:

“Now we shall have an open and honest review of the revolutionary forces ... Now we shall see whom the majority is following, you or us.” The Bolsheviks had accepted the challenge even before it was so incautiously formulated. “We shall join the demonstration on the 18th,” wrote Pravda, “in order to struggle for those aims for which we had intended to demonstrate on the 10th.”

The line of march – evidently in memory of the funeral procession of three months before, which had been, at least superficially, a gigantic manifestation of the unity of the democracy – again led to Mars Field and the grave of the February martyrs. But aside from the line of march nothing whatever was reminiscent of those earlier days. About 400,000 people paraded, considerably less than at the funeral: absent from the Soviet demonstration were not only the bourgeoisie with whom the soviets were in coalition, but also the radical intelligentsia, which had occupied so prominent a place in the former parades of the democracy. Few but the factories and barracks marched.

The delegates of the congress, assembled on Mars Field, read and counted the placards. The first Bolshevik slogans were met half-laughingly – Tseretelli had so confidently thrown down his challenge the day before. But these same slogans were repeated again and again. “Down with the Ten Minister-Capitalists!” “Down with the Offensive” “All Power to the Soviets!” The ironical smiles froze, and then gradually disappeared. Bolshevik banners floated everywhere. The delegates stopped counting the uncomfortable totals. The triumph of the Bolsheviks was too obvious. “Here and there,” writes Sukhanov, “the chain of Bolshevik banners and columns would be broken by specifically Social Revolutionary or official Soviet slogans. But these were drowned in the mass. Soviet officialdom was recounting the next day ‘how fiercely here and there the crowd tore up banners bearing the slogan “Confidence to the Provisional Government.”’” There is obvious exaggeration in this. Only three small groups carried placards in honour of the Provisional Government: the circle of Plekhanov, a Cossack detachment, and a handful of Jewish intellectuals who belonged to the Bund. This threefold combination, which gave the impression with its variegated membership of a political curio, seemed to have set itself the task of publicly exhibiting the impotence of the régime. Under the hostile cries of the crowd the Plekhanovites and the Bund lowered their placards. The Cossacks were stubborn, and their banners were literally torn from them by the demonstrators, and destroyed. “The stream which had been flowing quietly along until then,” writes Izvestia, “turned into a veritable river at the flood, just at the point of overflowing its banks.” That was the Vyborg section, all under the banners of the Bolsheviks. “Down with the Ten Minister-Capitalists” One of the factories carried a placard: “The right to Life is Higher than the rights of Private Property.” This slogan had not been suggested by the party.
- The History of the Russian Revolution by Leon Trotsky

There was a growing radicalism and a growing shift away from the moderate socialist parties, the parties of collaboration with the liberal Provisional Government. We can plausibly suggest that the Bolshevik demonstration would have been a success but it wouldn't have garnered the huge number of the 'official' Soviet demonstration. Lenin and the Bolsheviks here in this timeline are aided both by the Socialist-Internationalists and also the much larger and more dynamic left-wing of the Socialist Revolutionary Party. Mark Natanson's early return to Russia has driven a wedge in the middle of the SRs.

Chernov was himself the dominant figure in the left-centre minority of the Central Committee. Before 1905 he had been almost single-handedly responsible for the elaboration of the party programme, and for many years he had figured as the party's principle theoritician. SR positions of the peasant communes, the terrorist struggle, and Russia's road to socialism were almost entirely the products of his thinking and writing. Part of Chernov's skill lay in finding comprimise formulations that papered over the disagreements in the party, a mixed blessing in light of the party's divisions in 1917 and during the civil war.
- Captives of Revolution: The Socialist Revolutionaries and the Bolshevik Dictatorship by Scott B. Smith

During the spring the growing radical and discontented mood of the masses found expression in various ways; demands, backed by ever wider support, for workers' control; an already noticeable loss of confidence in the moderate socialist parties; a spectacular increase in membership of the Bolshevik Party; a crisis in the army, reflected in a growing number of deserters; finally and generally, exacerbation of a political climate in which dissatisfaction simmered into anger, that constantly threatened to boil over, against everything that hindered the revolution's advance. In June this pressure was already so vigorous that even the Bolsheviks, although their radicalism frightened all rival groups, were nearly overwhelmed by it, and were accused of excessive moderation by their impatient supporters.
- Leninism under Lenin by Marcel Liebman

Fyodor Dan was in his late forties, a committed high-profile Menshevik, a doctor who had served in the war as a surgeon, though he had been an anti-war ‘Zimmerwaldist’, close to the Menshevik left intellectually and personally – his wife Lydia was Martov’s sister. After February, however, he took a revolutionary defencist position, contending that newly revolutionary Russia had the right and the duty to hold out in the war. Notwithstanding certain leftist leanings, Dan was also, as he saw it perforce, an advocate of the ‘democracy’ – the democratic masses – working with the Provisional Government, and he supported Tsereteli’s ascension to minister for posts and telegraph in May. But despite that solidarity with his party comrade, and the vitriolic attacks it had earned him from the Bolsheviks, now, along with Bogdanov, Khinchuk and several others of his party, he opposed Tsereteli from the left.

On principles of revolutionary democracy, rather than of any particular support for the Bolsheviks, he argued against Tsereteli’s punitive stance. Dan’s group proposed a compromise. Armed demonstrations should be prohibited, and the Bolsheviks condemned rather than officially suppressed.
- October: The Story of the Russian Revolution by China Mieville

On June 18 the Soviet sponsored its own demonstration in Petrograd. The aim was to rally mass support behind the slogan of 'revolutionary unity', a by-word for the Soviet's continued participation in the coalition, and, from the viewpoint of someone becomming more radicalised, probably a more acceptable slogan to the call for unconditional support for the government. The Bolsheviks resolved to take part in the march with banners calling for 'All Power to the Soviets!', and most of the 400,000 marchers who came out did so under this slogan. Perhaps the supporters of the Soviet leaders had deliberately stayed away, as some of the press later suggested. Or perhaps, as seems more likely, the demonstrators did not understand the ideological differences between the Bolsheviks and the Soviet leaders and marched under the banners of the former on the false assumption that it was a mark of loyalty to the latter.
- A People's Tragedy by Orlando Figes
 
Pronouns
he/him
Saving Soviet Democracy: A Russian Revolution Timeline
by GiantMonkeyMan


Chapter 6:


Inspecting the troops just days before Kerensky ordered the beginning of his offensive, General Anton Denikin despaired at the state of the army. Where sentries should have been posted, soldiers played cards. Where equipment should have been stored, soldiers bathed and relaxed. Soldiers read Bolshevik pamphlets, Social Revolutionary newspapers, and German propaganda in equal measure. Instead of order being maintained and officers preparing their troops for the advance, the soldiers assembled in their committees and discussed politics, with the Bolsheviks' demonstration in the capital being the talk of the day. Some troops were prepared and ready, some agreed in their committees to follow the directive of the Soviet in readiness to advance, yet there were still gaps throughout, holes in the line where rifles should be. The cavalry and the artillery were the core sectors of discipline, having more career oriented soldiers and generally better officers, but even they were not immune to the drop in morale. Denikin sent a message to Brusilov, "I haven’t the slightest belief in the success of the offensive."

Everywhere, the old autocracy was on the back-foot and the Russian liberals, who had assumed that they would sweep up the mantle of power once Tsarism had been toppled, were too frightened by the surge of unrest from the masses to take decisive action. To the middle classes, Kerensky was a spirit of dynamism. They compared him to Napoleon, a great military unifier, and pinned their hopes on the offensive to bring patriotism and prestige back to a beleaguered Russia. The dire conditions of the army was unknown to them but the Provisional Government hungered to keep their commitments to the Western Allies, symbols of democracy for the new republican Russia, and on the 15th of June, the day after the reactionary march in Petrograd, Kerensky announced the advance from Tarnopol close to the front with the Soviet's blessing. The target was Galicia, the South-West front where the armies facing them were mainly Austro-Hungarians, but later advancements were also planned further to expand upon the attack in Romania and to the north back into Poland.

The barrage of shells that preceded the Russian advance had been calculated with precision. The Russian Seventh Army, led by General Belkovitch, charged the Austro-Hungarian Second Army which folded before the Russian advance. Over a hundred spotter planes, some flown by French and British pilots, aided the advance with General Erdelli's Eleventh Army attacking the Austro-German South Army and Kornilov's Eighth Army advancing along the Dneister river. The Eighth Army had once been Brusilov's own and in these moments it almost appeared as if he was replicating his successes in Lutsk in 1916. The Russians seemed to face little resistance as the Austro-Hungarian army was confronted by its own problems of desertion and lack of morale. Kerensky had issued the order to create a 'Hussite Legion' of Czech and Slovak prisoners of war and attached it to a corps in the Eleventh Army. It became a magnet to discontented troops in the Austro-Hungarian army, particularly the 15th Hungarian Division.

For a moment, it appeared that the army had just been waiting for its heroic leader figure to shake it from its slumber. Tseretelli proclaimed, "A new page is opening in the history of the great Russian revolution. The success of our revolutionary army ought to be welcomed not only by the Russian democracy, but by all those who are really striving to fight against imperialism" and the official statement of the soviet held the same tune, "In this decisive hour, the All-Russian Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants' Deputies appeal to the country to gather its strength and come to the help of the army". The Soviet appealed for bread from the peasants, ammunition from the workers, and for all, including the soldiers at the rear in the garrisons, to remember their duties and prepare themselves to be called to the front. On the 21st of June, the First Machine Gun Regiment of the Petrograd Garrison instead declared, "we will send forces to the front only when the war shall have a revolutionary character."

In some places the Russian troops occupied the enemy's positions almost without loss but soon they refused to advance further. In the city of Kalush in the Ukraine, patriotic troops not as infected by the spirit of the revolution participated in a pogrom against Jews and Ukrainians with a vengeful reactionary officer corps giving direction towards the local Centre of Ukrainian Culture. The motivation of the other soldiers wavered; it was one thing to fight for for a revolutionary republic, it was another thing to fight for the rabid patriotism of the officer class. Soon the German army rallied where the Austro-Hungarians faltered. Whilst the Austro-Hungarian army faced internal divisions of multiple ethnicities thirsty for political freedoms, the German army was still disciplined and still capable of launching a counter-attack.

The Kerensky offensive only lasted three weeks before General Max Hoffman turned the tide and drove the German army eastward. Kerensky and Brusilov had made plans for an expansion of the offensive on both the Romanian front and on the Western front at the beginning of July but, as Kerensky scrambled to salvage the South-Western front, the plans never came to fruition. Ever since the Bolshevik demonstration, the liberal-socialist coalition government had existed on a knife edge. The offensive was to rally the Russian people behind the nascent republic but, as the advance crumbled and the German counter gained steam, the government instead took to mitigating the damage. Troops who had been prepared to advance at additional points on the line were hastily sent to bolster the defence and prevent the German army's attack. Some never arrived, their trains commandeered and diverted by deserters, but it had been enough to stave off total disaster.

Deserters clogged the arteries of Russia. Over a hundred thousand soldiers had deserted between the February Revolution and the beginning of the Kerensky Offensive, almost reaching the total number of deserters counted throughout the entire war prior to the revolution. They piled onto trains returning from the front, stole horses and carts, or just filtered back on foot away from the thunder of guns, a great exhausted mass. Some of the lucky ones were close enough to go to return to their homes, whatever village or town they had been conscripted from, and they brought with them the explosive ideas of revolution: the war should end and the land should be distributed to those who worked it. Those who couldn't escape home converged on the major towns and cities, they engaged in petty crimes or did petty jobs, anything to survive. In Petrograd, thousands of them organised into a deserters' march, joined by sympathetic workers and soldiers of the Garrison, and they carried placards demanding the end of the war.

Confronted by disaster, defence became the watchword of the War Ministry and all defences need to be aware not only of the enemies at the front but also those at the rear. The cost of the war had become catastrophic and, instead of rising to the occasion, the economy was rapidly deteriorating. Metal production had fallen by nearly 40% and textiles production had fallen a fifth. Most critically for the war, nearly half of all locomotives were in need of repair, their overuse in ferrying troops and supplies had out-paced the capability to maintain them. Minister Skobolev, the Minister of Labour, called on all workers to cease with strikes and to focus all their efforts on supplying the army, an army that was rapidly disintegrating. Instead the strikes picked up pace. Inflation had driven up the prices of basic necessities and workers struggled to find food and fuel. They needed wages to increase to survive but there was little money to be allocated. More workers began swaying to the radical left: why strike for higher wages again and again when we could take control of the factory itself?

On the 27th, representatives from the Grenadier Regiment came to Petrograd with tales from the front. They were being forced towards the enemy by their officers with machine guns pointed at their backs. The rumours from the offensive frothed and bubbled and spilled over the edge of the boiling cauldron that was the populace of Petrograd. The First Machine Gun regiment was again ordered to prepare to be moved to the front and again they refused. A representative of the Military Section of the Petrograd Soviet, G.B Skalov, visited the First Machine Gun Regiment in order to try and convince them to follow the order to the front. The Social Revolutionary- and Menshevik-led Regimental Committee elected to transfer the discussion to Tauride Palace at the Soviet but the Bolshevik and Anarchist soldiers came to the conclusion that a sell-out was in the works. The whole regiment should be consulted, argued the Bolshevik Golovin, and the feeling among the regiment was that the regiment was to be broken up and disbanded if the counter-revolution got its way.

Insurrection was discussed openly and the soldier-activists proposed that any new attempt to disarm the regiment should be met by armed demonstration in the streets. On the 2nd of July, the Socialist-Internationalists brazenly organised a concert in the 'People's House', a music hall taken over after the revolution, with the aim of raising money to print anti-war literature with which to send with the troops being ordered to the front. The soldiers of the First Machine Gun Regiment didn't intend on being sent to the front. These transfers, it was concluded by many, were attempts to tear apart the revolutionary soldiers from the heart of the revolution. The orders came from Kerensky's Ministry of War in the liberal coalition government: the regiment was to send five hundred machine guns with ammunition to the front; the regiment was to prepare a detachment of a thousand men. The orders hadn't come from the Soviet, contravening Order Number 1. of the revolution, and it seemed to be intended to split apart the regiment piece by piece. The Machine Gunners sent out representatives to the other revolutionary regiments and to the factories in the Vyborg district, if the Bolsheviks wouldn't take the initiative then they would.

What turned the movement from an issue of the Petrograd Garrison into a broader movement of all the workers was the chaos rupturing the coalition government over the national question, a question that had been ignored until it couldn't any longer. For most of June, the Ukrainian Rada had been flexing its newborn muscles and on the 12th it proclaimed itself an autonomous Ukrainian republic, just short of full independence. In Latvia, a landless peasants movement was pressuring the Land Council to expropriate the estates of the autocratic landowners. In Baku, Armenians and Azerbaijanians clashed in city hall over the distribution of grain. The Bolshevik organisations in Tiflis and in Baku finally terminated all co-operation with their Menshevik rivals. The provinces generally lagged behind the major cities, which were increasingly seeing Soviets elect Bolsheviks or Socialist-Internationalists, but the tide was turning. Spreading out along the train tracks, like blood seeping through the arteries, the propaganda of the left organisations was taking hold and simultaneously the nationalities were shaking loose from their Russian chains.

The left-wing of the Ukrainian SRs, who dominated in Kharkov, held with the internationalism of their left-SR comrades in the rest of the Russian territories but the right-wing Ukrainian SRs wavered between strict independence and federalism. The Bolsheviks in the Ukraine were strict proletarian internationalists, contrary to the position of Lenin and the Central Committee that advocated for national self-determination, and they were concentrated in the major working class districts of the cities whilst the Mensheviks had virtually disappeared in the region. The countryside saw the rise of Ukrainian nationalism and the Rada in Kiev echoed with these rumblings. In June, the Rada, wanting to test its power, put forward the question of forming entirely Ukrainian Regiments. There was no dodging the question here, no vague allusions to federalism, it was a concrete question that Kerensky, as War Minister, struggled to answer convincingly.

Chernov claimed that the Rada was falling into "Leninism in the nationalities question" and that their aspersions to independence should be curtailed. The issue developed from a question of soldiers to the question of Ukrainian territory and then to grander questions of government. The Provisional Government determined to send a few negotiators to Kiev to settle the issue once and for all and Kerensky, Tseretelli, Nekrasov, and Tereshchenko arrived in Kiev just as the First Machine Gun Regiment was discussing insurrection. The negotiators returned with a bitter pill to swallow. Although many specific issues were left up in the air, the Provisional Government would have to accept the Rada's autonomy. Despite the Social Revolutionary Central Committee's lukewarm support for the move, the Ukrainian SRs voted against the move in the Rada. It satisfied none of their demands effectively and only served to further the divide between the Ukrainian SRs and the broader party.

The Ukrainian nationalists in the Rada were enough to see the change pass regardless. In Petrograd, the Kadets were furious, none more so than Miluikov with his fellow Kadet Nekrasov for failing to assert Russian territorial ambition. The Kadet Cabinet Ministers withdrew from the Ministries in protest. The Kadet Party, which had once been the centre of Russian defiance against Tsarism, had turned more conservative as the stirrings of the masses from below shocked and worried them. The coalition government, established to achieve stability and to balance the power between the liberals and the socialists, collapsed. The planned march for the soldiers quickly turned from one about the war to the failures of the government itself and found many sympathetic ears amongst the Petrograd population. The Soviet Executive could only look on in worry as the question of power was in the air.

With July came a new French ambassador, Noulons, a self-professed 'radical' sent to deal with this new republican government and he was introduced to Petrograd by the French journalist Claude Anet. He gestured across the river Neva from the embassy at the Vyborg district, "This is a district of big factories which belongs wholly to the Bolsheviks. Lenin and Trotsky reign there as masters." In truth, the inhabitants of the Vyborg district were moving ahead of Lenin and Trotsky, both of whom were urging caution and patience in the face of potential insurrection. The soldiers were far more willing to spark a confrontation, the threat of being sent to the front holding over them like a dark cloud, but the workers were not far behind. At a mass meeting in the Schlusselburg Powder Works a resolution was passed, "Enough hesitations! In the name of freedom, in the name of peace, in the name of worldwide proletarian revolution, the All-Russian Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies must seize power!"

-----

Although the Provisional Government sacked many commanders (and rapid turnover in the upper ranks became endemic), middle and junior officers largely remained in post. In the navy dozens of officers were murdered, but in the army violence was rarer, though officers were humiliated and old scores settled. In the Fifteenth Army, according to British Major J.F. Neilson, authority collapsed with bewildering speed, and Order No.1 was the main instrument, though followed up by agitators from Petrograd. Eyewitnesses commented on the exhilarating sense of liberation. The revolutionary impact was greatest round the capital city, in the Baltic Fleet, and the Northern and Western Front army groups; the South-Western and Romanian Fronts were less affected. It touched the infantry more than the cavalry and artillery (which had more long-serving officers and men). Nor were soldiers' committees everywhere subversive. Alekseyev quickly accepted the, and in many units they cooperated with the officers. Even so, during April conditions deteriorated, and even Brusilov became less confident. Visitors to his sector were bemused to encounter troops freely reading German propaganda and Bolshevik newspapers, routine tasks neglected, roads not repaired, horses not fed, and front-line men going bathing or sitting smoking and playing cards. Most immediately preoccupying were desertions.
- 1917: War, Peace, and Revolution by David Stevenson

On 1 July Brusilov, aided by 120 spotter aircraft, some flown by British and French pilots, attacked in force during the so-called Kerensky offensive. General L.N. Belkovitch's Seventh Army charged the Austro-Hungarian Second Army while General I.G. Erdelli's Eleventh Army tackled the Austro-German South Army; and Brusilov's old Eight Army, soon to be commanded by L.G. Kornilov, was to join the battle later against the Habsburg Third Army along the Dneister River. At first it seemed that Brusilov would rekindle the victories of 1916: at Zloczow, Erdelli's Eleventh Army drove back Eduard von Bohm-Ermolli's Second Army; and at Stanislau, General Kornilov's Eight Army caved in the front of Carl von Tersztyansky's Third Army.

For the Habsburg Army, the 'Kerensky Offensive' rekindled all the painful memories of Lutsk in 1916: catastrophic battlefield defeats, painful retreats, poignant desertions and eventual German rescue. The Germans concentrated their forces against the Russian Eleventh Army, and soon drove it back in headlong retreat, thereby exposing the flanks of Brusilov's Seventh and Eighth armies. Czernowitz fell to the Central Powers on 2 August after bitter battles.

The most embarrassing aspect of the defeats in Galicia was that the process of ethnic dissolution continued to plague the k.u.k Army. Most spectacularly, Infantry Regiment 35 and Infantry Regiment 75 of the Hungarian 19th Division, answering the call of earlier Czech deserters, surrendered to the Russians around Zborow on General A.E. Gutor's south-western front. It did not enhance Habsburg prestige that the desertions came on the very day that Kaiser Karl issued his amnesty decree for 1000 Czech political radicals. The Russians, as discussed in Chapter 5, had taken about 300,000 Czech and Slovak prisoners of war and deserters. Initially loath to create an independent Czech army, after the March Revolution of 1917, Kerensky agreed to stand up the so-called 'Hussite Legion' and attach it to General V.I. Selivachev's XLIX Corps of Russian Eleventh Army. The Ceska druzina consisted of three regiments, and it became a magnet for further desertion - including elements of the Hungarian 15th Infantry Division.
- The First World War: Germany and Austri-Hungary 1914-1918 by Holger H Herwig

“After an artillery fire unprecedented on the Russian side in its intensity and power,” says the Russian historian of the World War, General Zayonchkovsky, “the troops occupied the enemy positions almost without loss and did not wish to go any farther. There began a steady desertion and withdrawal of whole units from their positions.” A Ukrainian leader, Doroshenko, former commissar of the Provisional Government in Galicia, tells how after the seizure of the cities Calich and Kalush: “In Kalush there immediately occurred a frightful pogrom of the local population – but only of Ukrainians and Jews, they did not touch Poles. Some experienced hand guided the pogrom, pointing out with special care the local Ukrainian cultural and educational institutions.” The pogrom was participated in by “the better class of troops, the least depraved by the revolution” – those carefully picked for the offensive. But what still more clearly shows its face in this affair is the leadership of the offensive – the old czarist commanders, experienced organisers of pogroms.

On July 9 the committees and commissars of the 11th Army telegraphed the government: “A German attack begun on July 6 against the 11th Army front is developing into an overwhelming catastrophe ... In the morale of the troops, only recently induced to move by the heroic efforts of a minority, a sharp and ruinous break has occurred. The aggressive flare-up is rapidly exhausting itself. The majority of the troops are now in a state of increasing disintegration. There is nothing left of authority or obedience. Persuasions and arguments have lost their force. They are answered with threats and sometimes with death.”
- The History of the Russian Revolution by Leon Trotsky

The main change to the 'Kerensky Offensive' in this timeline is that Kerensky doesn't have the courage to try and expand the advance at the Western Front and the Romanian Front. The Bolshevik demonstration and the rumblings from the Petrograd Garrison has made him more cautious so when the initial move into Galicia goes badly he instead turns to the defensive. My main purpose for doing this is to justify a better negotiating position in any future peace talks but certainly the Russians have lost ground. I'm purposefully vague about how much ground.

The soldiers believed that they had 'made the revolution' and that they therefore had the right to remain in Petrograd to defend it against a 'counter-revolution'. The Provisional Government was all too aware that it lived at the mercy of the garrison's quarter of a million troops. Until now, it would not have dared to try and remove them from the capital. But by June the presence of these machine-gunners had become a major threat to the government's existence; and one of the aims of the offensive was undoubtedly to transfer them to the Front. The Foreign Minister, Tereshchenko, admitted as much to the British Ambassador when he claimed in June that the offensive 'will enable us to take measures against the garrison in Petrograd, which is by far the worst and gives a bad example to the others'; while Kerensky repeatedly stressed that it was the aim of the offensive to restore order in the rear.
- A People's Tragedy by Orlando Figes

Towards the end of June the First Machine Gun Regiment again received orders for an especially large transfer of men and machine guns (there were rumours that this was a prelude to the complete dismemberment of the unit), and at about the same time (June 30) a representative of the Military Section of the Petrograd Soviet, G.B. Skalov, visited the regiment to discuss the transfers. According to Soviet historian P.M. Stulov, Skalov and the SR-Menshevik controlled First Machine Gun Regimental Committee elected to move their discussion to Tauride Palace, to the great displeasure of unit Bolsheviks and Anarchists, who eventually came to the immediate conclusion that a sell-out was in the making.
- Prelude to Revolution by Alexander Rabinowitch

The First Machine Gun Regiment remains the most radical and rebellious section of the Petrograd Garrison as in OTL. Things are starting to butterfly but the Machine gunners are still stationed in Vyborg, the most radical workers' district, and so still develop their own radicalism as events progress. The offensive, that was doomed to fail just on a logistics front if anything, is the spark that lights the powder-keg.

In words the government had adopted a program of state regulation of industry, and had even established towards the end of June some lumbering institutions for this purpose. But the word and deed of the February régime, like the spirit and flesh of the pious Christian, were in a continual state of conflict. These appropriately hand-picked regulative institutions were more concerned to protect the capitalist from the caprices of a shaky and tottering state power, than to curb the interests of private persons. The administrative and technical personnel of industry was becoming stratified; the upper layers, frightened by the leveling tendencies of the workers, were going over decisively to the side of the capitalist. The workers had acquired an attitude of disgust toward the war orders by which the disintegrating factories had been guaranteed for a year or two in advance. But the capitalists also were losing their taste for a production which promised more trouble than profits. The deliberate closing-down of the factories from above was now becoming systematic. Metal production was cut down 40 per cent; the textile industry, 20 per cent. The supply of all the necessities of life was inadequate. Prices were rising at a pace with inflation and the decline of industry. The workers were aspiring towards a control of that administrative-commercial mechanism which in concealment from them decides their destinies. The Minister of Labor, Skobelev, was preaching to the workers in wordy manifestos the inadvisability of their interference in the administration of the factories. On June 24, Izvestia told about a new proposal for the closing of a series of plants. Similar news was arriving from the provinces. Railroad transport was stricken even more heavily than industry. Half of the locomotives were in need of capital repairs; the greater part of the rolling stock was at the front; fuel was lacking. The Ministry of Communications was in a continual state of struggle with the railroad workers and clerks. The supply of foodstuffs was steadily on the decrease. In Petrograd, the flour reserve was adequate for ten or fifteen days; in other centers, for little longer. With the semi-paralysis of rolling stock and the impending threat of a railroad strike, this meant a continual danger of famine. The future contained no glimmer of hope. This was not what the workers had expected from the revolution.[/QUOTE
- The History of the Russian Revolution by Leon Trotsky

The self-appointed negotiators who went to Kiev, therefore, did not have to worry about any interference from the PSR. They arrived in the mother of Russian cities at the end of June and returned to Petersburg on July 2 with an agreement which they submitted to the rest of the cabinet as the delicate fruit of difficult negotiations which must be eaten without further paring or delay. The Constitutional Democrats were furious, if Chernov was not, at being confronted with a fait accompli, and liking the substance still less than the form, their four ministers resigned from the government and put an end to the first coalition. Nekrasov was also nominally a Kadet but he and Miliukov were so far apart that there was nothing illogical in his staying on as minister without portfolio. The two Populist parties reacted in typical fashion: the SR's threw the weight of their influence behind the accord but the Ukrainian SR's would have no part of it, and cut the margin of acceptance in the Rada to the ill-boding ratio of 100 to 70. Chernov does not portray events in their full light; no doubt he would have found it embarrassing to admit that the dominant right-bank faction of the PUSR formed the spearhead of opposition to a compromise settlement.

The agreement itself left many things up in the air, including even the territorial extent of the Ukraine, and could have succeeded only with more good will than was visible on either the northern or southern horizons. It authorized steps towards autonomy while reserving the rights of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly; the General Secretariat would act as the chief governmental agency, but under the control of the Petersburg cabinet as well as the Rada; without accepting the principle of Ukrainian troops on Ukrainian soil, Kerenski acceded to the formation of detachments of one nationality if compatible with military requirements. There was nothing in the agreement that could be considered disruptive if the federal principle were taken seriously, but Miliukov's party was not federalist in outlook; rather was it deeply centralistic, with a pronounced anti-Ukrainian bias.
- The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism by Oliver Radkey
 
Pronouns
he/him
Saving Soviet Democracy: A Russian Revolution Timeline
by GiantMonkeyMan

Chapter 7:


Once again the masses of Petrograd poured out onto the streets and once again the sailors of Kronstadt, the workers of the Vyborg district, and the soldiers of the First Machine Gun regiment were at the forefront. People were frustrated, angry, food was increasingly expensive and harder to come by, and wages couldn't rise to meet the inflation. This time, there was no Bolshevik discipline to hold them back. The Bolshevik Central Committee had urged calm but the grassroots Bolshevik activists could feel the turn in the wind; a confrontation was coming regardless of whether they told their comrades in the factories and regiments to be patient. Even the Socialist-Internationalists urged calm. Up until this moment they had enjoyed the relative protection of being a minor, secondary party of the left in the shadow of the Bolsheviks and thus had avoided deep scrutiny from the reactionary and liberal press, now they were intimately involved in the beginnings of the spiralling demonstration.

In the early afternoon of the 4th of July, the trucks of the Machine Gun Regiment entered the main commercial thoroughfare, Nevsky Prospect, which ran between the Admiralty in the west and Znamenskaia square to the east. Each truck carried three or four machine guns peppered and ready with grim faced and determined operators. Behind them marched armed workers, soldiers, and sailors although it was far less organised and prepared than previous demonstrations. The air was filled with the cacophony of rifles firing into the air and the smell of smoke. Red flags and banners with the slogans "All Power to the Soviets!" or "Down with the Capitalist Ministers!" were held aloft with common regularity. Nevsky Prospect, the clean, tidy business district of the bourgeoisie, was the mirror opposite to the centres of working class power such as the Vyborg district and it had been invaded by the angry and the desperate.

The day dragged on and the sky darkened and it was precisely in this area, the streets that had long belonged to the rich and powerful, that the senseless clashes between the demonstrators and the supporters of the government occurred. Near the Public Library, the path of the Grenadier Regiment was blocked and a hand grenade thrown. The chattering of machine guns turned the crowd into a wild panic and the soldiers took cover to return fire or rushed to drag away the wounded. The march took a long and ponderous route through the bourgeois neighbourhoods towards Tauride Palace, the seat of Soviet power, and they were peppered with sniper fire from reactionaries along the way. Most of the local businessmen and rich pedestrians had fled but any who remained met the fists and boots, sometimes the bullets and bayonets, of the demonstrators who were not in a forgiving mood. With military precision, the injured were transported from the demonstration to hospitals and by midnight the demonstration had assembled outside the Soviet.

In the dead of night close to two o'clock in the morning, some 30,000 workers of the Putilov factories joined the regiments in the streets around Tauride Palace, they were accompanied by their wives and children and brought food and blankets. Inside, the delegates of the Soviet huddled in worry. A few loyal regiments had agreed to send a few detachments to act as guards but the reality was that near 70,000 armed protesters had surrounded the building calling on them to take power. If the demonstration had clear leadership and goals, a more decisive discipline to action, then the Soviet would have had little to prevent themselves from being overthrown. The crowd, however, were calling on the Soviet to seize power, not to surrender it. Speeches were heard from the courtyard with Zinoviev and Kollontai for the Bolsheviks and Trotsky for the Socialist-Internationalists. Some Social Revolutionaries even gave speeches, Boris Kamkov and Spiridonova had thrown their lot in with the crowd against the wishes of their own party. Each of them called for calm but they were all undoubtedly for Soviet power.

The crowd outside Tauride Palace lingered on through the night and more and more people came out to join them in the morning. The second day of demonstrations attracted even larger numbers with nearly half a million workers and military personnel out in the streets protesting the Provisional Government and calling on the Soviet to take power. At Tauride the demonstrators demanded an official of the Soviet come to speak with them. Victor Chernov left the Soviet to attempt to speak to the crowd but met a hostile audience. One Kronstadt sailor grabbed the old revolutionary turned Government Minister by the collar and screamed at him, "Take power, you son of a bitch, when it's handed to you!" The air was thick with tension, a lynching could have occurred, but Trotsky clambered on top of the roof of an auto-mobile to address the crowd and save Chernov's life. Chernov, frail and frightened, was allowed back into the halls of the impotent Soviet.

The Kronstadt sailors and the Putilov workers demanded that Lenin address the crowd and Lenin initially refused, citing that he had opposed the demonstration, but he eventually acquiesced. Lenin didn't have the oratory flair of Trotsky and, contrary to what was expected, Lenin called on the masses to remain calm and peaceful and that the demonstration was a sure symbol that the Soviet must take power. The crowd, bristling with bayonets, took the call for peace somewhat tepidly. The Putilov workers announced that they would remain outside Tauride Palace until a proclamation towards Soviet power was made but many soldiers returned to their barracks and workers to their homes. The anarchist-communist sections of the march proclaimed that they were abandoning it due to the overblown Bolshevik influence.

Inside the Soviet, the Congress had been debating fiercely in an emergency session. There were no Bolsheviks present as they were outside debating amongst themselves whether this was a revolution or just the rumblings of an angry populace and the only Socialist-Internationalists present were those of Martov's wing. The session began with the introduction of legislation stipulating that anything decided upon by majority in the Soviet would be binding on all participants. Martov rose to condemn the legislation for what it was, fetters for any opposition, and the Socialist-Internationalists left the hall in protest, joined by a faction of close to thirty Social Revolutionaries led by Mark Natanson. Without anyone to challenge them, the reformists began their attacks against the left in earnest and whilst the masses were assembled outside, the Soviet decreed, "The All-Russian organs of the Soviet of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies protest against these ominous signs of disintegration which undermines all popular government".

The Preobrazhensky, Ismailovsky Guards, and Semenovsky Regiments answered the orders of the Soviet to come to Tauride Palace's rescue, arriving in full battle gear with marching bands playing La Marseillaise and dispersing the workers. There was a lot of confusion from the demonstrators and many regiments signalled their neutrality. The third day of protests saw a dwindling of numbers, workers went home or back to the factories, needing to get back to work to struggle for meagre wages to survive, whilst the soldiers drifted back to their barracks. A contingent of left-wing SR sailors from Kronstadt led by G. Smoliansky stayed to enter discussions with the SR splinter group led by Natanson, Spiridonova and Kamkov. Victor Chernov, obviously shaken by the threat to his life, wrote eight scathing editorials lambasting the traitor SRs, the conniving SIP, and, above all, the treachery and opportunism of the Bolsheviks and the best four were printed in the well-distributed SR newspapers.

It was a signal for the start of the reaction, the demonstration had been aimless, had seen nearly four hundred dead in various clashes for seemingly no result, and the right-wing and centre Socialist Revolutionaries were closing ranks with the Mensheviks. The first to face reaction were the anarchists, Durnovo villa, the headquarters for the anarchist-communists, was surrounded by loyalist soldiers and, after a brief firefight, were raided with Asnin and Bleikhman arrested on dubious grounds of murder. It would have provoked a response, and indeed the most radical workers did once again come out to protest, but the events were overshadowed by a revelation plastering the front pages of the liberal and reactionary press. Lenin was a German spy, it was claimed, Trotsky accepted tens of thousands of dollars from German-Americans in New York to sow discord in Russia, the sealed train through Germany was proof of the traitors' links to the German High Command.

The assertions were barely even half-truths, which are the most damaging of truths, but it was enough to create an atmosphere of confusion amongst the radical workers and soldiers and the reactionary right capitalised. It rested on the word of an officer who had once been in the Russian intelligence corps, Yermolenko, who claimed that during his time captured in Germany he had come into possession of documents claiming Lenin had been in the pay of the German High Command. With these unverifiable claims came the assertion that Lenin's links to the likes of Parvus, the German social democrat turned social patriot, who had aided in the organising of the sealed train for the exiled revolutionaries back into Russia proved his association with the German government, never-mind Lenin's consistent rejection of Parvus and his like as scoundrels. Circumstantial evidence, at best, but that mattered little. News from the front had arrived confirming the failure of Kerensky's offensive and all the patriots of Russia now had a clear target to blame: the Bolsheviks were in the pay of the Kaiser and it was their agitation that had caused the offensive to fail. If the Bolsheviks had their way, said the reactionaries, they would offer up Russia to German Militarism.

General Polotsev, loyal to the Provisional Government, arranged troops to raid the offices of Pravda on the 7th of July. The printing machinery was destroyed, the papers seized, and all who were inside were arrested, including Lenin and Kamanev, the two most prominent leaders of the party. The Bolshevik leadership went into hiding, Provisional Government troops were out in force arresting any known leader and the offices of Soldatskaya Pravda, the Bolshevik paper for the military, was similarly raided along with multiple Bolshevik district and branch offices throughout Petrograd. Especially targeted were sailors, Kronstadt was seen as one of the central focal point of dissent, but many workers and soldiers, particularly of the Bolshevik-supporting regiments, were arrested or fled into hiding. Cossacks were out in force, trucks, boats, and machine guns were seized by the government. The tide had shifted in favour of the Provisional Government and the Soviet and, although attempts at a resurging of the demonstrations were made, it was clear that the flash in the pan moment had passed.

The Socialist-Internationalist newspaper Vypred, Forward, published scathing attacks on the government and the acts of repression. Two days latter they too were raided and Trotsky and Martov arrested. Gots and Avksentiev, leaders of the Social Revolutionary party within the Soviet, even gave speeches to loyalist troops before they underwent operations against Bolshevik strongholds and regiments. Lenin, from his cell, managed to smuggle out instructions to his beleaguered Party: the SRs and the Mensheviks had fully thrown their lot in with the counter-revolutionary military and whilst they were in charge the slogan "All Power to the Soviets" was outdated. But many of the grassroots Bolshevik organisations were equally surprised by events and the Provisional Government had hammered home the lies about Lenin's links with Germany. One Bolshevik branch amongst the Metal Workers in Vyborg even released a statement of their support for the Soviet, such was the impact of the government propaganda.

One point of contention was the left-wing Social Revolutionary faction that had split during the days of the demonstration. The Social Revolutionary leadership still prevaricated and wavered when it came to their own radical section. The pressures of Tseretelli of the Mensheviks and Miluikov of the liberal Kadets sealed the matter and soon Mark Natanson was arrested as well on the 14th, along with several others who had left the hall of the Soviet in protest. Boris Kamkov and Maria Spiridonova went into hiding but not before publishing their intention to leave the party, the grassroots SRs were shaken and divided. Kresty prison was once again overcrowded with political prisoners, thrown in with the general prison population of murders and thieves. For some, like Trotsky, it was the same prison the Tsar had used to imprison the 1905 Soviet leaders. Within those dark cells, with scarce food or privacy, the future leaders of the revolution were forced together.

---

Mid-afternoon. A seething, angry mass started to gather in the city's outskirts, heading slowly for the centre. Gone, now, were the uptown types. Vanishingly few of those present were the better-dressed, more affluent protestors who had taken part in the February marches. This was the armed anger of workers, soldiers - those Bonch-Bruevich had called to be Red Guards.
- October: The Story of the Russian Revolution by China Mieville

Delegates would arrive from the machine-gunners, or from a neighboring factory, and summon the workers into the street. It would seem as though they had been waiting for the delegates. Work would stop instantly. A worker of the Renaud Factory tells this story: “After dinner a number of machine gun men came running with the request that we give them some motor trucks. In spite of the protest of our group (the Bolsheviks), we had to give up the cars ... They promptly loaded the trucks with ‘Maxims’ (machine guns) and drove down the Nevsky. At this point we could no longer restrain our workers ... They all, just as they were, in overalls, rushed straight outdoors from the benches ...” The protests of the factory Bolsheviks were not always, we may assume, very insistent. The longest struggle took place at the Putilov Factory. At about two in the afternoon a rumour went round that a delegation had come from the machine gun unit, and was calling a meeting. About ten thousand men assembled. To shouts of encouragement, the machine-gunners told how they had received an order to go to the front on the 4th of July, but they had decided “to go not to the German front, against the German proletariat, but against their own capitalist ministers.” Feeling ran high. “Come on, let’s get moving!” cried the workers. The secretary of the factory committee, a Bolshevik, objected, suggesting that they ask instructions from the party. Protests from all sides: “Down with it! Again you want to postpone things. We can’t live that way any longer. Towards six o’clock came representatives from the Executive Committee, but they succeeded still less with the workers. The meeting continued, the everlasting nervous obstinate meeting of innumerable masses seeking a way out and unwilling to be told that there is none. It was proposed that they send a delegation to the Executive Committee – still another delay, but, as before, the meeting did not disperse. About this time a group of workers and soldiers brought news that the Vyborg Side was already on its way to the Tauride Palace. To hold them back longer was impossible. They decided to go. A Putilov worker, Efimov, ran to the district committee of the party to ask: “What shall we do?” The answer he got was: “We will not join the manifestation, but we can’t leave the workers to their fate. We must go along with them.”
- The History of the Russian Revolution by Leon Trotsky

On the evening of July 3 one of the most serious of these clashes occured when the 180th Reserve Infantry and Grenadier Regiments passed the Gostiny Dvor, a block-square shopping arcade on Nevsky Prospect, and the Public Library in the course of a round-about journey from Kshesinskaia ansion to the Tauride Palace. "At around 11:00," recounts a participant, "we reached Gostiny Dvor... Our path was blocked and it was dark... Suddenly we heard a bomb go off in front of us, someone had threw a hand grenade, and the blast seemed to be a signal. Several machine guns began chattering immediately. For an instant the crowd froze, the it backed away faster and faster into the courtyard of the Armenian church and the arcade of Gostiny Dvor. Some of the soldiers crouching down on the pavement... returned fire while others retreated with the rest of the crowd..."
- Prelude to Revolution by Alexander Rabinowich

The bloody clashes would eventually claim 400 victims. Little wonder that the mood of the crowd around Tauride Palace was angry and edgy by the end of the day. Victor Chernov, Social Revolutionary Minister of Agriculture, was seized by sailors when he attempted to give a speech and had to be rescued by Trotsky. "Take power, you son of a bitch, when the give it to you!" one worker snarled at Chernov.

But they would not. And the two-day seige of Tauride Palace dissolved, the July movement petering out in backstreet skirmishes between middle-class patriots and revolutionary militants. Then, around midnight, the balance tipped decisively. Regiments that had remained neutral marched to defend the Soviet Executive Committee - the Ismailovsky, the Preobrazhensky, the Semenovsky.
- A People's History of the Russian Revolution by Neil Faulkner

During that night of July 4, when the two hundred members of both Executive Committees, the worker-soldiers’ and the peasants’, were sitting around between fruitless sessions, a mysterious rumor arrived among them. Material had been discovered connecting Lenin with the German general staff; tomorrow the newspapers would publish the documents. The gloomy augurs of the presidium, crossing the hall on their way to one of those endless conferences behind the scenes, responded unwillingly and evasively even to questions from their nearest friends. The Tauride Palace, already almost abandoned by the outside public, was bewildered. “Lenin in the service of the German staff?” Amazement, alarm, malicious pleasure, drew the delegates together in excited groups. “It goes without saying,” says Sukhanov, who was very hostile to the Bolsheviks in the July Days, “that not one person really connected with the revolution doubted for an instant that these rumors were all nonsense.” But those with a revolutionary past constituted an insignificant minority among the members of the Executive Committee. March revolutionists, accidental elements caught up by the first wave, predominated even in the ruling soviet institutions. Among those provincials – town-clerks, shopkeepers, heads of villages – deputies were to be found with a definitely Black Hundred odor. These people immediately began to feel at home: Just what was to be expected! They had known it all along!
- The History of the Russian Revolution by Leon Trotsky

The government's offensive against the Bolsheviks was launched at dawn on July 5, when General Polovtsev dispatched a detachment of soldiers to Pravda's publishing plant; the unit arrived at its destination only a little too late to catch Lenin, who had just left the premises for the first of his pre-October hide-outs. The government detachment searched the Pravda plant, wrecked it, arrested the workers and soldiers on duty there, and returned to the head-quarters of the General Staff. Meanwhile, in the city districts patrols of officers, soldiers, and Cossacks began mopping-up operations. All through the day they confiscated armed trucks and disarmed and arrested suspicious looking workers, soldiers, and especially sailors, who were prevented from escaping behind barricades in the workers districts because the bridges over the Neva either remained open or were under heavy guard.
- Prelude to Revolution by Alexander Rabinowich

As a result of changes and develops, I'm having Lenin be arrested instead of just managing to avoid capture. Many revolutionary leaders were imprisoned during OTL and, although the Soviet and the Provisional Government attempted to organise a prosecution against them, events developed beyond the government's control. The July Days were tumultuous and the Soviet Executive, ostensibly made up of socialists, was more than willing to stand aside to let the counter-revolution have its way with their revolutionary counterparts.

The skeleton cabinet left by the resignations of Lvov, Pereverzev, and the four Kadets, posed of itself the problem of how it was to be filled out, and when. In soviet circles, aside from the Bolsheviks and left SR's, there was no disposition to go it alone: the Mensheviks were opposed on principle to a socialist government; and the SR's, because of the war, because of a fear of power, because of Kerenski, and because of their general helplessness, held in effect the same point of view. [...] In two of his editorials composed on the productive evening of July 4, Chemov had spoken out clearly against a soviet assumption of power "under such circumstances, at such a moment," on the ground that it would discredit the present majority (Menshevik and SR) and pave the way for a dictatorship of the minority (Bolshevik and left SR). The words in quotation marks indicate that he was hedging, as always, for he never took a stand without qualifying it, and so never could impress the people as did Lenin with his axe-like phrases. [...] The left SR's were not taken too seriously at the moment, though already they were becoming a serious force, and Kerenski need reckon with no other opposition in the party as he prepared to renew the experiment in coalition by inviting the Kadets to return to the cabinet.
- The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism by Oliver Radkey

We also see, finally, the split of the SRs. The Left-SRs, more organised and advanced than in OTL, tentatively join the Bolsheviks in the semi-support of the march. Like the Bolsheviks, they caution against the violence that the crowd of the July marches were demanding, but they also want Soviet power. As a result, they are swept up in the counter-revolution of the Provisional Government and as such find themselves breaking from their Party much earlier.

Thus in the middle of a revolution in which his former friends and former pupil had taken power, Trotsky found himself in the same prison in which the Tsarist government had locked him up in 1905. The conditions inside the prison were worse now. The cells were extremely overcrowded: the rounding up of suspects continued, and large batches were brought in daily. Criminal and political offenders were herded together, whereas under the old regime the political offenders had enjoyed the privilege of separation. All were kept on a near-starvation diet. The criminals were incited against the 'German agents', robbed them of their food and manhandled them. Prosecutors, examiners, and jailers were the same as under the Tsar. The contrast between the pretensions of the new rulers and the inside aspect of the judicial machinery was striking; and, as Trotsky watched it, he reflected that Lenin was no so mistaken when he decided to take refuge. Yet in this wild chaos, in which even the life of the prisoner was sometimes in peril, there was, just as under the old regime, still enough latitude for the prisoners' political and literary activity. With such debaters as Kamenev, Lunacharsky, Antonov-Ovseenko, and Krylenko, political debate flourished. Among the inmates were also Dybenko and Raskolnikov, the leaders of Kronstadt. Here were assembled nearly all the chief actors of the October insurrection and nearly the whole first Bolshevik Commisariat of War.
- The Prophet Armed: Trotsky, 1879–1921 by Isaac Deutscher
 
Pronouns
he/him
Saving Soviet Democracy: A Russian Revolution Timeline
by GiantMonkeyMan


Chapter 8:


The crisis in the Provisional Government over the situation in the Ukraine and the intense conflict in the streets at the beginning of the month led to the collapse of the First Coalition Government and the scrambling together of the Second. Prince Lvov, the old champion of Russian Liberalism, resigned and Kerensky ascended to the Prime Minister role, bringing together a cabinet of Kadets and right-wing socialists. The day after, tired and relieved to be free from the stress, Prince Lvov told a friend, "In order to save the situation it would be necessary to break up the soviets and fire on the people. I could not do that. But Kerensky can." The Social Revolutionary Party was in a crisis of its own and the members that joined Kerensky came as individuals and not representatives of their Party. Miliukov returned to government as Kerensky's right hand and Victor Chernov, the vacillating centre-left Minister of Agriculture, was jettisoned from the cabinet for his unreliability.

Kerensky moved into the Winter Palace, into the living quarters of the Tsar, and replaced the royal portraits with pictures of himself. The Soviet was ordered to vacate from Tauride Palace to allow the Duma to assemble there and there was little the Soviet Executive could do, particularly as key figures like the Menshevik Irakli Tseretelli had joined Kerensky's government. The peasants of the Voronezh Soviet, along with many other peasant soviets, demanded Chernov's reinstatement, "Chernov must remain Minister of Agriculture, the peasants' minister. He has our support; in him the peasants believe, and count on realizing, under his leadership, the socialization of the land." For the peasantry, Chernov was a symbol of the ongoing land revolution but Kerensky was juggling the interests of the reactionary military and bourgeois interests who were demanding the end of the upheaval in the countryside and the reinvigoration of the war effort. The French and British embassies proclaimed their support for ridding the Russian government of "the fog of Zimmerwaldist poison" and so Chernov soon found himself in the political wilderness with the unenviable role of being in the centre-left of a party that had just expelled its left-wing and hardened around the leadership of the right.

Soldiers and officers loyal to the Provisional Government disbanded first the Ukrainian Rada and then the Finnish Parliament for their allusions towards independence. The Ukrainian situation was particularly volatile as many regiments composed of Ukrainian conscripts were declaring their loyalty to the Rada as opposed to the Provisional Government so all the Russian patriots were united in crushing them. General Kornilov was instilled as commander of the South-Western Front and the death penalty was reinstated. Disobedience on the floundering front with an advancing German army was now met with the guns and sabres of Kornilov's loyal Cossacks. The Congress of Trade and Industry, an assemblage of Russian businessmen, declared on July 20th that, "a dictatorial power is needed to save the motherland". The Russian bourgeoisie were baying for the suppression of the Soviet entirely, even if the moderate socialists had continued their collaboration. Kerensky planned to oblige them as best as he could but the Smolny Institute, new home of the Soviet, was bristling with machine guns and armed soldiers and workers. Despite all the hopes of the bourgeoisie, and the political negligence of the SR and Menshevik Executive, the Soviet remained strong and independent.

Some people saw in Kerensky a Bonaparte, ready to save Russia from itself, but it didn't escape the notice of many that their new leader had just organised a disastrous offensive that even now threatened to collapse completely and allow German forces to drive into the Ukraine. The total Russian territory lost throughout the war had a devastating effect on the Russian economy with nearly a third of all of Russia's factories, accounting for approximately 20% of total Russian industrial output, fallen under German occupation. American involvement on the Western Front was building and Romania saw some decisive victories that scattered the German and Austro-Hungarian occupying armies. Russia's continued participation in the war was all the more vital for the Allied Powers but the Germans were committed to an advance into Ukraine and the ad hoc defence Kerensky had assembled from units formerly earmarked for the offensive was barely holding on. Kerensky's ascension to power came as a mirror to the temporary scattering of the revolutionary left.

The Bolsheviks and the Socialist-Internationalists existed in a semi-legality, their leaders and branches hounded but their worker and soldier activists remained to weather a storm of propaganda from the right-wing press and the frustrations of their fellow workers. Latsis, of the Military Organisation, said miserably, "The counter-revolution is victorious. The Soviets are without power. The junkers are running wild". In Kresty prison, the leaders of the left began their defence against the court proceedings. Zurudny, the Minister of Justice for the Provisional Government, by some twist of destiny, had been the council for the defence of the Soviet leaders in 1906, now he was leading the prosecution against his former associates Trotsky and Martov. The prisoners agreed to present a unified fight to completely destroy the government's arguments, as Vera Zasulich had once done to the Tsarist government after she had assassinated Colonol Trepov and as the Soviet leaders had done in 1906, and even the anarchist-communists Asnin and Bleikhman were involved.

Late on July 26th, in a workers meeting hall in the Vyborg district, 150 Bolsheviks from across Russia met for their much delayed Sixth Congress. Attending were representatives of the Left-SRs and the Socialist-Internationalists. Lenin and Kamenev were imprisoned, Zinoviev had fled to hiding at a sympathetic peasant's barn Finland, but Yakov Sverdlov, and Nikolai Bukharin led the meeting admirably. In the workers districts, the factory committees and workers' soviets were closing ranks with the Bolsheviks and the other repressed revolutionaries. In this moment of darkness, sparks were felt from all across the working class showing solidarity to their comrades and, while the mood was tense, altogether the Bolshevik Party remained strong, more than accustomed to existing in clandestine, semi-legality. The next day, at the insistence of the Kadets, Kerensky banned public meetings that would be deemed a danger to the war effort.

The Union of Left Social Revolutionaries, Soyuz Levykh Sotsialistov Revolyutsionerov, coagulated into existence during the final days of July and in the beginning of August. Formed by those who had been expelled from the SRs for their support of the violent July movement and the remnants of the tiny Union of Social Revolutionaries Maximalists, a section of the SRs who had already split from the party after the 1905 revolution, its programme was almost Bolshevik in its demands. They found immediate support from many of the soldier SRs, who were frustrated with the intransigence of the right-wing leadership of the party and the capitulation to the officers, and amongst the more politically volatile peasant soviets, who felt abandoned by the party in the wake of Chernov's political defeat. Maria Spiridonova and Boris Kamkov had gone into hiding due to their participation in the July crisis in the Tambov district where rebellious peasants eagerly joined a party willing to fight for the land revolution but Mark Natanson became the party's figurehead leader.

Imprisoned along with Lenin and Martov, the two rivals Natanson had once shared a train through Germany with, he smuggled many articles and statements, with clear Bolshevik influence in style and content, out to be published in the new ULSR press. The Bolsheviks also reorganised their newspaper and pamphlet activities, mixing statements from afar from Zinoviev, smuggled statements from Lenin, with the agitational cries of Stalin, Bukharin, and Shliapnikov. Once again the Provisional Government tracked down the presses of both the ULSR and the Bolsheviks, destroying the machines and arresting the print workers. The contributors and editors used pseudonyms but the police knew that notes and articles had been smuggled from Kresty prison so encouraged the guards to rile up the non-political prisoners to riot against the revolutionaries only to find the worker and soldiers prisoners being organising and preparing for a hunger strike.

The three revolutionary parties, and the anarchist fringe, were not officially banned but any public criticism of the war and any efforts to actively hamper the war effort were punishable by arrest and censorship. Workers factories and Red Guard organisations were disarmed where the Provisional Government felt they could do it swiftly enough to avoid great conflict but certain districts remained closed off to government forces. In the two capitals Petrograd and Moscow the Left-SRs set up branches of their new party formation, attracting working class and radical members of the SRs, much to the frustration of the party they emerged from. They spread slowly but steadily around the Volga, the rebellious Tambov district, and all the black earth regions where the peasant land revolution was most volatile and the peasants felt most betrayed by the Social Revolutionary's effective abandonment of Chernov. Maria Spiridonova was a popular counter to the ponderously slow shifts and changes in rural politics. Whilst older and richer peasants remained tied to the SRs out of loyalty, the poorer and younger peasantry were more ready to abandon their traditional party for either the ULSR or the Bolsheviks who were similarly making inroads.

Two currents emerged in the court of Kerensky's government as a result of the political upheaval. On the left, the SRs and the Mensheviks were feeling the steady decrease of their popularity due to their intransigence and collaboration. The only solution, that did not involve actively supporting the social revolution taking place in the factories and amongst the peasants, was to satisfy one of the democratic demands of their constituents by formalising the Constituent Assembly elections. All the more important to do it whilst they still remained politically prominent and therefore able to capture the majority of the vote. On Kerensky's right, the Liberals, the bourgeoisie, and all the reactionary right wing cared little for the prospect of giving the population more democratic control. The democracy of the Soviet had interfered with both the economic control of Russian business by tepidly giving hope to the factory workers and had allowed room for anti-war socialism to poison Russian society. Dictatorship was the only reasonable answer, a violent shock to set Russian society back on the correct path.

Thus emerged General Lavr Kornilov, the man on the pale horse, who had replaced General Brusilov at the head of the army - Kerensky had determined that the blame for the failed offensive would fall on another's shoulders. A cult of bravery had formed around Kornilov although his former superior Brusilov claimed he had "the heart of a lion and the brains of a sheep". He had once disobeyed an order from Brusilov to retreat in good order and as a result saw his forces defeated and ended up captured in an Austrian prisoner of war camp. Luck was on his side and he escaped to return to Russia not to find a court martial for his disobedience but acclaim for his bravery. In effect, Kornilov neither had the political acumen to understand the dealings of the politics in Petrograd and the Duma nor did he have the patience to deal with collaboration moderate socialists but he had gathered a mystique about him to rival Kerensky's. He was perfect for all the counter-revolutionary interests to rally behind. Rodzianko, the former attendant to the Tsar, and Guchkov, the Octobrist Minister of War prior to Kerensky, had backed his promotions early after February.

Between Kerensky and Kornilov was the political middleman Boris Savinkov who had a colourful history of his own. Savinkov had been a Social Revolutionary terrorist in the days of the First Russian Revolution, a gambler and a poet, only to abandon any notions to socialism altogether in a sharp right-wing shift. Now he was the voice the Black Hundreds spoke through, writing political statements for Kornilov and acting as Deputy Minister of War for Kerensky. He called the Soviet the "Council of Rats', Dogs', and Chickens' Deputies" and Kerensky once said to him, "You are a Lenin, but of the other side". It was he who had convinced Kerensky to appoint Kornilov, much to Kerensky's future frustration as Kornilov soon began dictating terms. The banning of soldiers' meetings and the end of the power of soldiers' committees, the militarisation of military industries and railways with a ban on strikes, the enforcement of quotas for workers supplying war material with the punishment being immediate firing for failure.

The nation was divided and Kerensky and the Provisional Government were balancing on a precipice. In order to unify all the disparate interests of Russian politics, Kerensky called a State Conference to take place in Moscow to take place on the 15th of August for two days in the Bolshoi Theatre. It couldn't have taken place in Petrograd because the populace was just too volatile, although none in the government would ever say it aloud. Over three hundred delegates attended the Conference, arriving to a welcome of a city-wide general strike, such was Moscow's relative calm that the trams didn't run and the restaurants closed so the delegates had to serve themselves food. Inside the opulent building, the delegates took their seats. On the right, starched shirts, well-pressed suits and expensive frock-coats of the middle classes and the rich. On the left, the representatives from the Soviet in their soldiers' uniforms, their workers' tunics, their faces grim. Kerensky had hoped to utilise the Conference to pull together some element of national unity but only found these divisions spelled out clearly.

----

It soon became evident that Chernov's enemies could not prove collusion with the German authorities, and the antiwar tone of his articles prior to 1917 could be explained away on the ground that they had been written before the transformation of the character of the war as a result of the revolution and the renunciation of imperialist aims. No one but the left SR's chose to speak of the failure of Russia's allies to make a similar renunciation, which alone could have bridged the difference in viewpoint between the SR leader and the other ministers and solidified his party behind the Provisional Government. The old make-believe continued. As for the feud with Miliukov, steps had been taken to constitute a court of honor when further developments deprived them of any meaning. For Chernov's rehabilitation was not to remain a private affair.

Rural Russia heard the news of its spokesman's retirement with incredulity and consternation. Once more, it seemed, the crafty landowners had foiled the simple folk; once more the toilers would be denied the land. Expressions of indignation from every part of the country poured into St. Petersburg over the wire. They came most of all from the Volga and black-earth districts, from the peasant heart of Russia, where land hunger was most acute and greed was greatest.
- The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism by Oliver Radkey

Military misfortune meant the loss of valuable resources and capacity. Around one-fifth of the total capital stock in Russian industry in 1913 was located on lands that were subsequently lost to Germany. Total territorial losses corresponded to 15.4 per cent of the territory and 23.3 per cent of the prewar population of European Russia. The loss of territory in 1914 corresponded to 3.7 per cent of prewar national income; further losses in 1915 accounted for 12.4 per cent of national income. Russia was deprived of around one-third of its factories, contributing 20 per cent of annual industrial output in peacetime.
- The Economics of World War One edited by Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison

The Kronstadt Executive Committee was ordered by the government, under threat of a blockade of the island, to put Raskolnikov, Roshal and ensign Remnev at the disposal of the Court of Inquiry. At Helsingfors, Left Social-Revolutionaries were for the first time arrested along with Bolsheviks. The retired Prince Lvov complained in the newspapers that “the soviets are beneath the level of state morals and have not yet cleansed themselves of Leninists – those agents of the Germans ...” It became a matter of honor with the Compromisers to demonstrate their state morals. On July 13th the Executive Committees in joint session adopted a resolution introduced by Dan: “Any person indicted by the courts is deprived of membership in the Executive Committees until sentence is pronounced.” This placed the Bolsheviks in fact beyond the law. Kerensky shut down the whole Bolshevik press. In the provinces the land committees were arrested. Izvestia sobbed impotently: “Only a few days ago we witnessed a debauch of anarchy on the streets of Petrograd. Today on the same streets there is an unrestrained flow of counter-revolutionary Black Hundred speeches.”

After the disbandment of the more revolutionary regiments and the disarming of the workers, the resultant of the composition of forces moved still farther to the right. A considerable part of the real power was now clearly in the hands of the military chiefs, the industrial and banking and Kadet groups. The rest of it remained as before in the hands of the soviets. The dual power was still there, but now no longer the legalized, contractual or coalitional dual power of the preceding two months, but the explosive dual power of a clique – of two cliques, the bourgeois-military and the compromisist, who feared, but at the same time needed each other. What remained to be done? To resurrect the Coalition. “After the insurrection of July 3-5,” says Miliukov quite justly, “the idea of a Coalition not only did not disappear, but acquired for the time being more force and importance than it had possessed before.”
- The History of the Russian Revolution by Leon Trotsky

The Peasants' Executive Committee, in the name of rural soviets throughout the country, and for the announced purpose of preserving village peace and quiet, adopted by unanimous vote a similar decision and added the weight of its representations to those of the party. In taking this action the Central Committee, according to its spokesman, had been motivated neither by personal nor by partisan considerations but by the certain knowledge that the country would regard the dropping of Chernov as abandonment of the government's commitment to land reform, and as tacit confirmation of the slanderous attacks upon his character.
- The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism by Oliver Radkey

Instead of the Social Revolutionary Party awkwardly rallying around Chernov whilst maintaining a right-wing leadership, here we have many of the very people frustrated with their party abandoning them for the newly formed Union of Left Social Revolutionaries. This is in part the effect of the stronger Left-SR organisational influence and as a reaction to a deeper collaboration of the SRs with the repression of revolutionary leaders after the July crisis.

Other than a well-known advocate of military discipline, it is not clear that Kerensky knew what he was getting in his new Commander. Kerensky harboured Bonapartist ambitions of his own, of course, and no doubt hoped that in Kornilov he might find a stong man to support him. But did he realise that Kornilov and his allies had similar plans to use Kerensky? Brusilov later claimed that he had already been asked by Kerensky is he 'would support making him [Kerensky] Dictator'. Brusilov had refused, believing Kerensky to be too 'hysterical' for this role. Kerensky had then asked him if he was prepared to become Dictator himself. But once again Brusilov had refused, comparing the idea to 'building a dam when the river is in flood'. Brusilov's refusal was certainly a factor in Kerensky's decision to replace him with a Commander of more primitive instincts. To secure his appointment, Savinkov had wisely advised Kornilov to stress the role of the commissars s a check on the power of the soldiers' committees at the Stavka conference on 16 July. This was a much more moderate stance than Denikin and the other generals, who advocated the immediate abolition of the soldiers' committees, and it would enable Kerensky to appease the Right while salvaging the basic structure of his democratic reforms. Thus Kornilov had given the impression that he might fit in with Kerensky's plans. Yet immediately after his appointment Kornilov began to dictate his own terms to Kerensky.
- A People's Tragedy by Orlando Figes

The assertion of Lenin and the Bolshevik Party. Congress that the dyarchy had disappeared and that power had passed to Kerensky's military dictatorship proved unfounded in the following weeks. Kerensky enjoyed neither the full confidence of the socialist soviet parties nor the support of bourgeois circles and the army. He called a "national conference" in Moscow for mid-August 1917, composed of representatives from every possible political and economic organization, but it did nothing but display the ever-increasing antagonism between the socialist left and the bourgeois right.
- The Soviets: The Russian Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers Councils by Oskar Anweiler
 
The contributors and editors used pseudonyms but the police knew that notes and articles had been smuggled from Kresty prison so encouraged the guards to rile up the non-political prisoners to riot against the revolutionaries only to find the worker and soldiers prisoners being organising and preparing for a hunger strike.

This bit gets me everytime.
 
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This bit gets me everytime.
At the beginning of August in 1917, when the reactionaries were in ascendance, members of the Black Hundreds and those who'd participated in pogroms were released from prison by reactionary officers. Trotsky writes, "The Bolsheviks remained in the Kresty Prison, where a hunger strike of arrested soldiers and sailors was impending. The workers’ section of the Petrograd soviet sent greetings on that day to Trotsky, Lunacharsky, Kollontai and other prisoners." But they also organised against the attempts of the guards to suppress the revolutionaries as well, I just merge it together a little.
 
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Saving Soviet Democracy: A Russian Revolution Timeline
by GiantMonkeyMan


Chapter 9:


By the beginning of August, the faltering of the left-wing parties in the face of reaction had already begun to swing around and the left was once again rapidly growing. This was exemplified nowhere clearer in the defections from the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionaries, and the inexorable shift in the internal politics of the Soviet as workers and soldiers voted eclectically to withdraw their moderate candidates in favour of Bolsheviks or Left-SRs. The soviets were organised on the principle that at any time the workers, soldiers, and peasants could vote to withdraw their delegates and vote in a new delegate and all through August district soviets would see the weighting of party representation swing leftward. A clear signifier of the impact would resound out from the meeting of the Soviet Workers' Section on August 7th. The Workers' Section had last met in July, in the midst of the upheaval, and had condemned the Bolshevik support of the aborted uprising. The August meeting was supposed to be based around some organisational questions, particularly in how workers could better prepare for the national defence, but quickly the minutes were torn up by the intervention of the Bolsheviks.

The Bolshevik delegates, supported enthusiastically by the Left-SRs and the Socialist-Internationalists, demanded the meeting be altered to discuss the plight of the imprisoned revolutionary internationalists. Volodarsky gave an impassioned speech condemning the imprisonment of stalwart comrades, the Central Executive Committee in particular received his wrath. The Social Revolutionary Avram Gots talked about the necessities of the war effort and the Menshevik Fyodor Dan defended the authorities' crackdown. For the first time, however, the moderate socialists were outnumbered. The meeting voted overwhelmingly for the Bolshevik motion that the persecution of the left-wing comrades was "a blow to the revolutionary cause, a shameful stain" and that it served only the counter-revolution. Shliapnikov's motion condemning the reintroduction of the death penalty was also passed and a vote to create a special commission to explore and organise support for political prisoners also was introduced.

Such were the shifts in representation within the soviets that the Moscow District Soviet narrowly endorsed the one-day general strike in response to Kerensky's State Conference. The Moscow Soviet had been firmly in the hands of the SRs and the Mensheviks until the very beginning of August when the defections to the Left-SRs and the Socialist-Internationalists tipped the balance. The strike was peaceful and there was enough moderate socialist influence that the slogans most of the workers gathered under were not combative or overtly revolutionary however a significant demonstration of close to 20,000 workers called for the freedom of political prisoners and the end of the war. There was a grudging co-operation between the revolutionary organisations and the reformists in Moscow, not out of any shared vision but rather due to the growing sense of momentum to the counter-revolution. Kerensky's government was being squeezed between two rapidly growing extremes.

Kerensky himself wanted to take centre stage at the conference but his two hour introductory speech, seemingly an attempt to threaten and cajole both the right and the left, showed how isolated he truly was. The Kadet leader Miliuikov would write, "He appeared to want to scare somebody and to create an impression of force and power. He only engendered pity". Kerensky's government, in trying to please both the right and the left, had failed to discover firm allies and now the man himself, in trying to assert his authority, found little more than scorn. At various points either the right side of the chamber would applaud an attack on "those who would overthrow the government with bayonets" or the left would politely clap a criticism of "those who would use force of arms against the power of the people" but never at all did the entire chamber join in praise except when the man had finally finished. It would take more than platitudes to unite a disparate nation.

The Menshevik Chkheidze read out the official position of the Soviet Executive, defending the gains of the revolution, and the left side of the chamber cheered whilst the right remained silent and scowled. The delegation from the Soviet was strict in its organisation as the moderate leaders didn't want the rumblings of the extreme wing to reveal the divisions. Even Chernov was refused the opportunity to speak at the Conference, not even to respond to criticisms directed towards him from the benches of the right-wing. The Bolsheviks boycotted the State Conference as Chkheidze and Tseretelli refused to allow them to speak, instead Yakov Sverdlov came from Petrograd to speak at the demonstration of the striking workers, alongside popular Muscovite Bukharin. In an example of his astute political manoeuvring, Sverdlov, after giving some of his own words condemning the repression of the Provisional Government, read an official statement from the left-SR Maria Spiridonova, officially a fugitive in hiding, and then spoke of Lenin's clever machinations in the legal proceedings facing the political prisoners. The Bolsheviks were more than willing to take on the mantle of leaders of the revolutionary left, particularly when there were no other revolutionaries there to contradict them.

In the afternoon of the first day of the conference, the much celebrated commander of the army arrived to cheering crowds and middle class women showered him with petals. He first went to the Iversky shrine, the place where the Tsars had traditionally prayed, and later he met with business leaders who told him they would help fund a right-wing authoritarian government. For the past week, all the right-wing newspapers, and more than a few centrist liberal papers, had been singing the man's praises. His victories were exaggerated and his losses ignored and liberal newspaper Novoe vremia suggested that "it was difficult, in fact probably impossible, to find a more suitable general and supreme commander in these days of mortal danger being experienced by Russia". He was prepared to speak the next day and Kerensky was worried that he would steal the show, insisting that he should only speak on military matters. The general had other ideas. When he rose to the podium, all the politicians of the government, and all the business leaders and officers at the right side of the chamber, rose to their feet and clapped. Remaining sat were those of the left, for once united if only under the gaze of the symbol of counter-revolution, in particular the soldier delegates remaining sitting received the ire of the right-wing with cries of "Get up!" resounding through the chamber and being resoundingly ignored.

Much to Kerensky's relief, Kornilov wasn't a great speaker, with none of the flair or verbosity of a politician, but through him spoke the voice of all the counter-revolution. He was blunt: the war was going poorly, soon Riga would be lost, and after Riga perhaps Pskov or beyond. "By a whole series of legislative measures introduced after the revolution by people strange to the spirit and understanding of an army, the army has been converted into a crazy mob trembling only for its own life." His meaning was implicit. The government and the anti-war left had, through their prevaricating and lack of support for the armed forces, allowed a German advance that could soon threaten Petrograd itself. The Archbishop Platon, one of the reactionary members of the Church Council, would tell Kornilov after the days proceedings, "If a miracle is necessary for the salvation of Russia, then in answer to the prayers of his church, God will accomplish this miracle" and the Moscow Bolshevik newspaper would print what this "miracle" might entail, "The Tarnopol defeat made Kornilov commander-in-chief, the surrender of Riga might make him dictator".

The final day of the Conference did little to heal the great chasm between the left and the right. "It is hard for me," Kerensky was to bitterly claim, "because I struggle against the Bolsheviks of the left and the Bolsheviks of the right, but people demand that I lean on one or the other... I want to take a middle road, but no-one will help me." The industrial strikes were spreading, the rail network was strained leading to great shortages of food in the cities, crime was rapidly growing out of control. One Bolshevik newspaper reported that the reason for the lack of basic goods "lies in the intentional derangement of all economic life by the messiers capitalists, factory owners, plant owners, landowners, bankers, and their hangers-on" but the reality was more complex with the mass of strikes and meetings that workers attended definitely contributing to the drop in productivity. There was no easy option for Kerensky, only a series of bad ones. A few days later, the siege of Riga ended in a victory for the Germans. As a result, many of the propertied classes arranged to leave Petrograd, fearing the capital city would soon be next or that the industrial unrest would make living in the city impossible. As a result, the idea of resorting to the mailed fist of authority began to have a seductive appeal for the man.

Kornilov had no real understanding of the differences between the various leftist parties and tended to lump the reformists willing to co-operate in with the far-left; General Martynov said that Kornilov was "an absolute ignoramus in the realm of politics". The counter-revolution looked to Kornilov not due to his political acumen but his worth a symbol, his valour and patriotism. He was effectively to be a figurehead with all the interests of business and the Old Order behind him. Kerensky and Kornilov reached a détente by the middle of August, with Kerensky thinking that he could utilise Kornilov to suppress dissent and then maintain his own position of power, particularly in light of the Petrograd City Duma elections on the 20th. Proletarii, one of the few unbanned Bolshevik newspapers, would write in the build up to the election, "Every worker, peasant, and soldier must vote for our list because only our party is struggling staunchly and bravely against the raging counter-revolutionary dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and large landowners." It was a shocking victory for what would become known as the Soviet Alliance.

After the balloting, it took several days to tabulate the results and there were immediate rumours that the electoral office were trying to suppress the news. The Bolsheviks received the largest share of the vote with 168,509 votes accounting for 61 seats, the Union of Left Social Revolutionaries, a relatively new formation, managed to capture 63,447 votes or 26 seats, and the Socialist-Internationalist Party gained 19,085 votes or 7 seats - for a total of 94 seats. The SRs had performed badly compared to the last city elections in May, receiving only 142,734 votes accounting for 52 seats and the Mensheviks had almost disappeared with only 11,830 votes which accounted for 4 seats. The Kadets completed the tally with 114,483 votes or 42 seats. The Bolsheviks effectively formed a minority City Duma government with the support of the Left-SRs and the SIP but could be outvoted in terms of numbers by the combined presence of the SRs, the Kadets, and the remnants of the Mensheviks.

The City Dumas had little in the way of legislative power but regardless it was a propaganda coup for the Bolsheviks and the other left-wing parties and brought dismay to the parties of government. It also signalled to both Kornilov and Kerensky that something needed to be done about this looming threat but in reality Kornilov had been moving before the results had even been collated as on the 20th, the same day of the city election, two cavalry divisions advanced towards Petrograd. The reactionaries had arranged that officers barracked in the capital would seize control of Kresty prison in order to carry out swift justice on the imprisoned radicals. The right-wing were salivating at the thought of a coup, hungering for the cutting down of the Soviet leadership and the far-left fringe both. Kerensky was split between wanted to crush the looming threat of far-left radicalism and the realisation that the right-wing didn't want to answer to him, or any sort of democracy, at all.

When Savinkov, the deputy Minister of War, went to Kornilov's Headquarters on behalf of Kerensky, his message was a contradiction. Kerensky wanted Kornilov's assurance that he would dismantle the reactionary Union of Officers, one of the General's core supporting organisations, but also that he should advance the Third Cavalry Corps on Petrograd. The conspirators for the coup had been mobilising regardless of Kerensky's intransigence. The Reval "Shock Battalion of Death" was to proceed to Tsarskoe Selo on the outskirts of Petrograd to the south, General Dolgorukov's First Cavalry Corps was to mobilise from Finland to the city's north. The date of the coup was set for the six-month anniversary of the February revolution, August 27th. It was hoped that the left would engage in more rioting as a pretext for martial law. "It is time," Kornilov said to his chief-of-staff, "to hang the German agents and spies, Lenin first of all, and disperse the Soviet of Workers’ and Peasants’ Deputies – yes, and disperse it so it will never get together again."

----

In the early months of 1917, there were many resolutions of cautious support for the Provisional Government. There were more resolutions demanding that Russia's war goals be clarified than there were in outright opposition to the war. Such resolutions reflected and helped to foster the spirit of compromise that characterized Moscow's revolution. But beginning in May, resolutions denouncing the Provisional Government replaced those supporting it, and the economy supplanted the war as the most talked-about issue. Inflation began to spiral uncontrollably about this time, and the number of strikes increased as well. Here in May was the first indication of how serious the economy and the question of the management of the economy would become for political stability. By August, resolutions began to focus on outright opposition to the Provisional Government: Workers spoke out against the Moscow state conference and against the growing indications of counterrevolution, given substance late in that month with the Kornilov mutiny.
- Moscow in 1917: The View from Below by Diane Koenker

Kornilov ascended. The right rose in ovation. ‘Shouts ring out,’ states the record. ‘ “Cads!” “Get up!” ’ No one on the left benches obeyed. To Kerensky’s intense relief, Kornilov, never a confident speaker, gave a speech both inexpert and surprisingly mild. The continuing roars of rightist approval were for him qua figurehead, rather than for anything in particular that he said. After Kornilov, speaker after speaker excoriated the revolution that had wracked Russia, and hankered loudly for the restoration of order. General Kaledin, the elected leader – ataman – of the Cossacks of the Don region, announced to the delight of the right that ‘all soviets and committees must be abolished’. A young Cossack officer, Nagaev, quickly insisted that working Cossacks disagreed with Kaledin, eliciting corresponding ecstasy on the left.
- October by China Mieville

That soldiers should be shot for refusing to fight in a war foisted by predatory allies upon a renegade socialist government was too much for these SR's, and Maria Spiridonova constituted herself a sort of female angel of vengeance, blasting the Provisional Government in countless meetings over the country for having brought this "greatest shame" upon the revolution. Nothing bore more eloquent testimony to the moral degradation of the revolution, she felt, than this "organized judicial murder," the fruit of the agitation of "the journalist Savinkov" and the negation of everything in the SR program, to say nothing of its spirit. [...] from this time dates the slide of the "praetorian guard," as the SR military support in the soviets was called, in the direction of left-wing Social Revolutionism, and then on beyond into Bolshevism. As the soldier mass moved to the left, pulling after it a large section of the peasantry, it destroyed in barracks and village alike the sinews of agrarian socialism and prepared the way for the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Black Sea Fleet had from the outset been a stronghold of Social Revolutionism, remoteness or some other factor having preserved it from the extremism rampant in Baltic naval centers; but now, under the impact of capital punishment and multiplying signs of reaction, the sailors became alarmed and would listen only to Bolshevik agitators. There was a swift change in sentiment, and the moderate socialists, fighting to hold their lines, themselves began to waver in their steadfast support of the Provisional Government.
- The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism by Oliver Radkey

The new public assertiveness by the conservative right was extensively discussed in the socialist and nonsocialist press, creating an image of July-August as a period of a shift to the right. Curiously, while the newspapers talked constantly of a rightist resurgence in their editorials and front pages, careful reading of the news articles of the inside pages suggested quite another development: a continued radicalisation of the lower levels of society and political activity. The leftward drift that began in the late spring was barely disturbed by the July Days and their aftermath. Its continuation manifested itself in various ways, but perhaps most unequivocally in the electoral results of late July and August in worker and soldier organisations. Reelections at factories and regiments replaced moderate representatives to soviets, factory committees and soldiers' committees with more radical ones: Mensheviks by Bolsheviks, moderate SRs by Left SRs and Bolsheviks. Worker self-assertiveness continued, as for example in the Red Guards, which survived post-July efforts to disband them and became ever more radical, more "Bolshevik" in outlook. An antigovernment and anti-Revolutionary Defensist leadership was taking control of the lower-level popular political institutions.
- The Russian Revolution, 1917 by Rex A. Wade

In talking about the Petrograd City Duma elections, it's important to note that the Bolsheviks vote was a complete shock to many but represented a part of that significant shift in public conciousness away from the moderate parties and towards the radical. Here is both Alexander Rabinowich and Oliver Radkey on the numbers:

After the balloting for the City Duma, it took several days to tabulate the final vote. When the results were in, the Bolsheviks, showing surprising strength in every section of the capital, received 183,624 votes, giving them sixty-seven seats in the new Duma.The Bolshevik tally was second only to that of the SRs, who received 205,659 votes and seventy-five seats; this represented an improvement of 14 percent over the Bolsheviks' performance in the district duma elections of late May. The Kadet vote was 114,483 votes, giving them forty-two seats, while the Mensheviks trailed with 23,552 votes and eight seats.
- The Bolsheviks Come to Power by Alexander Rabinowitch

Here's the numbers given by Oliver Radkey in The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism, slightly cropped and edited for visual purposes.
Parties - Votes (Seats)
Social Revolutionaries: 205,666 (75)
Mensheviks: 23,552 (8)
Bolshevik: 183,694 (67)
Kadets: 114,485 (42)
Minor Parties: 17,107 (-)
Residue: 4,875 (-)
Total: 549,379

In this timeline, the Bolshevik vote count is actually smaller. I made this decision in part to signify the existence of the Socialist-Internationalist Party: Trotsky's Mezhraiontsy never joined the Bolsheviks and some of the Mensheviks who might have jumped ship to the Bolsheviks would have instead joined the SIP. Incidentally, this is why the Menshevik vote is even worse. In this timeline, I had to consider how an early split of the Social Revolutionaries could have played out. I decided that the Left-SRs would not be as huge as they potentially could have been, this is because they're a relatively new organisation whose leadership has been scattered, but their vote count dropped the main SR party's results by enough that now the Bolsheviks are the largest party. The Soviet Alliance is forming before our eyes, taking up half the support of the capital, and conciousness is only shifting further left.

In the wake of the Moscow Conference Kornilov continued preparations to concentrate an imposing array of troops from the front around Petrograd. [...] As nearly as one can piece together from scattered, sometimes contradictory evidence, an elaborate scheme for a rightist putsch in Petrograd to coincide with the approach of front troops was worked out by the Main Committee of the Union of Officers and the Military Section of the Republican Centre and Military League. This plan appears to have been linked to a series of fund-raising rallies scheduled by the Soviet leadership in Petrograd for Sunday, August 27, the six-month anniversary of the February Revolution. The conspirators evidently assumed that the rallies would be accompanied by disorders which could be used as a pretext for proclaiming martial law, wrecking Bolshevik organisations, dispersing the Soviet, and establishing a military dictatorship.
- The Bolsheviks Come to Power by Alexander Rabinowich.
 
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This is the last of the old chapters. Posting them bit by bit has allowed me a little bit of time to write ahead and tomorrow I'll be posting a completely new chapter here and elsewhere such as SV.

Saving Soviet Democracy: A Russian Revolution Timeline
by GiantMonkeyMan


Chapter 10:


The tepid failure of the Moscow State Conference and the success of the radical left in the Petrograd City Duma elections was a signal that reached parts of Russian society other than just the reactionary right, marshalling their forces as they were in an attempt to sever the hydra's head. All across Russia, the turmoil within the Social Revolutionary Party reached its zenith. The SR party leadership in Ufa, in Kharkov, and in Pskov all made their intentions to side with the Union of Left-Social Revolutionaries and only small sections of their local organisations would remain with the parent organisation. The breaking of the party brought with it control of the Peasant Soviet in Kazan as the elected head of the local executive committee, Kalegaev, declared for the organisation of the imprisoned Natanson and the fugitive Spiridonova almost wholesale. Across Russia, district soviets were voting for Bolshevik or Left-SR resolutions and the by-elections of these democratic bodies saw a growth of vibrant radicalism.

The support for the Mensheviks in Petrograd and the other major cities had dwindled drastically and, with the exception of a few districts, Menshevik party branches were reporting a migration of support to the party of the former Menshevik leader Martov's Socialist-Internationalists. Martov and Trotsky's imprisonment had garnered a lot of sympathy with those workers and activists who might have disagreed with the naked ambitions of the Bolsheviks but could nonetheless not countenance the acts of state repression nor the lack of condemnation for those acts as the leadership of the Mensheviks had failed to do. More workers openly switched to Bolshevism, a sense that boldness was needed in this moment that the counter-revolution reared its head. The Trade Union leadership, notably of the Union of Railway Workers, signalled their support of the SIP and Martov. Workers and radical soldiers began questioning the Soviet Executive itself and why it remained in the hands of those who would collaborate with the capitalist class and the army officers in suppressing the revolutionary leaders and some workers just felt apathetic, no longer trusting any political organ to satisfy their needs. Whilst the district and local soviets could, and did, rapidly alter their make-up as the constituents triggered by-elections to remove delegates they felt no longer represented them, it was significantly more complex within the Soviet Executive and many were pressuring the moderate socialist leadership to organise a second All-Russian Congress of Soviets.

The Bolsheviks themselves experienced fluctuations in both goals and organisation, particularly with Lenin and Kamenev's imprisonment - the Provisional Government was desperate to pin some crime, either real or imagined, on Lenin to discredit him and his movement once and for all. Lenin reportedly struggled within the confines of Kresty prison, his abrasive personality and stubbornness brought him into conflict with many of the other political prisoners, and only Trotsky would take him on head to head but he also presented a clarity of vision and held a charismatic ambition that made it clear why he was so revered amongst the socialist movement. He disliked bourgeois political theatre as empty gestures but recognised when it was necessary and made great pains to represent to the outside world that he was organising the political prisoners' defence and as such also took on assisting other political prisoners' in their defence. Whilst Lenin had to take a slight step back from his leadership role, he led a significant section of the party that felt that the slogan "all power to the Soviets" was outdated considering the Soviet Executive, controlled as it was by the moderate socialists, had made clear that they were not willing to take the next step towards power.

As such, two distinct currents emerged within the party. Alexander Shliapnikov, Timofei Sapronov, and others on the left-wing of the Bolsheviks turned away from the idea of seizing power from the Soviet Executive and towards making inroads into the local and district soviets, where the Bolshevik Party's discipline and organisational abilities helped expand their influence. The factory committees in particular, intertwinned yet separate as they were from the power structures of the soviets with their focus on particular economic struggles in specific industries and plants, proved fertile ground for these worker-activist Bolsheviks. Simultaneously, a growing current led by Alexei Rykov and supported from within prison by Kamenev were seeking closer co-operation with the other anti-war parties, in particular the Socialist-Internationalists and the newly formed Union of Left-Social Revolutionaries. This current felt particularly vindicated upon the success of the Petrograd City Duma election and the propagation of the idea of an all-socialist alliance of organisations to defend against the counter-revolution appealed to great swathes of the population. It was due to the skilled organisational talents of Yakov Sverdlov in Petrograd and Nikolai Bukharin in Moscow that these two trends became united and intrinsically linked.

Ever since the Provisional Government had ordered the dissolution of the Finnish Parliament, events in Helsinki had rapidly developed and whilst Governor-General Stakovich was keen to follow his orders from the political centre and prevent the Finnish Parliament from meeting, thanks to the intervention of the Bolsheviks within the Soviet the soldiers at the Garrison refused the orders. In Ukraine at Huliaipole on the 20th August, a group of anarchist peasants led by Nestor Makhno met to discuss the future of the movement and the revolution. It was a meeting being echoed in all the peasant land committees and soviets across Ukraine and throughout Russia. The Provisional Government had failed to enact land reform, the soldiers at the front were once again subject to capital punishment, the forces of reaction were on the march. To remain as a small group publishing pamphlets was no longer tenable to Makhno, they had to draw the labouring masses to them in a coordinated movement. In Ivanovo-Voznesentsk, Kronstadt, Ekaterinburg, and in Tsaritsyn the Bolsheviks had taken control of the district soviets. In Samara and Saratov, a coalition of Bolsheviks and the ULSR had ascended to power.

All this and more would have been on Kerensky's mind when he invited Kornilov to advance on the capital but equally Kerensky was worried, and legitimately so, that endorsing a coup in this moment would have seen his own head on the chopping block. Once he had been seen by the establishment class as the saviour of Russian capitalism but with his ineffectiveness in the face of social turmoil these interests had quickly dropped him for the prospect of the iron heel of reaction. Kerensky hoped to use Kornilov but equally Kornilov hoped to use Kerensky. Both wanted to purge the undesirable elements of the Soviet but each saw themselves as the rightful inheritor of the political space that would be opened up as a result. Boris Savinkov was the middleman between these two political rivals and for a time it seemed that they would reach an equilibrium. Kornilov was perhaps the more flexible of the two and as long as the war effort continued and was not impeded then he could bend to some of Kerensky's demands - Kerensky had more to lose.

Vladimir Nikolaevich Lvov, of no particular relation to the former Minister-President, was inserted into this relationship and as a result began a tragedy of errors that would see the end of any hopes for a quick blow against the revolution and the saving of the old order. Lvov was sent to Kornilov by Kerensky in order to continue the informal talks and report back Kornilov's intentions. Lvov, in presenting himself to Kornilov, was introduced as being able to speak on behalf of Kerensky. It's entirely possible that Lvov misunderstood his intended role or that Kerensky failed to impress upon him the gravity of the situation but regardless, as the rumour-mills in Petrograd were abound with the news of counter-revolution, Lvov presented Kornilov with three possible options: Kerensky himself as dictator, a directorate with both figures on board, or Kornilov as dictator. Kornilov expressed a preference for the third option but suggested that he felt Kerensky and Savinkov would play important roles.

Lvov, upon returning to Kerensky, told the Minister-President that Kornilov was demanding that he would be made dictator. If Kerensky had been thinking straight and with less pressing worries about the survival of his government he may have been able to continue the negotiations and clarify. As it was, Kerensky's nervousness about the situation and his fears about his survival led him to realise he could use this against Kornilov and expose him as a traitor. Kerensky, at the War Ministry in Petrograd, began a tentative conversation with Kornilov, at headquarters at Mogilev, using a Hughes Apparatus, a rudimentary teleprinter communications device. Kerensky asked him to confirm what Lvov had said, without saying what it was exactly that Lvov had been suggesting. Kornilov did so without understanding the underlying implications and asked for Kerensky to present himself to Kornilov at Mogilev. Later that night, Kerensky called a cabinet meeting, armed with the transcripts of the Hughes Apparatus discussion.

Perhaps Kerensky hoped to present himself as the hero of the hour, the saviour of the Russian Revolution, by exposing and later defeating Kornilov in order to rally the people behind him. Savinkov, horrified at the misunderstandings, demanded that Kerensky reopen communication with Kornilov immediately but Kerensky refused and the majority of the cabinet ministers agreed that it was too late, that the wheels had been set in motion. The socialist ministers in particular, with their close relationship with the Soviet Executive, expressed their desire to negate the threat of Kornilov's coup. Vitally, this bungling of negotiations and discussions with Kornilov exposed a harsh reality to the Provisional Government. Those troops who might have been called upon to suppress the revolution were under the influence of Kornilov and those troops who might have been called upon to defend the Provisional Government from the counter-revolution were under the influence of the Soviet. In order to prevent the Provisional Government receiving the wrath of a right-wing coup, they would have to turn to the very political organs that threatened their authority.

Kerensky sent a message out to headquarters: "Hold up all echelons moving towards Petrograd and its districts". Kornilov responded: "Do not carry out this order. Move the troops towards Petrograd." Kerensky's government fell apart. Prior to the advance of Kornilov, General Lukomsky warned the Kadet Party "that they should withdraw from the government before the 27th of August, so as to place the government in a difficult situation and themselves avoid any unpleasantness". In response to the shambles that surrounded Kerensky's attempts to negotiate with and mitigate the threat of the military coup, the cabinet ministers resigned. At 14:30 on the 28th, nine trains full of Kornilov's troops passed the station at Oredezh and half an hour later the garrison at Luga surrendered to the advancing troops giving Kornilov a clear shot at the capital. General Krymov arranged the forces of the Don Cossack battlions in preparation to sweep the rebellious elements of the Petrograd garrison aside and support the Union of Officers and other right-wing forces in the purge of the city.

The ministers of the Provisional Government argued furiously and pointlessly. The Kadet Kokoshkin suggested that instead of either Kornilov or Kerensky, General Alexeev should take the helm. Nekrasov bitterly opined, "in a few hours Kornilov's troops will be in Petrograd". They bickered and cawed before being interrupted by a knock on the door. A representative from the Committee of Struggle against Counter-Revolution had arrived. In the night before, representatives from the Soviet Executive, the trade unions, and all the parties met to discuss the ongoing coup. The Soviet Executive received the ire of all the assembled delegates: why had they been attempting to co-operate with this failed government who even now debated the possibility of counter-revolution in their favour? The soviet organisations had argued about whether or not to come out to support Kerensky but a representative from the Kronstadt garrison broke through. They had previously sent a delegation to Kresty prison itself to ask the revolutionary leaders what the response should be and, in a rare moment of unity, Lenin, Martov, Trotsky, Kamenev, and Natanson were all agreed. Focus on the defensive measures immediately - defeat Kornilov and sort out the political implications later. The Provisional Government agreed, hoping to bring the defence under their sway.

It was the Bolsheviks' discipline and organisation that proved vital. Practically overnight, 40,000 workers were armed and given assignments. A young, newly minted, Red Guard called Rakilov said, "The factory looked like a camp. When you came in, you could see the fitters at the bench, but they had their packs hanging by them, and their guns were leaning against the bench." The Bolsheviks and the ULSR came to an agreement after the insistence of the SIP. Despite their attacks on the moderate socialists, they would put aside these differences to co-ordinate the defence. The Petrograd City Duma, now virtually in the hands of the Bolsheviks, voted to form a commission to aid with food supplies and, more importantly, it voted on sending delegates to the troops at Luga. The grandson of Imam Shamil, a legend of the 19th century struggles for Muslim nationalism in the Caucuses, was in the city to attend a meeting of the Executive of the Union of Muslim Soviets and it was his agitation amongst the 'Savage' Division, who had previously no idea what had been their purpose in coming to Petrograd, that turned that vaunted division away from their officers.

The All-Russian Executive Committee of Railway Workers formed a special bureau just for the defence against Kornilov on the 27th. The union, Vikzhel, had recently been making overtures to the SIP and were eager to defend the revolution. They sent a telegram along to key points along the rail network directing the local workers to prevent suspicious telegrams or trains being sent through and at key locations workers even dug up the tracks to stop Kornilov's trains. Whilst long lines of workers were filling the streets to sign up for Soviet and Bolshevik militias, the Petrograd Garrison met in their soldiers committees. The Litvosky Guards Regiment's committee passed a resolution: "All troops not involved in work details or without valid medical excuse are required to participate in the detachment now being formed. Officers and men refusing to do their duty will be subject to revolutionary trial." Detachments from all the Petrograd Garrison assembled ready and waiting for any advance from counter-revolution. They were not willing to die for the nation on the front but they were willing to die for the revolution. The leaders of the Kronstadt Soviet issued the orders to take over all communications, all weapons depots, and all vessels in port whether military or private. Once more, a fleet of sailors armed to the teeth descended on Petrograd but this time they were not there for demonstrations but rather to add their bayonets to the cause.

Faced with this rapid and impressive mobilisation, a realisation was had by the forces of reaction and by the 30th, Kornilov's advance had collapsed and the counter-revolution's opportunity had passed. The Savage Division, once numbering amongst Kornilov's most disciplined formation, raised the Red Flag. The Cossacks, thanks to agitation from the Bolsheviks, threatened to arrest their leaders if they ordered them onwards. The Union of Officers, particularly the officers schools in Petrograd, were divided with some willing to go down in a blaze of glory and others, witnessing the impressive mobilisation of the workers, realising that their time had passed. General Krymov, whose Cossacks had abandoned him, met with Kerensky on the 31st only to face a torrent of blustering abuse suggesting that he was a traitor and after the meeting retired to a private room to commit suicide. Like many others faced with the realities of the strength of the left, he initially attempted to distance himself from the coup. Rodzianko, the former attendant to the Tsar, had the gall to say, "all I know about the evils of the day is what I read in the papers". Savinkov, due to his close association with Kornilov, was stripped of his post and more than a few right-wing figures back-pedalled in an attempt to distance themselves from a coup that they had previously been cheering on from the sides.

A new government was formed by Kerensky from the political ruins of his own making - composed of younger, subordinate, Generals and junior ministers not directly associated with the coup but the Second Machine Gun Regiment summed up a lot of the feeling of the workers and soldiers in the capital: "The only way out of the present situation lies in the transferring of power into the hands of the working people. We demand the immediate liberation of our comrades arrested in July". In the following week, going into September, the revolutionary leaders in Kresty prison were finally granted bail and freed. Since the Provisional Government and the Committee of Struggle against Counter-Revolution had relied upon these people and their organisations in organising the defence against what they considered traitors then the idea that they, in turn, could be considered traitors became farcical. The pressures of the Petrograd City Duma, the shift in the air in the soviets, and the now armed and prepared workers with their Bolshevik sympathies revealed the impotence of the Provisional Government in attempting to hold them. The Soviet Alliance was free.

----

It is doubtful whether in any other province the rural soviets were so solidly entrenched as in the old Tatar stronghold on the Volga, and it is certain that nowhere did they display a more virulent hostility to the landowners. At the head of the Kazan Peasants' Soviet stood A. L. Kalegaev, perhaps the most able of the left SR leaders. Already in May the provincial soviet had decided that privately owned lands should be taken over by the volost land committees, for use by the peasants, but without being parcelled out, lest the soldiers' interests should suffer. The Interior Ministry under Prince Lvov had promptly annulled this "decree," only to be answered with defiance by Kalegaev, who declared that such measures were necessary to head off anarchy and that the will of the people would be carried out despite threats from the Provisional Government. The ministry had then resorted to armed coercion, causing some of its district commissars to resign, but nothing much seems to have come of its action, for by June 10 peasants' committees were reported to be in full control of estates in Spassk uezd, setting an example for other districts to follow, and the landowners of Kazan telegraphed Kerenski in July to protest the ineffectiveness of government measures against seizures, which in Sviiazh uezd had led to the full liquidation of private economies and even to the expropriation of household effects. There is no reason to question Kalegaev's assertion, made before an All-Russian conference of peasants' soviets, that by July the land of Kazan province was already in the hands of the peasantry and the soviets were supreme in the villages.34 The ministerial council at its session of September 28 took up the question of agrarian disorders, especially in Kazan province, and tried to devise a system of mixed councils for public officials to fall back upon in their effort to uphold the law, but by that time peasant communities all over Russia were following the example of the left SR's in Kazan, whether the local party organizations sought to restrain them, or wrung their hands in despair, or acquiesced in the seizures.
- The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism by Oliver Radkey

I briefly mention events in Finland. I will be going into these events in more detail in the future as they pertain to the potential success of the revolutionary movement in Finland. Suffice to say, things were polarising in Helsinki just as they were in Petrograd.

Around August 20 1917 our group reviewed the distribution and utilization of our forces. This meeting was the most serious one we had held. I have already mentioned that our group did not have in its ranks a single theoretically-trained anarchist. We were all peasants and workers. Our schools turned out half-educated people. Schools of anarchism did not exist. Our fund of knowledge of revolutionary anarchism was obtained reading anarchist literature for many years and exchanging views with each other and with the peasants, with whom we shared all that we had read and understood in the works of Kropotkin and Bakunin. We owe thanks to Comrade Vladimir Antoni (known as Zarathustra) for supplying us with literature.

In the course of this very important meeting we discussed a number of burning questions and came to the conclusion that the Revolution was having the life choked out of it by the garrotte of the State. It was turning pale, weakening, but could still emerge victorious in the supreme struggle. Help would come to it principally from the revolutionary peasant masses who would remove the garrotte and get rid of this plague – the Provisional Government and its satellite parties.
- The Russian Revolution in Ukraine by Nestor Makhno

A similar swing to the Bolsheviks took place in the Soviets. Here too grass-roots apathy deprived the Mensheviks and the SRs of their early ascendency. They had only themselves to blame. To begin with, the Soviets had been open and democratic organs, where important decisions were made by the elected assembly. This made their proceedings chaotic, but it also gave them a sense of excitement and popular creativity. As the Soviet leaders became involved in the responsibilities of government they began to organise the work of the Soviet along bureaucratic lines, and this alienated the mass of workers from them. [...] The Soviets' bureaucratization had set them apart from the lives of ordinary workers, who began to reduce their involvement in the Soviets and either lost all interest in politics or else looked instead to their own ad hoc bodies such as factory committees to take the initiative. This added strength to the Bolshevik campaign, which was largely channelled through these grass-roots organisations, for the recall of the Menshevik and SR leaders from the Soviets as part of Lenin's drive towards Soviet power.
- A People's Tragedy by Orlando Figes

Kornilov's failed coup is important in the history of the Russian Revolution. I could justify my perspective of events using Trotsky's history, he's bitingly critical, or China Mieville's narrative style, Mieville is almost embarrassed for the pair but following is in fact four extracts from respected histories of the period that are not overtly leftist or pro-Bolshevik. The simple fact of the matter is, Kornilov had ambitions and a vision of restoring order. Kerensky shared those visions somewhat but feared Kornilov expanding his targets to include him. The middlemen negotiating between them, particularly Lvov, contributed to utterly failed communications and a disintegration of their relationship. Kerensky flinched and the only force organised enough to prevent the decimation of Petrograd was the Bolshevik Party. In this timeline, this is expanded somewhat to be the entirety of the revolutionary left but the results remain somewhat the same - partly because they are an important culmination in the shift in tides towards the left and the failure of the right, and partly because I'm lazy and lack imagination.

In August, the coup from the right was finally attempted by General Lavr Kornilov, whom Kerensky had recently appointed Commander-in-Chief with a mandate to restore order and discipline in the Russian Army. Kornilov was evidently not motivated by personal ambition but by his sense of the national interest. He may, in fact, have believed that Kerensky would welcome an Army intervention to create a strong government and deal with left-wing troublemakers, since Kerensky, partially apprised of Kornilov's intentions, dealt with him in a peculiarly devious way. Misunderstandings between the two principle actors confused the situation, and the German's unexpected capture of Riga on the eve of Kornilov's move added to the mood of panic, suspicion, and despair that was spreading among Russia's civilian and military leaders. In the last week of August, baffled but determined, General Kornilov dispatched troops from the front to Petrograd, ostensibly to quell disorders in the capital and save the Republic.

The attempted coup failed largely because of the unreliability of the troops and the energetic actions of the Petrograd workers. Railwaymen diverted and obstructed the troop-trains; printers stopped publication of newspapers supporting Kornilov's move; metalworkers rushed out to meet the oncoming troops and explain that Petrograd was calm and their officers had deceived them. Under this pressure, the troops' morale disintegrated, the coup was aborted outside Petrograd without any serious military engagement
- The Russian Revolution by Sheila Fitzpatrick

Without asking what precisely Lvov had said, Kornilov confirmed his "urgent request" that Kerensky come to military headquarters. Believing this to be a trap and proof of a plot against him, Kerensky announced Kornilov's removal as commander-in-chief. A thunderstruck Kornilov responded in outrage at what he saw as betrayal and further proof of the government's weakness. He issued a statement denouncing Kerensky, the Soviet, and the Bolsheviks and ordered General Krymov, with the "Savage Division" and the Third Cavalry Corps, to take Petrograd. Now, however, Kerensky was rescued by the very Soviet and the workers and soldiers he had intended to move against. The socialist parties, always on the lookout for counterrevolution, responded energetically, calling on the workers and soldiers to rally to the defence of the revolution.
- The Russian Revolution, 1917 by Rex A Wade

On the following day, 26 August, Lvov met Kerensky again in the Winter Palace, He claimed that Kornilov was now demanding dictatorial powers for himself (he had done nothing of the sort) and, on Kerensky's request, listed the three points of his 'ultimatum': the imposition of martial law in Petrograd; the transfer of all civil authority to the Commander-in-Chief; and the resignation of all the ministers, including Kerensky himself, pending the formation of a new cabinet by Kornilov. Kerensky always claied that when he saw these demands everything instantly became clear: Kornilov was planning a military coup. In fact nothing was clear. For one thing, it might have been asked why Kornilov had chosen to deliver his list of demands through such a nonentity as Lvov. For another, it might have been sensible to check with Kornilov if he was really demanding to be made Dictator. But Kerensky was not concerned with such details. On the contrary, he had suddenly realised - and this is no doubt what he really meant by his lightning-flash of revelation - that as long as everything was kept vague he might succeed in exposing Kornilov as a traitor plotting against the Provisional Government. His own political fortunes would thus be revived as the revolution rallied behind him to defeat his rival.
- A People's Tragedy by Orlando Figes

Actually, there were almost no skirmishes between Kornilov's forces and those on the government's side during the entire affair. In the case of the First Don Cossack Division, agitators were soon drawing the troops to mass rallies before Krymov's very eyes. With relatively little difficulty they won soldier-representatives in most units to their point of view, and by August 30 some cossacks were expressing their readiness to arrest Krymov. Finally, late on the afternoon of August 30, a government emissary, Colonel Georgii Samarin, invited Krymov to accompany him back to Petrograd for talks with Kerensky. Given firm assurances of his personal safety, Krymov reluctantly acquiesced.
- The Bolsheviks Come to Power by Alexander Rabinowitch

Trotsky highlights the importance of how the coup's forces disintegrated so quickly when he says that, "there was no military encounter, but there was something far more dangerous: contact, social exchange, inter-penetration." Two things can be noted about the coup - firstly, that the Bolsheviks were vital in their discipline and organisation to mobilise the working class in defence; secondly, that more and more layers of society, even those who the establishment had counted on as their strongest tools, were susceptible to the agitation and propaganda of the left. In part, the Bolsheviks were just very good propagandists and, in another way, society and the Russian economy had broken down enough that such agitation struck deep. I will be talking about these developments in society in the next chapter as well as the development and building of the Soviet Alliance.

A scene of almost whimsical fantasy took place in Trotsky’s cell. The sailors of Kronstadt sent a delegation to ask him whether they ought to respond to Kerensky’s call and defend Kerensky against Kornilov or whether they should try to settle accounts with both Kornilov and Kerensky. To the hot-headed sailors the latter course certainly appealed more. Trotsky argued with them, reminding them how in May he had defended them in the Soviet and had said that if a counter-revolutionary general were to try to throw a noose around the neck of the revolution then ‘the sailors of Kronstadt would come and fight and die with us’. They must now honour this pledge and postpone the reckoning with Kerensky, which could not be far off anyhow. The sailors took his advice. While this was going on, the prosecution mechanically continued its job. The examination dragged on and Trotsky had to answer questions about his connexions with the German General Staff and the Bolsheviks. Antonov-Ovseenko and Krylenko, against whom no charges were brought after six weeks of imprisonment, threatened a hunger strike, but Trotsky tried to dissuade them. At length he decided to take no further part in the farce of interrogation. He refused to answer the examiner’s questions and gave his reasons in a letter to the Central Executive of the Soviets. Three days later, on 4 September, he was released on bail.
- The Prophet Armed by Isaac Deutscher
 
While Kerensky and Kornilov have their own share of the blame to shoulder, Lvov seems to have been the straw that broke the camel's back, at least from a surface read of the situation. My man's handling of the communications between the two principal actors was astonishingly poor it looks like.
 
Pronouns
he/him
So, it's been a while since I updated this. Thanks to Nyvis for reading the drafts and for Sumeragi for help sourcing materials. Hope you enjoy and don't hesitate to comment or ask questions!

Saving Soviet Democracy: A Russian Revolution Timeline
by GiantMonkeyMan

Interlude: Soviets, Unions, Factory Committees, and the Petrograd Metalworkers


For most of the history of the Russian working class their organisations had been illegal and brutally suppressed but nonetheless the working class was routinely willing to dismiss these laws as unjust and collectively struggle to improve their living conditions, their wages, and the conditions in their workplaces. Their organisations were spontaneous and embryonic, usually limited to one factory plant or one industry, and these organisations would try to negotiate with the management some improvement to the current state of affairs and either be successful or face repression and sometimes both as the management would initially give in to some key demands but later fire or have arrested all the organisations' leadership. Workers looked to the trade unions of the more developed working class in the European West but all such projects were illegalised before they could coalesce and so mostly the forms of organisation thrust upon Russian workers were vibrant, temporary, and sudden invasions into a normality of autocracy.

The working class was still a small minority of around 3 million in Russia prior to 1905 but it was during the strike wave and revolution of that year that the organisational form of the "soviet" became popularised and solidified. Prior to 1905, workers' organisations would take upon a multitude of different names but would mostly reflect the same sorts of projects facing the same sorts of struggles. "Sovet starost" (council of factory elders), "deputatskoe sobranie" (assembly of deputies), "komissija rabocich" (workers commission), "stacecnyj komitet" (strike committee), and a host of other names would be utilised and their flexibility, the lack of any specific terminology or structure, showed both their origins as springing from spontaneous traditions of struggle and their decentralisation.

The only official representation workers could expect were in the form of police-controlled unions but for obvious reasons these were unlikely to be fully supported by workers. In some cases the police-controlled unions' attempts at mitigating radicalism found themselves outpaced by the energetic desperation of the workers they claimed to represent. One such instance was in the midst of the war with Japan in 1905 which was rapidly becoming unpopular with the working class, particularly in the face of rising prices and worsening living conditions. Father Gapon, a priest who became the head of one such police union, unwittingly ended up leading a march of workers that intended to show their disgruntlement. His intention had been to direct the anger of the workers towards peacefully presenting a letter to the Tsar. The Tsarist state couldn't countenance such perceived arrogance and the demonstration was fired upon in a massacre that became known as Bloody Sunday. It was as if a fire burned in the major cities but in 1905 the strike waves and revolution emerged not because of the agitation of specific political parties or the organisational prowess of trade unions but on the contrary instead a spark met the tinder and it was from this developing struggle that trade unions emerged and the political party that most supported workers, the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, flourished.

Workers in factories organised meetings during which representatives were elected for sometimes temporary and sometimes permanent committees to engage with management for increases in wages, improvements in working conditions, and decreases in working hours. One such organisation developed in the Ivanovo Voznesensk district of Moscow in mid-May as 40,000 textile workers on strike elected 110 representatives to what would become the first recognised "soviet". The textile workers initially formed the soviet as a much familiar attempt to organise a strike to simply improve pay and conditions in the factory but the demands of the strike grew beyond that limited scope and the workers linked their struggle with the struggles of other workplaces, the struggles in the communities and neighbourhoods in Moscow, and the general struggle against the war. The military intervened in bloody clashes and although the soviet disbanded and the strike ended by July, it had caused a lasting impression on the Russian working class. By October the strike wave across Russia reached a new crescendo and this time the form of the "soviet" spread to Petrograd where a city-wide soviet was organised with one representative being elected for every 500 workers and radicals like Leon Trotsky emerged as powerful voices.

The revolution of 1905 was crushed, the workers' organisations made illegal once more, the revolutionaries arrested or exiled, and a wave of reactionary opposition arose once more to inflict pogroms on Jewish and minority communities and declare the unwavering defence of autocracy. The soviets had been disbanded but the memory of these community and workplace organs of power that had spread out along the iron arteries of the Russian rail network, developed and controlled by the disenfranchised and the oppressed, remained in the minds of working people and the small underground revolutionary network. Trotsky would suggest in his history of 1905 that "The Soviet’s strength was determined by the role of the proletariat in a capitalist society. The Soviet’s task was not to transform itself into a parody of parliament, not to organise equal representation of the interests of different social groups, but to give unity to the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat." and Lenin would say also in 1907 that "the soviets of workers deputies and their union are essential to the victory of the insurrection".

Following the First Russian Revolution of 1905, trade unions, much like radical political parties, existed in a state of semi-illegality. Being employed in vital heavy industry and working within large condensed factories with tight-knit communities, metalworkers were often at the forefront of industrial struggles and were tightly linked to the various formations of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party. Most trade unions lacked national bodies and organised within cities or districts and the St Petersburg Metalworkers' Union was among the most significant trade unions in Russia's pre-revolutionary history and yet even despite this it would only unite around 13% of the metalworkers in the city prior to 1917. Some workers actually argued for district or individual factory autonomy and some workers preferred to maintain the old system of factory elders however eventually a centralised city-wide union was eventually formed in the summer of 1906 in the aftermath of the revolutionary struggles in the year before. The St Petersburg Society of Mill and Factory Owners, representing a conglomerate of Russian capitalists, refused to recognise the Union and worked with the state to destroy the organisation whenever they could.

Prior to 1914, the Metal Workers' Union and its leadership faced constant harassment and oppression, being formally closed five times and having its journal censured for multiple perceived infractions and closed completely seven times. The Tsarist autocracy battled with the ideas of democracy and representation constantly. When the Second Duma, a grudging concession after the revolution, was closed in July of 1907 it was only twenty days later that the metalworkers in Petrograd also found their Union closed. Whilst the Union was formally centralised across the city, in concessions to the pressures of those that wanted decentralised autonomy, the Union had many institutional structures, such as district treasuries and strike co-ordination, that shielded it from easy suppression of its leadership as various districts would still have well-realised organisation. Between 1907 and 1912, the Union's leadership was largely composed of Mensheviks or their supporters, similarly to many emergent trade unions of the period including the railway workers' union, largely because they were seen to be committed to broad open and democratic workers organisations in the tradition of Western trade unionism.

Despite all its set backs and the hurdles that they had to overcome, the Metalworkers' Union became a focal point of militant proletarian class consciousness. It strove to improve the social, economic, and political conditions of workers throughout Petrograd. It was central to the growing strike wave that developed prior to the first world war, with the first six months of the year seeing one and a half million Russian workers on strike, and again after the initial wave of patriotism and repression at the start of the war had passed the Union was once more central to the building strike wave all the way up to the February Revolution. Bolshevik Alexander Shliapnikov returned to Petrograd in April of 1914 and, partly to reacquaint himself with the workers movement and partly to avoid the suspicions of the police, decided to turn down the offer of the Petrograd Party for a leadership role to instead get a job in a metalworking factory. He managed to get work at first the New Lessner Works and then later at the prestigious Ericsson factory, where only the most skilled found work.

Shliapnikov was a metalworker and Bolshevik organiser who due to his commitment and dedication became a member of the Petersburg Committee of the Bolsheviks at the age of 22 but this rise in prominence had garnered police attention and forced him to flee in exile to France. He became a "worker-intelligentsia", working in French factories and writing articles for both trade union and Bolshevik Party publications, sometimes under the pseudonym "Metallist". He was a quick mind and became fluent in French and heavily involved in the French trade union movement. He developed a strong romantic relationship with fellow Russian socialist emigre Alexandra Kollontai and although their relationship eventually ended she would remain fond of him and they would develop similar ideas of strong working class autonomy and grassroots organising. Lenin also recognised his worth and as Shliapnikov travelled in Europe and worked in different cities the two exchanged letters and coordinated. Eventually he decided to return to Russia using a false passport and immediately reintroduced himself to the workers movement at the ground level saying, "I am in admiration of our proletariat. Since I last left Petersburg, it is as if it has been reborn. Real leaders have emerged from the deep cadres of the working class; despite exiles and arrests, the cause has moved forward".

He had hoped to stay in Russia indefinitely but the war violently interrupted those plans as the autocracy began an even harsher crackdown of individuals involved in illegal political activities. With the blessing of the Bolshevik Duma faction and the Petrograd Bolsheviks, he fled to Sweden and became an intermediary between the Bolsheviks within Russia and Lenin and the other exiled leadership but once those networks had been set up with the help of Swedish social democrats, Shliapnikov found himself struggling for funds and eventually went to seek work in factories in England where he joined the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, a militant trade union that accepted only the most skilled workers. However, towards the end of 1915 it became clear that, after the repression of the Bolsheviks within Russia, that the party needed co-ordination and Lenin implored Shliapnikov to return to Russia and reorganise the smuggling routes for correspondence and newspapers as well ensure that the party remained healthy. Shliapnikov had a conspiratorial bent and favoured finding dedicated worker-organisers instead of less reliable members of the intelligentsia so under his influence rose prominent worker-bolsheviks like Kliment Voroshilov and Yuri Lutovinov and Shliapnikov would also recruit Bolshevik student activist Vyacheslav Molotov for help in editing Pravda.

Lenin chaffed at the distance between himself and the struggles in Russia during the war and Shliapnikov often felt frustration at being the middleman in his arguments with other party members and as a result during one such dispute over some articles in Kommunist, a journal ran by Bukharin, Shliapnikov wrote back to Lenin "I relayed your decision, but of course not in such a harsh form as your postcard. And I further refuse to be your intermediary in this affair". Lenin respected him enough to write back an immediate apology but Shliapnikov was a forgiving person, understood Lenin's frustrations, and at the time was largely focused on the building struggle within the War Industries Committees. The War Industries Committees were established by the Kadets and the Octobrists in an effort to placate workers through the election of workers' representatives to help in the organising of vital plants and to circumvent the ponderously slow Tsarist bureaucracy. The Bolsheviks boycotted the Committees as they were organs used with the aim of furthering the imperialist war effort but nonetheless all the factions of the RSDLP and the nascent anarcho-syndicalist movement participated in the elections on the factory floor as they were vital moments to agitate and argue freely and openly.

It was in the midst of the organisation of the Labour Group of the War Industries Committees, led by the Menshevik Kuz’ma Gvozdev, that the idea of reviving the factory committees was discussed openly only months before the February Revolution. Out of the 1905 revolution, "factory committee" became the accepted term for the embryonic workers' organisations within a single workplace whilst "soviet" had come to mean a very specific working class organ that stepped beyond the individual factory or shop floor into the broader community and into broader political argument. Close to 60% of all workers in Petrograd were involved in the metalworking industry and the most concentrated elements were largely centred in the Vyborg District and they were young, literate, and militant. The largest strike during the war to date occurred on January 9th with 200,000 workers in Petrograd with metalworkers at the forefront. It was but a prelude of the February Revolution in which women workers demanded bread on February 23rd, taking their demands to the streets and into the factories, and then two days later the workers of the Vyborg district lead a General Strike in which again over 200,000 workers participated and with complete political chaos came the abdication of Tsar Nicholas.

The factory shop floors became large meeting areas for thousands of workers to share their disgruntlement with the war and the state of the economy. Factory committees sprung up organically in these conditions to make sometimes mundane and sometimes entirely radical demands on the shop floor. Some factory committees argued for the complete transfer of production into workers' control, the end of the war, and the end of Tsarism while other committees had more simple demands like increases in wages or the continuation of production, and thus their jobs, despite turbulent economic conditions. The most common demand was for the eight hour working day. It was the demand that initially divided the Liberal controlled Provisional Government, who wanted to maximise war production, and the more Social Democratic Petrograd Soviet but on March 10th the Provisional Government acquiesced and recognised the eight-hour day within the capital on the same day that the Petrograd Owners Association agreed with the Soviet to allow the formation of factory committees. The factory committees had mostly pragmatic motives, organised by the workers themselves to improve the general working conditions that they inhabited day to day and there were as likely to co-operate with management to ensure the smooth running of the workplace as they were to organise wildcat strikes.

Shliapnikov was the most senior Bolshevik on the ground in Petrograd during the February Revolution and became a central figure in the Petrograd Soviet. Due to his experience as a metalworker and a revolutionary both in Russia and abroad, he was well respected by the grassroots working class of the city but with the return of Kamenev and Stalin from internal exile he found himself pushed to the sidelines as the two preferred to moderate the revolutionary demands in order to better co-operate with the Mensheviks in the Soviet. Instead, he dedicated himself to trying to reconstitute the city-wide Metalworkers' Union and after a near miss collision with an automobile he claimed his focus sharpened from the brush with mortality. Despite his, and many others', efforts the metalworkers were among the last to actually form (or reform, as it were) an official trade union after February, regardless of the fact that the metalworkers were at the forefront of militancy, in part due to the conflict of interests between individual workplace factory committees and industry-wide trade unionism. However, on 23rd of April during a city-wide assembly of metalworkers an agreement was made with various nascent metalworker union branches to formally approve of the Metalworkers' Union's statutes as a coherent and encompassing body. On the 7th of May Shliapnikov himself, a Menshevik Volkov, who would eventually join Martov's Socialist-Internationalists, and an independent socialist Gastev, who would eventually swing towards the Bolsheviks after the July Days, were all elected to a central board of the Petrograd Union.

Soon after the formation of the Petrograd Metalworkers' Union, an industrial union encompassing all workers in the industry, there formed a union of welders, a craft union trying to organise a specific job within the metalworking industry. Shliapnikov warned the members of the welders' craft union that they threatened to undermine the unity of workers' struggles but the union persisted nonetheless. Craft unionism was largely insignificant in the grander scheme of things and across Russia industrial unionism remained the preferred organisational method. Prior to the February revolution, trade unions had largely been illegalised and suppressed by the Tsarist autocracy but by the end of the year Petrograd would be the most unionised city in the world and 90% of those union members were part of industrial unions, uniting all the workers in one industry, regardless of pay grade or skill level. In June, workers and trade union activists would organise a Trade Union Conference and overwhelmingly offer its support for industrial unionism.

In many ways, the conflicts between the Union trying to organise the broad challenges of workers throughout the whole industry, the factory committees struggling and organising amidst the specific challenges of individual factories, and the Soviet trying to balance a broad political struggle with constant pressures from its constituent parts, exemplifies the same layered and nuanced internal struggles being repeated across Russia often between groupings and organs of power that should technically be struggling towards the same goals. The Bolsheviks had many dedicated and militant worker-organisers within the factory committees, competing on the far left with the much smaller and less organised anarcho-syndicalists, but mostly the party considered the trade unions to be the central organ of workers' struggles. Shliapnikov, influenced by his experiences in Western trade unions and due to his position in the Petrograd Metalworkers' Union, tended to think the trade union as a coordinating body was key but he also recognised the importance of the committees and tried to get them to associate with the unions and work within the unions where possible.

Between the 30th of May and the 5th of June, the First Conference of the Factory Committees of Petrograd and Its Environs was convened representing nearly 80 percent of all the workers in Petrograd through 367 factory committees. The Mensheviks opposed the move towards a co-ordination of factory committees as they had found a lot of traction within the burgeoning trade union movement whilst the anarchists opposed what they saw as centralisation but ultimately the Central Council of Factory Committees for the City of Petrograd was formed with a strong Bolshevik influence. Shliapnikov, much like many Bolsheviks, gathered many hats in this period being on the chair of the Metalworkers Union, being involved in the Council of Factory Committees, as well as being involved in the formation of workers' militias and the Red Guard as a representative of the Petrograd Soviet. All these formations were inherently interwoven within the general struggle ongoing throughout the city and Russia.

Within the factory committees, as within the unions and the Soviet itself, the question of workers' control consistently arose and throughout 1917 there were constant moments where workers asserted "workers' control" in conflict with the management. However, what this actually constituted to the rank and file differed greatly depending on the factory, the skill of the workers, whether the trade union or the factory committee was more influential, and a host of other factors. For some workers, "workers' control" just meant having respect on the shop floor instead of being abused or the management using diminutive terms of address. For others the right to decide hours and the bargain for wages was considered "workers' control". Some saw workers' control as the oversight and organisation of the factory by the Soviet and others that the rank and file workers would co-ordinate production and distribution through the factory committees. What is clear throughout this period is that the Bolshevik's grassroots organisers were far to the left of their leadership in calling for the factory committees to instate direct control and Shliapnikov and other leading Bolsheviks at times had to wade through turbulent waters during this debate.

The end of June and the beginning of July saw the tumultuous build up to the July Days but specifically for the Petrograd Metalworkers Union there began the establishment of the All-Russian Metalworkers Union. The trade union leadership and rank and file radicals argued in the period over the domain and authority of the trade unions and the factory committees. Shliapnikov was amongst the trade union moderates, wanting to fold the factory committees into the trade unions, but he had been working since April very closely with the Bolshevik activists in the factory committees and later with the Central Council of Factory Committees and so had much influence on the rank and file. He tried to articulate a system in which factory committees would provide the organ within which the industry-wide unions could organise and guide the struggle. Similar conflicts and overlapping layers of control and responsibility were taking place across Russia due to the very decentralised and spontaneous nature of the revolutionary upheaval established after the February Revolution. It was during this period that Shliapnikov began organising with Metalworkers in Moscow and coordinating with the left wing Bolsheviks in Russia's Second Capital such as Timofei Sapronov.

The Metalworkers' Union Leadership called on the demonstrators in July to remain peaceful, to avoid armed confrontation, but they still supported the striking workers and although the Union had particular influence amongst the Vyborg workers many of the rank and file activists were amongst the most militant workers. Many Menshevik trade unionists during this period were joining Trotsky and Martov's Socialist-Internationalists and by the end of July the entirety of the All-Russian Metalworkers' Union central committee was composed of either Bolsheviks, Socialist-Internationalists, or left-wing independent socialists. The factory committees, due to their decentralised nature, either joined the demonstrations whole-heartedly or urged caution amongst their members. Ultimately, the shift in political rhetoric in all arenas of discussion and organisation in this period became more radical and more militant. July and August saw some of the greatest levels of participation within the factory committees mainly because all across Russia reaction was rearing its ugly head in the form of Black Hundreds and the threat of right-wing military autocracy led by Kornilov so most of the workers saw the need to organise within the workplace to prevent any reversion to the old days prior to the gains won after the February revolution.

With the arrest of Lenin and many other leading Bolsheviks, Shliapnikov, by necessity, was launched back into a senior leadership role. Along with Yakov Sverdlov, who was the primary organisational figure of the Bolsheviks during this period, Shliapnikov recognised the threat of the possibility of a sweeping series of arrests, or even potential assassinations, that could lead to the Bolsheviks becoming rudderless and the revolution destroyed. Shliapnikov set about ensuring that within districts, within factories, Bolshevik activists had the tools needed to operate autonomously and co-ordinate the defence of the working class and, whilst he distrusted much of the intelligentsia of other parties, he ensured that the Bolshevik worker-organisers co-operated with rank and file Socialist-Internationalists and Left-SRs. Rank and file Bolsheviks were demoralised by Lenin's arrest but the threat of suppression by Kornilov mobilised them rapidly. Through the Metalworkers' Union and the factory committees, Shliapnikov coordinated the formation of the Red Guards that would defend the city of Petrograd from the advance of Kornilov's forces during the failed coup attempt. The Provisional Government's credibility was destroyed. All across Russia, workers were radicalising and peasants were revolting. When finally the Soviet Alliance emerged from their jail cells after finally being granted bail they found, already prepared, a working class hungry for power.

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These committees carried various labels: assembly of delegates or deputies (delegatskoe, deputatskoe sobranie), workers commission (komissija rabocich), commission of electors (komissija vybornych), council of factory eiders (sovet starost), council of authorized representatives (sovet upolnomocennych), strike committee (stacecnyj komitet), and the like- or simply deputies (deputaty).
- The Soviets: The Russian Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers Councils by Oskar Anweiler

As one of Russia's largest trade unions and as a focal point of Social Democratic organizing activity, the St. Petersburg Metal Workers' Union was among the most significant of the prerevolutionary trade unions. Its history is richly suggestive not only of the patterns and problems of the Russian labor movement as a whole in the critical 1907-1914 period, but of the distinctive features of the Russian labor experience as compared to that of its Western counterpart. Even a cursory glance at this history would note the extraordinary repression the union suffered at the hands of the autocracy—in the prerevolutionary period the union was closed five times, its journal seven times, and its governing board racked by countless arrests. The union faced by all accounts the strongest employers' association in the country and sustained a remarkably high rate of failure in its strikes. Although one of the largest and most militant of the prewar unions, i t never united more than 13 percent of the capital's metal workers and waged a continuous and on balance unsuccessful struggle against factory-based labor organizations. Further, the councils of the metal workers' union were often rent by the intense, bitter, and divisive fractional struggles of Social Democracy. The union developed as well in the context of significant structural change in the metal-working industry, at first in a period of sharp economic dislocation and high unemployment, later in a period of economic growth and expansion. Metal workers suffered the unique strains and anxieties of a rationalizing industry, and their union struggled to interpret and respond to these pressures.
- Labour and Management in Conflict: The St Petersburg Metal-Working Industry, 1900-1914 by Heather Jane Hogan

He yearned to return to St. Petersburg, where worker unrest was growing. In April 1914 he entered Russia with the passport of a French citizen (Jacob Noé). When he returned to Russia, he had been away for so long that he already ‘felt like a tourist’ in his native land, indicating how strongly Western Europe had shaped his identity. In Petersburg he met with Bolshevik Party leaders Lev Kamenev, Alexei Badaev and Grigory Petrovsky, but claimed later that he felt uncomfortable in the presence of Roman Malinovsky, who in 1918 was convicted of having been a police informer and shot. By keeping Malinovsky unaware of his whereabouts, Shlyapnikov unwittingly avoided the wave of arrests that decimated the ranks of Bolshevik leaders and activists in summer 1914. [...] Not long after Shlyapnikov arrived, Petersburg Bolshevik leaders offered him a post in the central Party organisation, due to his past membership in the Petersburg Committee and his leadership experience abroad. Instead, he chose to work in factories because he wanted to reacquaint himself with working-class life, make new contacts among workers and avoid police attention.
- Alexander Shliapnikov, 1885-1937: Life of an Old Bolshevik by Barbara Allen

In need of funds, Shlyapnikov sought factory work in England. To Lenin’s continued protests, he finally answered that not only was he unable to support himself and Bolshevik operations, but that he needed to help his mother in Murom. Having arrived in London in early April 1915, he established contact with Maxim Litvinov, the most prominent Bolshevik in England and later Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs. Within four days of his arrival, Shlyapnikov found work as a turner at the Fiat automobile plant in Wembley, near London. Although he corresponded with cc members infrequently in the summer of 1915, he lectured at Russian clubs on the revolutionary movement in Russia and in Scandinavia. He spoke English well enough to discuss his opposition to the war and his political views with British workers. Moreover, he joined and participated in the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, a militant British union, and was proud of his membership. It was not easy for foreigners to join the ASE. Shlyapnikov’s acceptance marked recognition of his advanced metalworking skills. Generally, English workers positively impressed him; he perceived them as less militarist or chauvinist than workers in ‘semi-free’ European countries.
- Alexander Shliapnikov, 1885-1937: Life of an Old Bolshevik by Barbara Allen

The workers’ economic struggle was once again partially legalized before the war, and trade unions and locally elected factory committees, often under Bolshevik leadership, waged a number of quite militant struggles in the 1912-1914 period.7 Russia’s entry into the war dealt a severe though temporary blow to this process. Many Russian workers, like their European counterparts, put aside their class demands and rallied under the flag of patriotism. Labour organizations were again decimated, partly by renewed tsarist repression and partly by the call-up of many workers to the front, especially the more militant. Many large plants were even militarized, the workers legally treated as mobilized soldiers. By 1915, however, strike activity had resumed again, but the strike committees did not become permanent organs. In the summer of 1915, legal worker representation at the plant level was again revived under the system of War Industries Committees, which was initiated by the Constitutional Democrats (Kadets) and the Octobrists, two liberal bourgeois parties, in an effort to free Russian industry from the constraints of tsarist bureaucracy. Workers representatives, elected in two stages beginning at the plant level, were to sit in a special section on the War Industries Committees, but their proportion of votes was minimal. Although the Bolsheviks boycotted the committees on the grounds that they furthered the aims of an imperialist war, all sections of the Social Democratic Party participated in the plant elections, which provided the first opportunity since the beginning of the war for public meetings and open political debate.
- Workers Control and Socialist Democracy: The Soviet Experience by Carmen Sirianni

For example, the location of most printing shops not in the predominantly industrial and working-class peripheries but in the centre, populated by the more affluent and educated elements, undoubtedly reinforced the ties felt by the printers towards 'society' as well as their perceptions of the power of the propertied classes compared to the workers. By contrast, working in the militant atmosphere of the Vyborg District with its large cadre of skilled metalworkers, its homogeneous proletarian population and revolutionary reputation, the wartime newcomers were more quickly assimilated into the prevailing spirit of working-class radicalism here than elsewhere.
- The Petrograd Workers and the Fall of the Old Regime by David Mandel

The Vyborg District continued to lead. Large factories provided the major meeting places that held thousands of workers, with orators of different ideological persuasions all advocating radical actions. An Okhrana spy, Limonin’ (Bolshevik Shurkanov) noted that factories were turned into ‘grandiose’ clubs. Experienced orators electrified the workers and attempted to coordinate actions for strikes and demonstrations. At New Parvianen more than 5,000 workers assembled at the mining workshop, where the Bolshevik, Menshevik-Internationalist, and SR orators appealed to fight against the war and tsarism.
- The February Revolution, 1917 by Tsuyoshi Hasegawa

The demand for the eight-hour day was the most insistent of all in the early weeks of the revolution. It had been part of the Social Democratic programme since 1898, and had been central throughout the stormy months of 1905. In 1917 it was one of the first issues that threatened to tear apart the hastily constructed coalition of bourgeois liberals in the Provisional Government and the reformist socialist leadership of the Petrograd Soviet. And, indeed, it threatened to alienate the workers from their Soviet leaders, who did not press the issue vigorously until the workers in many plants in Petrograd and Moscow simply stopped working after eight hours. An agreement with the Provisional Government on 10 March did recognize the eight-hour day in the capital, and as the news spread, workers elsewhere pressed the demand with similar insistence. But the owners soon reneged, arguing that the shortened day threatened to disrupt war production. The Soviet leaders accepted this rationale, and many workers seemed to do so as well, with the added compensation of double pay for overtime in many places. But the issue remained alive, especially as the justifications for continuing the war began to lose cogency in face of the repeated defeats of the Russian armies over the next few months.
- Workers Control and Socialist Democracy: The Soviet Experience by Carmen Sirianni

The Mensheviks, who opposed the formation of a factory-committee centre independent of the Central Council of Trade Unions, voted against the proposal, as did the Anarcho- Syndicalists, who feared the overcentralization of the movement. But the conference approved the proposal and elected nineteen Bolsheviks, two Mensheviks, two SRs, one Interdistricter (Trotsky’s group), and one Anarcho-Syndicalist to the twenty-five member council. Later in the month, the Organization Bureau of the state artillery enterprises was merged with the Central Council. The functions of the Council were to include directing the acquisition of fuel, raw materials, machinery, and markets; the distribution of financial and technical information; and the establishment of a committee to aid the peasants (mostly by providing farm implements). Members of the Central Council, which was in more or less permanent session, also participated in various government boards and state agencies concerned with labour, defence, and supply, although usually only to demand two-thirds representation for itself.
- Workers Control and Socialist Democracy: The Soviet Experience by Carmen Sirianni

Perhaps more importantly, the workers viewed these conflicts against the background of both the government's plan to 'unload' Petrograd and the long history of recourse to lockouts by Petrograd industrialists as a favourite means of struggle against the workers' political as well as economic demands. The defensive or reactive nature of workers' control explains why the demand did not really come into its own until May when the situation had become sufficiently serious. Even so, control in the sense of access to documents and comprehensive monitoring of management was still very rare in this period. A Soviet study of 'instances of control' for May and June in 84 Petrograd factories (employing 230 000 workers) found that only 24.5 per cent of all cases involved any sort of control over production, with another 8.7 per cent over finances and sales. For the rest, 24.6 per cent had to do with 'control over conditions of work', 24.1 per cent with hiring and dismissals, and 7.5 per cent with guarding the plants-all areas previously subsumed under the March demand for 'control over internal order'.
- The Petrograd Workers and the Fall of the Old Regime by David Mandel

Foreign Minister Milyukov, in assuring the Allies in a 20 April telegram that Russia would wage war according to the tsarist government’s treaties with them, radicalised many leftists. By the Bolsheviks’ Seventh Party Conference (24–9 April 1917), a large majority of delegates agreed with Lenin’s positions on the Provisional Government and the war. Nevertheless, the conference did not agree wholly with his claim that Russia was undergoing a transition to socialist revolution, but leaned somewhat towards Kamenev’s position that Russia was still in the process of a bourgeois-liberal revolution. Shlyapnikov played a minimal role in this sea change in the Party, because in April he suffered concussion in an automobile accident and was hospitalised for several weeks.14 His incapacitation pushed him further from the centre of party activity.
- Alexander Shliapnikov, 1885-1937: Life of an Old Bolshevik by Barbara Allen

In addition to the Socialist-Internationalists having an influence on the trade union movement, turning many of the leaders of the trade unions away from the more moderate socialists and more specifically the Mensheviks, in this timeline Alexander Shliapnikov avoids being his by an automobile on the streets of Petrograd and as a result is more central to the organising of the Factory Committee Council, the All-Russian Metalworkers' Union, and the general rank and file organising of the Bolshevik Party. What I'm hoping to set up here is that Shliapnikov had a lot of potential through his influence with the grassroots workers within Petrograd and in this timeline he might be closer to reaching that potential in part because he avoids a stay in the hospital and remains directly involved in party organising. The Bolsheviks, as a result, become slightly more oriented towards the rank and file radicalism that was so endemic during this period.

Craft unionism was therefore by no means a spent force in 1917, but its strength was not great, if one compares Russia to other countries. By October 1917, Petrograd had one of the highest levels of unionisation in the world, and at least 90% of trade unionists in the city were members of industrial unions. Measured against this achievement, craft unionism must be counted a failure. This failure was partly due to the fact that the guild tradition had never been powerful in Russia, whereas in Western Europe craft unions were heirs to a vital guild 'tradition'.35 More importantly, however, craft unionism and trade unionism were not suited to an industrial environment where the majority of wage-earners worked in modern factories. Even the skilled craftsmen in these factories were not of the same type as those who had formed the 'new model' unions in Britain after the demise of Chartism. They therefore tended to see their interests as being best defended in alliance with less skilled factory workers, rather than in isolation from them. We shall see that sectional pressures of all kinds existed within the Russian labour movement in 1917 and were a force to be reckoned with, but they did not seriously endanger the project of industrial unionism.
- Red Petrograd: Revolution in the Factories, 1917-1918 by SA Smith

Shlyapnikov numbered among the moderate union leaders, including Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, who favoured the subordination of factory committees to industrial unions at the factory level. Bolshevik radicals, on the other hand, advocated an independent role for the committees. At the First Conference of the Petrograd Factory Committees, held on 30 May–5 June 1917, radical Bolsheviks won approval of a central council for the factory committees, thus unifying the factory-committee movement. The alarmed moderates saw this as a threat to trade unions, but the radicals held a stronger position. The radicals conceded that the Central Council of Factory Committees should coordinate its actions with the All-Russian Central Trade Union Council (VTsSPS), but there was no indication of any subordinate relationship. In addition, Shlyapnikov and some other moderate Bolsheviks won election to the Central Council of Factory Committees. When reporting the results to the Petrograd Metalworkers’ Union, Shlyapnikov attempted to soften the blow by emphasising similarities and minimising differences between moderates and radicals, but his colleagues refused to surrender.
- Alexander Shliapnikov, 1885-1937: Life of an Old Bolshevik by Barbara Allen

The nadir of popular participation seems to have been reached in July and August, due to a convergence of factors whose relative significance is not completely clear. In Petrograd, fear and a sense of isolation among the militant workers after the July repression and the unleashing of the right-wing Black Hundreds surely played a part. As class and party polarization increased, the more militant workers may have shifted the focus of activity to the Bolshevik party. After General Kornilov’s attempted march on the city in late August, a renewed burst of activity and participation occurred, as workers saw the gains of February threatened, and also perceived the chance of extending the revolution with the support of the moderate socialist forces. In Moscow as well, there was renewed interest and participation after the Kornilov threat. July and August were also months of vacation for many, of temporary plant closures and travel to the countryside for the five major religious holidays of the late summer period.
- Workers Control and Socialist Democracy: The Soviet Experience by Carmen Sirianni
 
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he/him
I swear, all this build up to the October Revolution is giving me blue balls. You're an evil evil person, GMM, teasing us like this. 😳
As I said before, it's a major fake-out to trick you. Cossacks will be riding up the Don in the next chapter and wiping out the Reds first in Moscow and then in Petrograd. Chapter after that is the restoration of liberal democracy and it turns out that everything would have been absolutely perfect as a result with no problems or issues at all.
 
Pronouns
he/him
Saving Soviet Democracy: A Russian Revolution Timeline
By GiantMonkeyMan

Chapter 11:

In some ways it was almost an exchange of prisoners. Lenin, Martov, and the other prisoners of the Provisional Government emerged one after the other over the first week of September as the legal proceedings being levied against them were finally overwhelmed. Even the anarchist Bleikman was granted bail, paid for by collections from the Vyborg factory workers. On the opposite side Kornilov and his co-conspirators were absconded to a prison of a very different type than that of Kresty, a jail that had been in use since the 1700's. The supporters of the attempted coup found themselves confined to a monastery in Bykhov in the Mogilev region. Their "jailers" were chosen from among the soldiers that the Provisional Government still had the authority to command, since most of the pro-Soviet soldiers' committees were passing motions calling for Kornilov's immediate execution, and so the guards were largely chosen from among those sympathetic to the coup. As a result the imprisoned officers were visited by their families daily whilst Kornilov himself kept his bodyguards and acted as if he was still the head of an army.

Kerensky was desperate to assert his authority and demanded the disbandment of the impromptu defence committees and militia organisations that had been established when the threat of Kornilov's advance became apparent. The Committee for Struggle Against the Counterrevolution met, dismissed Kerensky's orders, and vowed to continue their vigilance in the face of potential reactionary attacks. A meeting of soldiers of the Petrogradsky Guard Regiment declared that the Capitalist-Ministers, the government that Kerensky had assembled, should be removed and instead replaced with a government "made up exclusively of socialists who have suffered in prisons for the people's cause and who have wasted the best years of their lives in far-off Siberia". The Petrograd garrison wasn't the only part of the armed forces that started to reject the authority of the Provisional Government. Stankevich, who had been appointed Head Commissar of the Army by the new government in the aftermath of Kornilov's coup, said of the situation amongst the troops, "The Bolsheviks lifted up their heads, and felt themselves to be complete masters in the army. The lower committees began to turn into Bolshevik nuclei. Every election in the army showed an amazing Bolshevik growth. And moreover it is impossible to ignore the fact that the best and most tightly disciplined army, not only on the Northern front but perhaps on the whole Russian front, the Fifth Army, was the first to elect a Bolshevik army committee.”

On the 6th of September the Ekaterinburg Soviet declared that they no longer recognised the authority of the Provisional Government. In Tiflis, the capital of Georgia, the Mensheviks had split hard and in the wake of the coup the Socialist-Internationalists captured the majority of the support in the city soviet. In Helsinki the Left SRs seized the party organisation, beginning a co-operation with Finnish Bolsheviks and socialists, and in Krasnoryarsk in Siberia the Bolsheviks gained a majority in the soviet. Lenin drafted and wrote up an article "On Compromises" in which he once again argued for the peaceful transfer of power away from the self-appointed Provisional Government and to the Soviet Executive. "The Mensheviks and the Right SRs, being the government bloc, would agree to form a government wholly and exclusively responsible to the Soviets," he wrote. For Lenin and many in his wing, there was a sense that the Bolsheviks could lead a "loyal opposition" to a moderate socialist government, an opposition that would uphold internationalism and would only take power when "a dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasants has been realised". He would continue, "There is a third voice, a chorus from the supporters of Martov and Natanson, that unhesitatingly support the motions and arguments of the Bolsheviks and the revolutionary proletariat and yet hesitate at the question of power".

Momentarily the prospect of some sort of co-operation between the revolutionary elements and the more moderate socialists seemed a possibility. Sections of the Socialist Revolutionaries, mainly among Victor Chernov's supporters, recognised the possibility of an SR-led government that would bypass the liberals and the conservatives. The core stumbling block was that the Union of Left Socialist Revolutionaries were chipping away at the SR membership and influence, Spiridonova and Kamkov were still technically fugitives although it was well known at this point that they were guests of the Soviet in Kazan which had fully broken from the Provisional Government after news of the attempted coup. Kalegaev, the Left-SR head of the Kazan Soviet, had ordered the city's garrison to ignore all further orders from the Provisional Government, the soldiers listened and agreed, and with the Bolsheviks had organised a Red Guard of factory workers. In the surrounding countryside, emboldened peasant supporters of Spiridonova burned down the estates, set up peasant soviets, and began redistributing land resulting in a desperate series of communications to the Provisional Government, pleas for help from private landowners associations. The right-wing leadership of the SRs were aghast at this open radicalism and confrontational direct action.

Chernov's wing of the party, already pressured and marginalised, were ordered through SR party mechanisms by Avksentiev to maintain discipline, to not reach out to the "traitors" or, perhaps even worse, the Bolsheviks, and to maintain the alliance with the Kadets and the liberals in order to support the Provisional Government. The editors of Delo Naroda and Viola Naroda, the major SR newspapers, refused to print Chernov's castigation of Kerensky's handling of the crisis, fearing it would confuse and divide the party further. Similarly, the Mensheviks were shaken by events but due to the chasm that had opened up between them and the Socialist-Internationalists that supported Martov there could be no suggestion of any co-operation or engagement. Everywhere and always the Bolsheviks were blamed by the moderates which had the side effect of ensuring many ordinary workers or soldiers would look at their flailing and powerlessness and consider Bolshevism as the only alternative. If the SRs and the Mensheviks were so content to keep working with the Kadets and the Generals, who everyone knew wanted to form a military dictatorship and crush the revolution, why shouldn't they instead put their trust in the Bolsheviks who had in contrast stalwartly defended the revolution at every turn? For a while Bolshevik activists had been heckled as German spies and now the Mensheviks and the SRs were facing the wrath of those fed up with their associations with a hated war and a parasitic conglomerate of business interests.

Within the Petrograd Soviet the question of power was on everyone's lips. Mark Liber, a Menshevik, proclaimed that "the Kadets have been thrown from the chariot, but let us take heed lest we end up in it by ourselves" and the Trudovik Sergei Znamensky suggested that "there are social and political groups apart from the Kadets that can walk arm in arm with us". One by one, radical voices that had up until recently been imprisoned by the Provisional Government took up the cry for breaking with Kerensky and forging a socialist coalition government, centred on the Soviet but, even if the wind had changed dragging the ship of revolution leftward on a turbulent sea, through inertia the Soviet Executive remained controlled largely by comparatively right wing individuals whose parties were slowly being chipped away in the factories and the villages. Trotsky, an expert at cutting through chicanery, asked a simple question of the Executive: Kerensky had once straddled both Soviet and Provisional Government, did he still remain a part of the Soviet? At one time Kerensky had been a popular figure but it was obvious that many had become disillusioned with him. Unable to give up their coalition with the government, the Executive affirmed their support of Kerensky and his part in the Soviet and with that they affirmed in the eyes of many that they were an anchor dragging behind the advance of progress.

As is the way with many moribund bureaucratic organisations, the answer to the question on everyone's lips from the Executive was to call for another meeting. They deigned to organise a Democratic Conference in Petrograd, a sort of mirror of Kerensky's ill-fated conference in Moscow but one with an actual purpose in mind: defending the coalition government and setting up the basis for election for a Constituent Assembly, a democratic parliament for all Russia. Organising a Constituent Assembly had been a demand for many from the beginning, it was even suggested that such an election should have taken place in September, but continuously the Provisional Government delayed and the Soviet Executive hesitated. Many tired and frustrated people of Russia, who longed for greater democratic representation, questioned why they hadn't arranged the election in April, May, June, or any period really, and why there were constant delays. The Kadets, the Constitutional Democrats, were supposed to be the driving force for the Constituent Assembly but again and again they prevaricated and now in September they worried about greater issues for their party. Would they even win such an election? The Democratic Conference was a sort of compromise that was first discussed by the Soviet and agreed upon as Kornilov was advancing on the city but in the aftermath, as rival voices were free from prison and now free to enter the Soviet once again and demanded breaking with the Kadets altogether, the Mensheviks and the SRs determined to make the Conference theirs and argue the case for coalition government.

The Soviet Executive had a lot of institutional power and the SRs were still a hugely influential and important party so the composition of those attending was gerrymandered to weight things towards the moderate socialists. Unlike during Kerensky's Moscow Conference, at this assembly there was no extending of the hand towards business interests or military Generals. Some of the more right-wing Socialist Revolutionaries, those who had virtually abandoned all notions of revolutionary socialism, conspired to reject any participation from members of the breakaway ULSR but the newly formed party was rapidly becoming just as influential as its estranged parent organisation. Instead, Avram Gots and Avksentiev worked to prevent Chernov from attending to ensure that no-one from their party would openly support any of the motions from the ULSR and reveal the tensions within their organisation. The man who had been the guiding light for the SRs for so long, the man who was still considered by many the grandparent of the revolution, was now finding himself cut out from his party's print media and cut out from the party's decision-making.

The Democratic Conference was, in a way, an attempt by the Executive to justify their continued grip on power and the continued co-operation with the Kerensky government. The socialist-ministers of Kerensky's government, including Kerensky himself, were to be key speakers and the assembly was to be convened on the 15th of September but the work of the Soviet continued in the meantime. On the 9th, the Bolsheviks pushed hard on the prospect of a reelection of the Presidium of the Soviet Executive, composed as it was of the right-wing Menshevik-SR clique that had remained virtually unchanged since the Soviet's founding, in order to better reflect the clear changes in the composition of the Soviet as more and more factories and soldiers' soviets were recalling their current representatives and then electing Bolsheviks or other radicals instead. Kamenev knew that the soldiers were still on active garrison duty and their attendance during proceedings in the soviet fluctuated dependent on the time of the day and he recognised that the soldiers' soviets were more likely to support SRs despite at this point essentially entirely rejecting the authority of the Provisional Government. With Shliapnikov and Sverdlov working to ensure that all Bolshevik worker representatives were present, Kamenev's legislation to reelect the Presidium through proportional representation passed despite the grumblings of the SRs and Mensheviks and a proportional representation election would take place on the 25th. There was a lot of inertia maintaining the SRs and to a lesser extent the Mensheviks and a lot of soldiers and workers would vote for Bolshevik or Left-SR motions, push for far more radical positions, whilst claiming to be SRs or Mensheviks but the Bolsheviks felt that this might change if the Presidium was properly representative.

The composition of the Democratic Conference maintained this thin veneer. Of the nearly 1800 delegates, although not all would attend throughout the entire assembly, the majority were either SRs or Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks numbered less than 250 delegates whilst the Socialist-Internationals and the Left-SRs had less than 100 delegates each. The Presidium was mainly composed of the Menshevik-SR bloc but there were representatives from each of the parties. Lenin was joined by Sverdlov, Kamenev, and Shliapnikov to represent the Bolsheviks, Mark Natanson and Isaak Shteinburg represented the Left-SRs, whilst Trotsky and Martov stood for the SIP. With a comparative look at the Petrograd Duma elections, the shifts in various soviets across Russia, the deep seated splits in the Mensheviks and the SRs, it was hardly representative of the changing political landscape. The Petrograd Soviet publicly made a standing invitation for Maria Spiridonova and Boris Kamkov to attend on behalf of the Left-SRs, seemingly an olive branch and a show of magnanimity, but it was little more than political theatre with the two still under threat of arrest from the Provisional Government if they were found in Petrograd. Despite their best efforts many of the moderate SR and Menshevik delegates had different ideas on the efficacy of the coalition with the non-socialist parties and in particular many SR delegates from the peasant soviets were shocked and frustrated by the sidelining of Chernov.

In the days just before the opening of the Conference, the various parties caucused their delegates to decide upon the course that should be plotted and delegates from the Bolsheviks, the Socialist-Internationalists, and the Union of Left Socialist Revolutionaries met in a Joint Caucus of the Left. There was general agreement with the Bolshevik position for compromise with the aim being the bringing down of the coalition-led Provisional Government in order to form some sort of all-socialist government - the question of how that government would be formed, either within the bounds of a future Constituent Assembly or within the All-Russian Soviet, remained a point of contention. Even within each party there was debate. Lenin preferred the revival of the slogan "All Power to the Soviets" but many were not as concerned with the form of government as its socialist character and Kamenev said, "The only possible course is for state power to be transferred to the democracy-not to the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, but to that democracy which is well enough represented here. We must establish a new government and an institution to which that government must be responsible". Similarly, among the Socialist-Internationalists Martov held the opinion of wanting the convening of a Constituent Assembly to be the parliamentary battleground on which socialism could be won whereas Trotsky felt that they were seeing his conception of Permanent Revolution being played out and the workers, soldiers, and poor peasants would have to continue the revolution beyond the scope of parliaments.

In the opulence of Alexandrinsky Theatre the Democratic Conference finally met and Kerensky entered to polite applause, ascending the stage to deliver his speech. He extended his hand in greetings to each of the Presidium members, being warmly received by Avksentiev and Tseretelli and the other moderate socialists alike. Shliapnikov extended his hand but withdrew it as Kerensky stepped forward, leaving the man standing there awkwardly. Lenin didn't even bother to look up from his notes. Undaunted, the Head of the Provisional Government stepped up to the rostrum. Kerensky regurgitated much of what he had said in Moscow a month before but it seemed like rambling platitudes ever since the events of Kornilov's attempted coup. Everyone wanted an explanation for his part in the chaotic events and after a series of hecklers Kerensky tried to assure his audience that he had no part in it. "Before they went to Kornilov they came to me and suggested that I take the same course." But the response from the hecklers was to question who "they" were, whether "they" still threatened the revolution, and why "they" weren't stopped before they backed Kornilov in the first place. A soldier delegate stepped unprompted up to the stage "You are the calamity of the nation!"

In the middle of his speech, Kerensky laid into the Bolsheviks, "Do not think to bait me as the Bolsheviks do! At a word I can make the railways stop. I am not powerless". Half of the hall applauded but others held an embarrassed silence. The left laughed openly. Any man who had to remind others that he was not powerless was, in fact, quite powerless. Other Ministers of the Provisional Government spoke but much like Kerensky their words held little substance. They had no answers to the economic crisis, they had nothing of value to say on the situation of the war except that it must continue to be fought. Various socialists spoke in either support for the coalition or in criticism. Trotsky responded directly to Kerensky, "Why does Kerensky occupy the place which he occupies today? A place was opened for Kerensky by the weakness and irresolution of the democracy. I have not heard a single speaker here who would take upon himself the unenviable honour of defending the directory or its president". Certainly Lenin didn't defend the Provisional Government and its unelected head. His was the most controversial speech, "The wavering of the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks and the increase in the number of internationalists splitting from their ranks proves one thing. This Conference represents not a majority of the revolutionary people of Russia but the remnants of the petty bourgeois compromisers. The elections in the Soviet and elsewhere proves as much".

The proceedings and deliberations continued for a week but the results of these talks were as confused as many had assumed they would be. Their packing of the hall with delegates allowed the SR-Menshevik clique to pass a motion supporting the coalition government but an amendment was also passed that such a government should exclude the Kadets. How could there be a motion that simultaneously supported a Liberal-Socialist coalition government but at the same time excluded the Liberals? The debates were fraught and bitter with many attacks being levied against the Bolsheviks and the Left-SR splitters. Tseretelli castigated the Bolsheviks as power-hungry and trying only to seize power. Yakov Sverdlov explained the Bolshevik position: "In struggling for the power in order to realise its program, our party has never desired and does not desire to seize the power against the organised will of the majority of the toiling masses of the country. We will take the power as the party of the soviet majority." Considering the steady leftward turn of the Soviets, it wasn't an empty promise.

The question of establishing the proceedings for a Constituent Assembly election was also hotly debated. Under the direction of Tseretelli, the intention of the SR-Menshevik clique was to form a Pre-Parliament, an unelected body formed of delegates to start the proceedings and open the way to Constituent Assembly elections. Outvoted, the left-wing couldn't prevent the Presidium of the Conference declaring that the Pre-Parliament would include capitalists and the propertied classes. For some, it just seemed like the only coherent decision made by the assembly was to form another self-appointed assembly. Outside the Conference, the far left parties met once again on the 21st. It was a heated debate but eventually a decision was made: the far left parties would refuse to participate in the Pre-Parliament. At the Conference itself, Trotsky gave the news, "The parties standing for a democracy of the working class, the soldiers and sailors, and the poor peasants of all of Russia refuse to participate in another unelected and unrepresentative organ of capitalist state power." The far left parties agreed on the 21st that they would form a bloc of their own whose sole aim was the transference of power to the All-Russian Soviet, with them at the head.

----

On 4 September Kerensky demanded the dissolution of all revolutionary committees that had arisen during the crisis, including the Committee for Struggle Against the Counterrevolution. That committee immediately met – in itself an act of civil disobedience – and bullishly expressed confidence that, given the continuing counterrevolutionary threat, such bodies would continue to operate. Recalcitrance from the grassroots like this, as well as the growing and dramatic splits between left and right wings of the Mensheviks and SRs, kept Lenin hopeful for possibilities for compromise, his recent postscript notwithstanding. Between 6 and 9 September, in ‘The Tasks of the Revolution’, ‘The Russian Revolution and Civil War’ and ‘One of the Fundamental Questions of the Revolution’, he maintained that the soviets could take power peacefully. He even granted to his political opponents a degree of respect for their recent endeavours, declaring that an alliance of Bolsheviks, Mensheviks and SRs in a soviet regime would make civil war impossible.
- October: The Story of the Russian Revolution by China Mieville

The Mensheviks and S.R.s, being the government bloc, would then agree (assuming that the compromise had been reached) to form a government wholly and exclusively responsible to the Soviets, the latter taking over all power locally as well. This would constitute the “new” condition. I think the Bolsheviks would advance no other conditions, trusting that the revolution would proceed peacefully and party strife in the Soviets would be peacefully overcome thanks to really complete freedom of propaganda and to the immediate establishment of a new democracy in the composition of the Soviets (new elections) and in their functioning.

Perhaps this is already impossible? Perhaps. But if there is even one chance in a hundred, the attempt at realising this opportunity is still worth while.

[...]

There may also be a third voice coming from among the supporters of Martov or Spiridonova, which would say: I am indignant, “comrades”, that both of you, speaking about the Commune and its likelihood, unhesitatingly side with its opponents. In one form or another, both of you side with those who suppressed the Commune. I will not undertake to campaign for the Commune and I cannot promise beforehand to fight in its ranks as every Bolshevik will do, but I must say that if the Commune does start in spite of my efforts, I shall rather help its defenders than its opponents.

The medley of voices in the “bloc” is great and inevitable, for a host of shades is represented among the petty-bourgeois democrats—from the complete bourgeois, perfectly eligible for a post in the government, down to the semi-pauper who is not yet capable of taking up the proletarian position. Nobody knows what will be the result of this medley of voices at any given moment.
- On Compromises by VI Lenin

The SR's had always tried to lock up their quarrels in the inner councils of the party, safe from the view of outsiders and their own rank and file. Hitherto only the controversy with the left wing had been publicized, and many branches in their ignorance of the true state of affairs had preserved something of the honeymoon spirit of March. So much greater the shock when the Kornilov affair like a surgeon's knife revealed the ravages of the cancer which had first manifested itself at the Third Congress but which had formed long before. Party members rubbed their eyes in amazement at Number 145 of the Delo Naroda, where the article published over Chernov's signature was a monument of political castigation. Then came Number 110 of the Volia Naroda, and their distress was complete. The Alexander Nevski district organization in St. Petersburg spoke for others besides itself when it confessed to having read the latest dispatches with "fear and torment in our souls," and then went on to lament the harm done to morale by these exchanges between "Babushka," Chernov, and Kerenski, all of whom were held in equal esteem.
- The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism by Oliver Radkey

It's necessary to talk somewhat about the divisions within the Socialist Revolutionaries. In our timeline, Chernov played a continued role of acceptable dissent within the SRs and openly criticised Kerensky. It was in part because of his respected position as a voice for the left of the party but still working within the establishment leadership that in early September many of the more rebellious Left-SRs publicly apologised to the SR Central Committee for their transgressions, delaying the split of the party. In this timeline, the split has happened and those like Kalegaev in Kazan don't come back into the fold of the main SR party and instead he uses his influence within Kazan to deepen the split in the party and offer refuge to Spiridonova and Boris Kamkov. The right-wing of the SRs in this timeline are panicking about the state of the party but trying to hide that and instead of offering an olive-branch to the disgruntled radicals in their number, which is what Chernov would have been useful for, they instead try to silence dissent and present a united front.

Although in retrospect the Executive Committees' decision to go along, temporarily, with the Directory appears to have been a particularly fateful step, it would obviously have been very difficult for the moderate socialists to have acted otherwise. Support for the course proposed by the Bolsheviks would have required the Mensheviks and SRs to repudiate their policies of the preceding six months and abandon their ideal of creating a democratic government representing all classes. It would have signified willingness on their part to form a new political regime and to take full responsibility for maintaining civil order, administering the economy, providing essential food and fuel supplies and services, and satisfying mounting mass demands for immediate social reform and peace; further, adoption of the Bolshevik resolution would have indicated the moderate socialists' readiness to attempt these tasks without the help of, indeed faced with certain opposition from, liberal political leaders, industrialists, and large landowners, as well as the military command. Finally, for the Mensheviks and SRs to have united with the Bolsheviks, as Kamenev and Riazanov eloquently advocated, would have meant forming an alliance with elements of dubious reliability whose political goals were often less compatible with their own than were those of the liberal bourgeoisie. If one takes into consideration the Bolsheviks' past behavior, coupled with the German military threat and the prevailing economic and social chaos, it is perhaps not so difficult to understand why the main body of Mensheviks and SRs, despite their by now almost universal disdain for Kerensky, resisted popular pressures for an immediate change in government.
- The Bolsheviks Come to Power by Alexander Rabinowitch

The Democratic Conference opened on the 14th of September, exactly a month after the State Conference, in the auditorium of the Alexandrinsky Theatre. The credentials of 1,775 representatives were accepted; about 1,200 were present at the opening. The Bolsheviks of course were in the minority, but in spite of all the tricks of the elective method, they constituted a very considerable group, which upon certain questions gathered around itself more than a third of the whole assembly.

Would it be suitable for a strong government to appear before a mere “private” conference of this sort? That question became a matter of enormous indecision in the Winter Palace, and of reflected excitements in the Alexandrinsky. In the long run the head of the government decided to show himself to the democracy. “He was met with applause,” says Shliapnikov, describing the arrival of Kerensky, “and went over to the praesidium to shake hands with those sitting at the table. We (the Bolsheviks) were sitting not far from each other, and when it came our turn, we glanced at each other and agreed not to extend our hands. A theatrical gesture across the table – I drew back from the hand offered me, and Kerensky with his hand extended, not meeting ours, passed along the table!” The head of the government got a like greeting on the opposite wing from the Kornilovists – and besides the Bolsheviks and the Kornilovists there were now no real forces left.
- The History of the Russian Revolution by Leon Trotsky

In our timeline, Lenin around this point still a fugitive, hiding in Finland and passing articles and letters to the Bolsheviks remaining in Petrograd. He's initially willing to compromise with other socialist parties but soon turns towards a much more revolutionary position and, frustrated at the Bolshevik Central Committee's moderation in his absence, he makes the decision to return to Petrograd regardless of the potential threat towards himself so he can make his case in person. Some historical analysis puts this turn away from moderation and cooperation as based on the conditions in southern Finland where the socialists were very strong. Obviously in this timeline Lenin is in Petrograd, he's spent a period in jail with the other left-wing socialists, and he's on the ground to understand the conditions in Petrograd itself a little better. Following this logic, in this timeline Lenin's perspective is one of "cooperate with the other revolutionary parties with the Bolsheviks as the leader of this alliance".

It is indicative of the amount of freewheeling debate within the Bolshevik organization in 1917 that even Lenin's new moderation was not accepted without opposition. By the time "On Compromises" was received by Bolshevik leaders in Petrograd, the All-Russian Executive Committees had formally rejected the Bolsheviks' August 31 declaration. To the editors of Rabochii put', the kind of "compromise" envisioned by Lenin seemed impracticable. One member of the editorial board, Grigorii Sokolnikov, later recalled that "On Compromises" was initially rejected for publication. Upon Lenin's insistence, the decision was reconsidered, and the article was published on September 6.
- The Bolsheviks Come to Power by Alexander Rabinowitch

It was no surprise that the overrepresented moderates had it: the vote went 766 to 688 for coalition, with 38 abstentions. However, straight after this passed delegates had to discuss two competing amendments. The first insisted that those Kadets and others complicit in the Kornilov Affair be excluded from the coalition; the second that the entirety of the Kadet party, as counterrevolutionaries, be excluded rout court. The Bolsheviks, along with Martov, sensed an opportunity. They spoke for both amendments, no matter that they were not complementary. There was a tense, confused debate. But those who were deemed to have collaborated with Kornilov had come to be so roundly despised that when the votes came, both amendments passed. This meant the altered proposal had to be voted on anew. As doubly amended, it declared in favour of coalition with the bourgeoisie, but now on the basis that this should be without the participation of the Kornilovites, including implicated Kadets; and, incoherently, that it should be without any Kadets at all.
- October: The Story of the Russian Revolution by China Mieville

Thus four days of the most intense discussion and debate had fully revealed the fundamental difference of opinion among "democratic groups" but had settled absolutely nothing regarding the makeup of the future government. The relationship of the socialists to the government was, if anything, more confused than it had been before the contradictory voting of September 19. That such a situation could not continue was abundantly clear to the Presidium of the Democratic State Conference; upon its insistence, before adjournment of the session of September 19, conference delegates resolved not to disperse until mutually acceptable conditions for the formation, functioning, and program of a new government were somehow agreed upon.
- The Bolsheviks Come to Power by Alexander Rabinowitch

On the 20th of September, the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks called a party conference consisting of the Bolshevik delegates to the Democratic Conference, the members of the Central Committee itself, and of the Petrograd committee. As spokesman for the Central Committee, Trotsky proposed the slogan of boycotting the Pre-Parliament. The proposal was met with decisive resistance by some (Kamenev, Rykov, Riazanov) and with sympathy by others (Sverdlov, Joffé, Stalin). The Central Committee, having divided in two on the debated question, had found itself compelled, in conflict with the constitution and traditions of the party, to submit the question to the decision of the conference. Two spokesmen, Trotsky and Rykov, took the floor as champions of the opposing views. It might seem, and for the majority it did seem, that this hot debate was purely tactical in character. In reality the quarrel revived the April disagreements and initiated the disagreements of October. The question was whether the party should accommodate its tasks to the development of a bourgeois republic, or should really set itself the goal of conquering the power. By a majority of 77 votes against 50, this party conference rejected the slogan of boycott. On September 22nd, Riazanov had the satisfaction of announcing at the Democratic Conference in the name of the party that the Bolsheviks would send their representatives to the Pre-Parliament, in order “in this new fortress of compromisism to expose all attempts at a new coalition with the bourgeoisie.” That sounded very radical, but it really meant substituting a policy of oppositional exposure for a policy of revolutionary action.

Lenin’s April theses had been appropriated by the whole party; but upon every big question that arose, the March attitudes would swim out from under them. And these attitudes were very strong in the upper layers of the party, which in many parts of the country had only just now divided from the Mensheviks. Lenin was able to take his part in this argument only after the event. On the 23rd of September he wrote: “We must boycott the Pre-Parliament. We must go out into the soviets of workers, soldiers, and peasants’ deputies, go out into the trade unions, go out in general to the masses. We must summon them to the struggle. We must give them a correct and clear slogan: To drive out the Bonapartist gang of Kerensky with its fake Pre-Parliament ... The Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries even after the Kornilov events refused to accept our offer of compromise ... Ruthless struggle against them! Ruthless expulsion of them from all revolutionary organizations! ... Trotsky was for the boycott. Bravo, Comrade Trotsky! Boycottism was defeated in the faction of the Bolsheviks who attended the Democratic Conference. Long live the boycott!”
- The History of the Russian Revolution by Leon Trotsky

The issue of boycotting the Pre-Parliament was one that raged within the Bolsheviks. The more parliamentary figures, such as Kamenev, supported engaging in these sorts of bodies whilst the likes of Lenin saw them largely as a distraction. In this timeline, the existence of such an obvious and real possibility of cooperation amongst the far left parties and Lenin being there to argue in person gives the far left parties the confidence to keep the boycott of the Pre-Parliament. Lenin would say around this time, "Either a Soviet government or Kornilovism. There is no middle course". However, in this timeline it is not the Bolsheviks going it alone but a conglomerate of revolutionary forces, strengthened and emboldened by each other. The Menshevik-SR clique are finding their grip on the narrative to be slipping and their rivals emerging stronger.

Lenin's attitude toward the Democratic Conference was ambiguous. As before the July uprising, he again followed an equivocal tactic. On September 26 he publicly repeated his proposal for a compromise soviet government composed of Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries ("probably that is the last chance of a peaceful development of the revolution") but earlier, on September 13, he had said in a secret letter to the party's Central Committee: "It would be the greatest mistake ta believe that our compromise proposaI has not yet been rejected, that the 'Democratie Conference' might still accept it." In the same letter Lenin advocated immediate armed rebellion. "It would be the greatest mistake, the worst kind of parliamentary idiocy [!] on our part to regard the Democratic Conference as a parliament, for even if it had proclaimed itself the sovereign parliament of the revolution, it would have nothing to decide: the power of decision lies elsewhere, in the workers quarters of Petrograd and Moscow." In dramatic elections in these cities during early September, the Bolsheviks for the first time had won a majority in the soviets. Now Lenin's renewed call for soviet power, which after the Kornilov putsch had been a purely tactical maneuver, led directly to preparations for the Bolshevik takeover. "For this reason," Trotsky wrote, "the slogan 'Power to the soviets' was not removed from the agenda a second time, but it was given a new meaning: all power to the Bolshevik soviets. In this formulation the slogan finally ceased to be a call for peaceful development. The party approaches armed uprising through the soviets and in the name of the soviets."
- The Soviets: The Russian Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers Councils by Oskar Anweiler

It should be added that in the wake of the Democratic State Conference, right Bolsheviks also supported the early convocation of a Congress of Soviets and paid lip service to the slogan "All Power to the Soviets." The essential difference between "Leninists in spirit," like Trotsky, and right Bolsheviks, like Kamenev, was that while the former looked to a soviet congress to transfer power to a government of the extreme left pledged to immediate peace and a radical program of internal change, the latter viewed a Congress of Soviets as a vehicle for building a broader, stronger alliance of "democratic groups," which might, at the most, form a caretaker allsocialist coalition government, pending convocation of the Constituent Assembly.

Hence the central issue that divided the party leadership in Petrograd as the Democratic State Conference drew to a close was not the organization of an immediate popular uprising, which everyone in the coterie of high Bolsheviks privy to Lenin's most recent recommendations seems to have rejected categorically, or the immediate convocation of a Congress of Soviets, which all accepted. Rather, it was whether to stage a formal walkout from the Democratic State Conference and whether to participate in the Preparliament, the former in its last hours and the latter in the process of formation and scheduled to open on September 23. To the Kamenev faction, taking advantage of the end of the Democratic State Conference and the proceedings of the Preparliament to discredit coalition politics and to maintain alliances with wavering elements in the Menshevik-SR camp was an essential counterpart to the consolidation, at the coming Congress of Soviets, of the strongest possible broad socialist bloc. Meanwhile, to party leaders of Trotsky's persuasion, demonstratively withdrawing from the Democratic State Conference and boycotting the Preparliament constituted the necessary prelude to utilizing a Congress of Soviets to break decisively with conciliatory groups, transfer power to the soviets, and strike out anew on a revolutionary path with whatever other genuinely revolutionary groups were willing to go along.
- The Bolsheviks Come to Power by Alexander Rabinowitch
 
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Pronouns
he/him
Someone suggested that I create a glossary of the political parties so people won't feel so drowned in names and acronyms and I thought it was a fantastic idea.

Kadets
The Kadets, or the Constitutional Democratic Party, were the main party of liberal capitalism in Russia, formed from a merger of various liberal and conservative democratic groups opposed to authoritarian Tsarism. Orlando Figes in A People's Tragedy descibes its founding in 1905: "The manifesto concentrated almost exclusively on political reforms — a legislative parliament elected on the basis of universal suffrage, guarantees of civil rights, the democratization of local government, and more autonomy for Poland and Finland — not least because the left and right wings of the party were so divided on social issues, the land question above all. But perhaps this concentration was to be expected in a party so dominated by the professional intelligentsia, a party of professors, academics, lawyers, writers, journalists, teachers, doctors, officials and liberal zemstvo men. Of its estimated 100,000 members, nobles made up at least 60 per cent."

Through 1917 it is the Kadets that provide the majority of the members of the Provisional Government including the first head of the government Prince Lvov. They support the continuation of the War to align themselves with France and Britain and the establishment of a democratic parliament along the lines of the their international allies' systems but they fear the unrest and chaos that an election could potentially bring so they delay any move to actually making an elected parliament a reality in order to maintain power. As the events shift and the Kadets' control over politics drifts away from them, more and more of their members become supportive of a military solution to prevent any far left revolutionary uprising with some supporting Kornilov.

Trudoviks
The Trudovik (Labour) Group were a small agrarian party who after 1905 distinguished themselves from the SRs mainly because of their willingness to continue to participate in Duma elections when the SRs boycotted. Effectively, they operated as a slightly more conservative group attached to the much larger Socialist Revolutionaries. Kerensky ostensibly came from this grouping. They collaborated closely with the Popular Socialists, a small group of dissident SRs.

Socialist Revolutionary Party
The Socialist Revolutionary Party, SRs or sometimes Essers, were an agrarian focused socialist party that found its origins in the politics of the Narodniks. Oliver Radkey in The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism describes their perspective and focus: "it was the peasantry that engaged the attention of the Populists. They were lovers of the people, and most of the Russian people were peasants. Furthermore, they wanted to make a revolution, and without peasant support no revolution could possibly succeed." They emerged from the union of several Narodnik, populist, groups under a non-Marxist socialist programme with a focus on the peasantry and the specific conditions of an agrarian dominated Russia.

The Party is ostensibly a socialist organisation, wanting the redistribution of land and, showing the influence of Marxism, the workers' control of production. In reality, over the course of 1917 they hesitate when it comes to the question of power even as their party grows in influence to become the largest party in Russia. The party has great divides over the legitimacy of the war and it is these divides, along with the hesitations and prevarications of the leadership, that lead to a decisive split and the formation of the Union of Left Socialist Revolutionaries. The split has led to some measure of panic from the right-wing of the SRs and a sense that they will best remain united and strong by keeping the left-wing and centre-left of the party quiet.

Union of Left Socialist Revolutionaries
The ULSRs are described in chapter 8 as "Formed by those who had been expelled from the SRs for their support of the violent July movement and the remnants of the tiny Union of Social Revolutionaries Maximalists, a section of the SRs who had already split from the party after the 1905 revolution, its programme was almost Bolshevik in its demands. They found immediate support from many of the soldier SRs, who were frustrated with the intransigence of the right-wing leadership of the party and the capitulation to the officers, and amongst the more politically volatile peasant soviets, who felt abandoned by the party in the wake of Chernov's political defeat."

Orlando Figes describes the Left-SRs in A People's Tragedy as this: "Their three major policies — a socialist government based on the Soviet, the immediate confiscation of the gentry’s estates and an end to the war — could not have been better tailored to suit the demands of the SR rank and file, the mass of the peasants and soldiers, though such was their disillusionment with Kerensky and Chernov that many of them abandoned the SRs altogether and moved directly to the Bolsheviks." In this timeline, they're composed of the most radical of the Socialist Revolutionaries who emerge from a very bitter split and support the concept of a collaboration with other far left parties such as the Bolsheviks with the aim of forming a Soviet government.

Bolsheviks
If you need to learn more about the origins of the Bolsheviks and their perspectives then the interlude after Chapter 3 offers a brief summary of their history.

Mensheviks
Alexander Rabinowitch in Prelude to Revolution describes the Marxist organisations of Russian: "the Marxist Social Democratic movement was already split by differences between the more orthodox Mensheviks and the ideologically flexible, more radically inclined Bolsheviks". What an "orthodoxy" meant in reality was that the Mensheviks understood the development of history with a very dogmatic "stagist" theory that postulated that first society must go from feudalism into capitalism before it could finally develop into socialism. As a result, they spend much of 1917 hoping that the Kadets would step up to the plate and form a coherent parliamentary democracy of liberal capitalism within which they hoped to play the founding role of a socialist opposition.

The Mensheviks, like pretty much every party, were divided on how to politically engage with the war. Few Mensheviks were patriotic or nationalist enough to advocate for the support of an aggressive war with annexation aims but most supported a defensive position against the potential threat of German Militarism and in support of the revolutionary gains of February and the possibility of a parliamentary government. The Internationalist-Mensheviks formed around Julius Martov, calling for the immediate end of the war, but became estranged from the bulk of the party and leading to a split.

Mezhraiontsy
The Mezhraiontsy, or the Inter-District Group, were a small section of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party that didn't side with either the Mensheviks nor the Bolsheviks. In A People's Tragedy, Orlando Figes describes them prior to their entry into the Bolsheviks, "The Mezhraionka, or Inter-District group, was a faction of SD Internationalists with good contacts in the Petrograd garrison. Its importance stemmed less from the size of its following (which was certainly fewer than 4,000 members) than from the stature of its leaders. It was really no more than a collection of brilliant generals without an army." In this timeline, they never join the Bolsheviks and instead merge with Martov's faction of the Mensheviks to form the Socialist-Internationalist Party.

Socialist-Internationalist Party
The formation of the SIP is described in Chapter 3: "Martov met with Trotsky, two titans of the Social Democratic movement in Russia. They had been allies and rivals throughout their time as revolutionaries, they had both edited the Russian exile newspaper Iskra with Lenin and Plekhanov. Now they found themselves aligned, both vehemently against the war and the participation of socialists in the coalition government and both unwilling to submit to the locomotive that was Lenin in the Bolshevik Party. Gorky dismissed them both as "scoundrels" but they were scoundrels united in their cause and soon Trotsky's tiny Mezhraiontsy were merged with Martov's faction to form the Socialist-Internationalist Party (Sotsialistichesko-Internatsialisticheskaya Partiya). It remained small but its members were well recognised, the great orator Trotsky, the diligent Martov, the clever Lunacharsky, Uritsky, Larin, Riazanov, Joffe. Where they lacked the depth and spread of the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, they made up for it with their powerful profile and plethora of well-known revolutionaries."

They remain small throughout 1917 but an important alternative for workers, soldiers, or intelligentsia who are fed up with the hesitations of the Mensheviks but cannot quite stomach the more directly radical Bolsheviks. They are very much a junior party of the far left revolutionaries but their leadership, particularly Martov and Trotsky, are well known and well respected by workers who are knowledgeable of the long struggles of Russian socialists. If there is any division in the party it is between the more cautious Martov and the more ambitious and eager Trotsky.
 

Aaron Fox

Member
Actually, there are only two ways that the Russian Republic can stay alive in Russia: 1) after the establishment of the Republic, immediately peace out of WW1 or 2) ensure that they've got all the royal tea warehouses. If the Whites can't ensure they've got a reliable tea supply, then they literally can't win. If there is anything that Russians love more than vodka, it is tea. I kid you not.
 
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